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Great Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 5 November
191k, and two days later landed troops on Turkish soil at the head of
the Persian Gulf. Indian Expeditionary Force 'D', commanded by General
Sir Arthur Barrett, quickly captured the port of Basra and expanded
their hold to encompass the Shatt-al-Arab as far up-river as Kurna, at
the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. An expedition up the
Karun River into Persia secured the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's fields,
and the original instructions of Force 'D' were fulfilled. Their
orders had been to maintain the British interests and alliances with
the Gulf sheikhs, show the Arabs that Britain meant to support them
against the Turks, and consolidate the oil fields and pipeline. By
April 1915, another division was added to Force 'D' and its new commander,
Genenal Sir John Nixon, arrived in Mesopotam.ta with orders to protect
the oil supply, establish British control in the province of Basra, and
prepare plans for a possible future offensive on Baghdad.
From April 1915 to April 1916, the lack of direction, policy and
cooperation between Nixon, India and London resulted In the total lack
of a suitable logistical framework in Mesopotamia, and only disaster
could result. It is the purpose of this paper to examine how the course
of Force 'D' altered from its original purpose, what the effects of that
change were, and to apportion responsibility for the drift and the
calamity that ensued because of it • This paper will also attempt to
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AUTHOR'S NOTE
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Before undertaking the study of the British-Indian campaign in Meso-
potamia, it is important to understand why Great Britain should become
involved In hostilities with Turkey in the first place. With her re-
sources committed to such a great extent in France, and the struggle
there far from sure, Britain seemed to have little reason to enter into
a second front far from home. Nevertheless, Britain went to war in the
Middle East in November l9l Li, following Turkish aggression against RussIa.
Within a week of the bombing of Sevastopol, Indian Expeditionary Force
'D' began operations against Fao at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab. The
landIng there took place within twenty-four hours of the official Brit-
ish declaration of war. Since the operations could not have been planned
arid executed overnight, it is obvious that this force had been committed
to action in the Persian Gulf for some time. This quick action confirms
that Mesopotamia was important enough to require British invasion. Why
should Force 'D' have been committed here rather than elsewhere on the
frontier, such as Palestine or Syria? The original plans, dating back
as far as 25 August, were for the India Office to prepare a force 'for
safeguarding the refinery in case of an attempt being made to interfere
with it" and to despatch two gunboats to keep the Shatt-al-Arab open
'Memo, no. M011l.96, ADM to 10, 25 Aug lLl, FO/37l/2l36/3OLI-9.
2for operations.
The protection of the refinery of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on
Abadan Island, at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, has enera1ly been
regarded as the main reason that the British took such an interest in
the Persian Gulf during the war. 'In idde11 Hart' view the Force's
objectives were priiarily strategic. In 191 11. , the Abadan oil stores and
Persian petroleum fields of the Gulf were "essential" to Great Britain;
I.E.F.'D' was despatched in order to secure them from Turkish attack.'1
From the point of view of the Admiralty, which needed this Jacility as
a supply base for naval fuel and toluol (for the manufacture of explo-
sives2), this is a logical reason. In reality this was not the main
reason, although 'Hart's interpretation has since become part of English
folklore.' 3
 Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary to the India Office,
said on 26 September 19111. that an operation in the Persian Gulf area
would be 'ostensibly to protect the oil installation but in reality to
notify the Turks that we mean .business and to the Arabs that we are
ready to support them.' 11 This Is confirmed bythe fact that plans for
the actual protection of the refinery, pipeline and oil fields were not
finalised before 22 October l9l5 and. even those plans were not put into
effect. Rather, in February 1916, the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir
1S. Cohen, British Policy in Mesopotamia, 1903-191k, (London, 1976)
p. 299.
2N. Kent, Oil and Empire, (London, 1976), p. 119.
3Cohen, p. 299.
lip Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914-1918, (Oxford,1965),
p. 43
5Report of Departmental Committee of the Defence of the Persian
Oil Fields, 22 Oct 15, IO/L/P&S/lO/487/P.3665.
3Beauchamp Duff, stated that 'the manner in which the oil fields should
be protected must be left entirely to the discretion of the General
Officer Comniarrling, Force 'D'.' 1 This is hardly a comprehensive battle
plan for the operations of an entire theatre.
The British involved themselves In Mesopotainla for three basic
reasons, only one of which concerns Admiralty oil; they were also con-
cerned with the expanding foreign, especially but not exclusively Ger-
man, economic interests in the Persian gulf, where Great Britain had
long enjoyed a most-favoured status. Finally, Britain was striving to
maintain good Anglo-Arab relations. Oil security and political and
economic considerations weighed heavily in British policy, but did not
occupy British attentions in the years 191 11_l916 as much as did the
fear of an Arab-led holy war against the British. However, in the two
years preceding the war the threat of German intervention in the area
preoccupied the Foreign Office.
The major German incursion toward the Persian Gulf came in the
form of the Baghdad Railway. This was by no means the only German in-
terest in the area, but it foreshadowed the entrance of German commerce
on an ever-Increasing, and perhaps all-encompassing, scale. Sir Edward
Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, later wrote
What Germany really wanted was a place in a temperate climate
and a fertile land, which could be peopled by her white pop-
ulation and be German, part of the German empire and under
the German flag. . . . These were the inexorable facts of the
situation, and if the talk about a 'place in the sun' was
translated Into terms of practical application and of fact,
It became two thins-Walfisch Bay n southwest AfrIc and
the Baghdad Railway.
1
Tel. no. P.717, Duff to Chamberlain, Ii. Feb i6, IO/L/P&S/lO/487.
E. Grey, Twen-five Years, (New York, 192.5), vol. 1, p. 118.
4Germany viewed the completion of the railway line from Berlin to Bagh-
dad in 1916 as a thread tying together a future 'political and economic
,1federation which would establish Germany as the major power of Nit-
teleuropa, stretching from Germany, through Austria-Hungary and. Bul-
garia to the Ottoman Empire in a monopoly that would secure Germany's
political, economic and military future.
Before the war, the Baghdad line was to te a commercial venture.
'The Baghdad Railway project, or, to give its official title, "l.a So-
cit Imperiàle Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Baghdad", was definitely
launched in 1903 by a diplomatic agreement, dated 5 March, between the
Turkish Government and a syndicate of Germans.' 2 The railway's aim was
'to divert the Levantine, Indian and Far Rastern trade from the sea
lanes to London overland to the Reich. '3 It was this diversion of trade
routes that worried the British about Mesopotamia. German money sup-
ported both the Baghdad Railway Company and the Turkish Anatolian Rail-
way Company. Railway lines had existed since the turn of the century
ectending east from Constantinople, and the proposed Baghdad line was
to be built as an extension east of Konia, some 300 miles south-east
of the Turkish capital. From Konia it would pass through the Taurus
Mountains to Alexandretta, Aleppo and Mosu]. to Baghdad. 4 Work on the
line proceeded from both ends, but it was slower roni Baghdad because
Fischer, War df Illusions, tr. by Marian Jackson, (London, 1975)
p. 240.	 - ________
2M Jastrow, The War and the Baghdad Railway, (Thiladelphia, 1917),
p. 82.
3W.W.Gottlieb, Studies in the Secret Diplomacy during the First
World War, (London, 1957), p. 22.
4F.W.Halsey, Literary Digest History of tho World War, (New York,
1919, vol. 8, pp. 8-9, 14.
5of the difficulties of transporting materials up the Tigris from Basra,
Native craft had to be used extensively on the Tigris owing to a lack
of dependable motorised craft to navigate the winding and uncertain
river. 1
 The link between Nisibin, some 300 miles east of Aleppo, and
Baghdad, another 300 miles south-east, was incomplete in 1914 and not
projected to be finished before the end of 1916. The whole line between
Baghdad and Constantinople was intended to be opened a year later2 af-
ter the construction of two tunnels through the mountains.
The exact role of the Baghdad Railway in pre-war politics is a
subject of speculation. Many sources cite it as a major part of fler-
man foreign policy and a project that excited the imagination of the
German people. Even if its origin was strictly commercial, its devel-
opment was highly political. Arthur von Gwinner, Director of the Deut-
sche Bank (which financed German participation in the line) pointed
out to the Kaiser that the Baghdad Railway 'was not a commercial under-
taking but a political one, since it would reflect the position of the
German Empire, its prestige in the world, its financial power and eco-
nomic exiansion.' 3 If one accepts the idea that German policy was to
create an empire through 'Mitteleuropa' ,then the railway becomes a sym-
bol of German imperialism and can easily be seen as a major factor in
increasing tensions between the European Powers before the war. Fritz
Fischer states.
	 -
1Tel. no. 430, Birdwood to IndGovt, 8 Apr 14, F0/37l/2131/15587.
3F. Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power, and German War Aims', in
H.W.Koch, ed., The Origins of the First World War, (London, 197 2), p. 95.
6In 1914 Mitteleuropa was seen essentially as a hegemony on
the Continent and as a foundation for her as a World Power
alongside the other World Powers, since the control of the
main arteries of traffic in all directions and, of the most
industrialised part of the world 1
 that is Europe, would make
the German Empire equal to the powerful countries of Kmer-
ica, Russia and the British Empire, jn extent of territory,
in size of population and resources,
This is emphasised by early German commercial ventures in the Middle
Bast. The original plans for the line's construction through the Otto-
man Empire called for a route through Persia, but this was blocked by
Russia in a 19].]. agreement. A similar attempt to build a line to Alex-
andretta met French resistance. Thus, Germany took the central route
to Baghdad, that Indirectly threatened both Russia and France, and con-
fronted the British directly.
This threat expanded further when the contract between Germany and
Turkey was made public. 'One of the articles In the convention of 1902-
1903 . . . stipulated that the road was to be used by the Turkish Gov-
ernment for military transportation, and the German company had to
pledge itself to build military stations along the route.' 2
 Should
the line be completed, and these outposts be constructed alongside it,
then Germany 'should have, even in a future war, all necessary raw
materials--by mea of the Baghdad Railway--without the enemy being
able to hinderhe.' 3
 German political parties, such as the Young
Liberals, envisaged 'an economic federation, a so-called "central Euro-
pean customs union" which included the German Reich, Austria-Hungary,
1Fischer World Policy', p. 125.
2Jastrow, p. 134.
3Dr. P. Rohrbach, lecture, 'Germany and the Middle East', in Ham-
burger Fremdenblatt, 3 Dec 15, IO/L/P&S/l0/101/B221.
7and. the Balkans, with German hegemony being silently taken for granted.'1
The planned confederation had offensive as well as defensive military
significance. Von der Go].tz saw early in the war that a completed
Baghdad Railway would be vital as a supply line in an invasion of ypt,
or perhaps even India. 2 'A safe position in the interior of Asia Minor
gave he railwa unique strategic value for the imminent struggle with
Britain. '3 GIven that the Ottoman Empire was a declining Power, the
establishment of German imperial aims toward Turkey and the Middle East
was a cause for deep concern among the other European Powers. Should
the Ottoman Empire collapse, Germany was in a key position to profit
most from its fall. 'In London, Dr. Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche
Bank, during negotiations over the Baghdad Railway, implied that an ac-
tual partition of Asia Minor was under consideration.
This possibility of Turkish dismemberment struck close to British
Interests In Mesopotamla, especially south of Baghdad. Britain was
sure that once the railway was completed, Basra and the Persian Gulf
were the next logical extensions of the line. The British saw that
this could lead to the establishment of German political infLuence, as
well as the possibility of German military or naval posts on the Gulf.
The Foreign Office wanted British participation in the construction of
an extension to Basra as soon as possible, so they approached the German
1Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 232.
2U. Truinpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, (Princeton, 1968),
p. 29]..
3Gottlieb, p. 22.
H.S.V.Corrtgan, 'German-Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of
Wars A Reassessment', Past and Present, no. 36, April 1967, p. 1k5.
8and Turkish Governments to negotiate for British cooperation in the
area. 'The general idea of the negotiations on the Baghdad Railway
was that the Germans should cede the southern section of the railway
to us, and that we should consent to a 14 per cent. increase in Turkish
customs' 1wrote Grey. Talks in mid-1912 centred on the amount of con-
trol the British would be able to exercise over the construction and
operation of the line. The Foreign Office originally requested to par-
ticipate financially in the railway' s construction, bit on 18 July 1912
proposed to the Ottoman Government that they were 'prepared to withdraw
their request for British participation in the railway from Baghdad to
Bussorah, if a satisfactory agreement is arrived at on other points.'2
In order to ensure 'that British interests of whatever character were
fully safeguarded', Sir Edward Grey told Tewfik Pasha, in London to
negotiate for the Ottoman Government, that Britain wanted two represen-
tatives on the board of any company that undertook to build the Baghdad-
Basra railway,i.e., fifty per cent. control. Grey mentioned at the
same time that the British had 'consistently maintained that a satis-
factory settlement of the Baghdad Railway question was a necessary con-
dition of their assent to an increase in Turkish customs duties.' In
spite of this threat, arid the fact that Germany needed additional cap-.
ital to construct the line, Turkey refused to agree to the British con-
siderations, which amounted to half-British control of a railroad in
1 .	-	 -grey, vol. 1, p, 214.5.
2Merno, no number, Grey to Tewfik Pasha, 18 Jul 12, IO/L/P&S/1O/
60/10135.
3Ibid.
9which they had no investment and. which operated totally within the con-
fines of the Ottoman Empire and not directly in a British sphere of
influence.
Talks resumed In 1913, and in June l9l11 the British and. Germans
agreed on a convention 'destined to prevent all cause of misunderstand-
ing' 1
 between the two countries in regard to the railway. Britain got
her two directors on the board of the proposed Baghdad-Basra rail pro-
ject, plus the controlling voice in any line from Basra to the Gulf.
In return for this, the British promised not 'to encourage' the German
venture, as the Germans wanted the clause phrased, but 'to do nothing
to duiscourage' the advance of the Baghdad Railway. 2 Prince Llchnowsky,
German Ambassador to London, claimed that Germany 'achieved more than
the founders of the railway had dreamed of. . . . I succeeded in ob-
taining Basra as the terminus, though we had already given up hope of
It.' 3
 Britain's Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation tompany, plying
their steamship trade between Basra and Baghdad, received a guarantee
that no German firm would compete on that route, although the German
company of Wonckhaus continued to operate In competition with them on
the Karun River into Persia and at other points around the Gulf. This
Anglo-German agreement followed a F'ranco-German pact signed in February
19111.
 concerning French railway construction in Syria which set out
spheres of influence in the area for France and Germany and guaranteed
1German-British Convention, Baghdad Railway, 16 Jun 11i, IO/L/P&S/
10/14.15/2311.1.
2Thid
3J. Rohi, 19111.g Delusion or Design, (London, 1977), p. 98.
German British Convention, Baghdad Railway.
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non-interference within those spheres.'
Although the Anglo-German agreement guaranteed a British voice in
the affairs of the German-controlled railway company, it also guaran-
teed a German economic foothold in the area heretofore predominantly
British. Britain had been the source of sixty per cent. of the Meso-
potamian imports in the pre-war era and controlled some thirty to forty
per cent, of the imports into Asiatic Turkey. 2 Still, Germans expanded
their share of the Persian Gulf trade through 1913-14 and planned an
even further business growth. 'The Berlin-Baghdad line, the embodiment
of Drang to the Middle East, was reaching out for the copper of the Tau-
rus, the oil of Kerkuk, the tobacco, wool, cotton, grain and fruits of
Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, and one of the richest markets in the world
for German manufactures.' 3 Using the shipping firm of Wonckhaus, and
the Hamburg-Amerika line, Germany traded drugs, milway material, cot-
ton goods, woollen goods,lass, liquors, paper, arms and ammunition, for
Gulf exports of poppy seed, linseed, sesame, gum, wool, almonds, shells,
intestines, tobacco, carpets, opium, dates and oil,4 In addition, Ger-
many expanded her trade into the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Some Ger-
mans brought their own businesses and some came with the railroad, both
attempting to extend German services and influence throughout the Em-
pire. When, for example, in March 1914, the Vali (governor) of Basra
asked that suggestions be made by European firms for city improvements,
'Minute by Alwyn Parker, Board of Trade(B0T) to FO, 27 Feb 14,
F0/371/2131/95.53.
2Letter, no number, Stanley (B0T) to Parker, 11 Jul 14, FO/371/
2136/31713.
3Gottlieb, p. 22.
4'German competition in Arabistan and Persia', I0/L/P&S/lO/336.
1].
British representatives found that Germans had already begun surveys
of the area to study such projects as tramways, electric lighting, etc.
Mesopotamia 'seemed destined to afford a stage for full German pene-
].tration.'
It was not only the expanding German interests that worried Bri-
tain. Austria-Hungary and Italy both claimed mining rights in Asia
Minor, 2aM the Russians in northern Persia seemed to come into increas-
irg friction with the British. Britain and Russia had drawn up spheres
of Influence in a 1907 agreement which cut Persia roughly into three
sections, the Russian trade was in the north and the British in the
south and Persian Gulf, with a neutral zone between the two. 'The Anglo-
Russian convention reconciled the long-standing differences between the
two empires, arid Britain's old enemy became her quasi-ally.' 3 'By par-
titioning Persia re prevented Germany from advancing the railway from
Baghdad overland to Teheran and also thwarted the plan of .. . . Russia
for a trans-Persia railway. ' Even so, the British position was not
stable. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf reported to India
in late 1913 that 'Russian influence has steadily increased In the Rus-
sian zone, and is now admittedly predominant . . . both commerciafly
and. politically' in the capital of Teheran, and that Britain must be
on guard against 'the wedge of Russian influence driven down the Karun',5
1S.H.Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, (London, 1953), p. 66.
2Tel, no. 133, Buchanan to Grey, 5 Nay lLi, FO/371/2].311j20880.
3W.D.Pulestofl, 	 Command in the World War, (London, 1934),pl7.
Thid., p. 18.	 -	 ____
5Tel. no. 3713, Cox to IndGov-t, 7 Dec 13, I0/L/P&S/10/]-33/231.5.
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the river that meets the Shatt-al-Arab at Mohámmerah. Likewise 1 the
Russians feared British encroachment in the northern sphere when the
Admiralty gained a major share of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a move
which was hailed in Russia as 'equal, in the disastrous nature of its
effect on Russia, to an unsuccessful war."
It was the oil question that was the second major reason for Brit-
ish interest in Mesopotainia, although their investment in oil there
was limited. Although the British attempted to gain oil rights through-
out Mesopotamia, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and its fields in south
Persia were the focal point of British interests.? This company had
been forned in 1901 by W. K. D'Arcy, and he gained from the Persian
Government in May of that year 'special and exclusive privilege to
search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry
away, and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalte, and ozokerite through-
out the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of 60 ypars. '3
This all-British company seemed a perfect source of supply of fuel to
the Royal Navy which, In the immediate pre-war years, was converting its
ships from coal to oil as a means of power. In January 1913 the First
Sea Lord directed the War Staff to set about finding a steady source
of supply and reserve for the Navy, and to set out a projection of needs
in both peace and war. Churchill pointed out that since the 'basis of
our whole defensive policy Is the command of the sea' then 'it may be
assumed that for a purpose so vital as the supply of oil to the Fleet
'Letter no. 191, Buchanan to Grey, 211. Jun 111, I0/L/P&S/l0/410/2753.
2For a full survey of this subject, see M. Kent, Oil and Empire,
and H. Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, l910-l928,(ic1ori,1976).
3Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Concession, 28 May 1901, ADM/116/
3806/12053.
13
in time of war' 1 price would be no object, yet a reliable source of
supply would be necessary, no matter what the cost • While oil was avail-
able from Burma, Texas, Mexico, California, Roinania, Borneo and Trini-
dad, 2
 none of these sources offered the advantage of being controlled
by the British Government.
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company courted Admiralty interest, claiming
impending financial troubles. Even though the Persian fields were suc-
cessful('a bore-hole seldom being completed without yielding oil' 3) the
Company inftrmed the Admiralty in October 1913 that in order to exploit
the fields and expand the operations, a large investment was necessary
from an outside source. They hinted that they could sell a major share
to some foreign company and get the capital 'by availing ourselves of
the offers which have been, and are still being, pressed upon us from
certain quarters.' 4 If this were to happen, however, Admiralty inter-
ests would suffer and total British control of the fields would be lost,
'neither of which contingencies will occur if the Government will come
to a prompt decision. '5 The Admiralty hesitated while awaiting an of-
ficial survey they had commissioned by dmira1 Sir E. Slade, which
reached them in December 1913. The report stated that the Anglo-Per-.
sian Company could, with the output of the fields around Maidan-i-Naph-.
tun alone, 'supply the Admiralty with 500,000 tons of fuel in the year
'Memo, no number, First Sea Lord to War Staff, 8 Jan 13, ADM/116/
1219/4013.
2Memo, no number, War Staff to First Sea Lord, no date, ADM/116/
1219/4013.
3Extmct from 'Oil News, 4 Oct 13, ADM/1l6/3806/26644.




1917-18 and to continue that supply annually for the following 17 years. 1
In addition, the other fields looked just as promising and. the possibil-
ity of oil production on the Persian Gulf itself at Mohammerah, a con-
cession gained in June 1913, seemed to confirm that the company would
have no trouble supplying oil to meet Admiralty needs. Finally, in a
conference held early in January 1914, the Admiralty decided it would
buy shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in order to ensure the Com-
pany' s solvency and the Fleet's fuel needs. The Ad.nira1ty proposed a
contract for 300,000 to 500,000 tons a year for twenty years, with a
400,000 ton reserve supply. 3 The Admiralty gained a long-term, fixed-
price contract when oil prices were just starting to rise.
During the January conference the question of protection of the
oil fields arose. Sir Percy Cox, Persian Gulf Chief Political Officer,
reported to the Admiralty his estimate that a force of from two bri-
gades to a division was necessary to guard the field.sagainst minor
local disturbances, and if a war should break out it was possible that
more men would be required. 4 Churchill, who had pioneered the invest-
ment in this project, ignored it after the war broke out in August. He
stated on 1 September 1914 that the was 'little likelihood of any
troops being available for this purpose . . . We shall have to buy our
oil from elsewhere. . . . Europe and Egypt have greater claims than we
1Flrst Interim Reoit of t1e Admiralty Commissin on the Oil Re-
sources, Persian Gulf, 17 Feb 14, ADM/U6/3806/12503.
2Te].. no number, Towriley to Grey, 18 Jun 13, ADM/116/3806/27960.




have on the Indian Army." This idea was in direct opposition to the
Foreign Office assurance of May 1914 that the oil field personnel
could 'count on such support and protection as British subjects are al-
ways entitled to expect from His Majesty's Government' because, since
the Admiralty was to become a major stockholder, they 'as a matter of
self-interest . . . must necessarily have a greater interest than
hitherto in all measures that may be necessary for the safe and unin-
terrupted prosecution of the enterprise of the company.' 2
 However,
such was not to be the case. 'During the early part of the campaign,
Mesopotainia was clearly not a major battleground, and oil, whether Per-
sian or Mesopotainian, was not a major factor in planning military strat-
egy.' 3 In spite of this later lack of interest, the Admiralty became
a major stockholder in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with a total sub-
scription of £2,2OO,OOO. Thus, much as Disraeli had done in acquiring
the major share of the Suez Canal, Churchill obtained for the British
Government a major advantage for the strategic superiority of the Royal
Navy.
This acquisition met with the approval of the India Office, which
believed that this move would aid the British position in the Persian
Gulf by widening governmental interest in the area. 5 The Russians, as
1Puleston, p. 119.
2Letter, no. CP14784, W.G.Creene to USSInd, 8 May 14, P0/371/2131/
20258.
3Kent, p. 118.
4Agreement with Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd., and ADM, IO/L/P&/lO/
410/2463.
5Memo no. 2255, 10 to P0, 11 Jun 14, IO/L/P&S/1O/l33/2255.
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mentioned earlier, were not at all pleased. They too realised the sim-
ilarity between this action in Persia and the Suez acquisition in re-
lation to British political influence in Fgypt, and therefore felt that
the British were encroaching on Russian interests in Persia without
having previously discussed the move with her. Russian public opinion
viewed this as a violation of the 1907 agreement. The Petersburgh
Courier stated that Britain might be forced to 'take the consequences
of exploiting the idiocy of others. The leader of the Imperial Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs is a ussian at whose services are Russian dip-
lomacy arr the greatest army the world has ever seen." Although the
British influence that was gained in the purchase of the oil shares ex-
tended no further north than the neutral zone, Britain decided that it
was not advisable to argue with the Russians over such a point at a
time when friends were necessary. In July 191 L. Buchanan, Ambassador
to Russia, suggested to Sir Edward Grey that since the British inter-
ests were primarily in developing the southern fields, then perhaps it
was worthwhile to offer Russia some part of the northern fields. 2
 Grey
agreed, but did not want to give away any territorial concessions out-
right. Grey told Buchanan that he 'felt that it would be to our in-
terest at any rate to lease the part of the concession in the north to
some other company, which might be an Anglo-Russian company.' 3
 Before
this offer to buy off Russia was advanced, however, the outbreak of war
'Letter no. 191, Buchanan to Grey, 24 Jun 14, I0/L/P&s/l0/41o/2753.
2Tel. no. 152, Buchanan to Grey, 7 Jul 14, I0/L/P&S/l0/410/2776.
3Tel. no. 290, Grey to Buchanan, 22 Jul 14, I0/L/P&S/10/410/3022.
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and the resulting shift of ussian interest elsewhere made the offer
unnecessary.
As the British were trying to entrench themselves economically in
Ottoman and. Persian territory, they also intensified their political ef-
forts around the Persian Gulf to increase their influence there. Nego-
tiations with the Turkish Government culminated in the signing of a
Persian Gulf convention on 29 July 1913 which recognised Britain's in-
fluence and treaties around the Gulf. These treaties covered relations
with the sheikhs of Koweit, Bahrain, Mohammerah and Abu Dhabi concern-
ing piracy, arms trading, slave trading and postal agreements dating
back as far as 1820.l After almost a century of official involvement,
British influence in the Persian Gulf rested 'not only on the agreements
concluded. . . but on custom, consent, and long-established relations
between local chiefs and the Government of India.' 2
 As tensions mounted
in the summer and fall of 19111. the political positions of these sheikhs
became more important. The British Consul in Arabistan realised the
advantage that Britain had in having 'control of this country through
the Sheikh . . . and any lessening of his authority will act to our
detriment • The greater the power of the Sheikh the greater our con-_
trol. '3
It is the position of Britain in regard to these sheikhs, and, more
important, the control the sheikhs would exercise over their followers,
1Conventions between the United Kingdom and Turkey respecting the
Persian Gulf and Adjacent Territories, 29 Jul 13, FO/371/2136/31036.
2Memo, no number, Grey to Tewfik Pasha, 211. Oct 1]., IO/L/P&S/10/
60/786/13.
3Memo by Maj. Howarth, Arabistan Consul, 7 Dec 13, IO/L/P&S/1O/133/3215.
18
that is the third and most important reason for British military in-
volvement in this area. As war neared, Britain's greatest fear in this
part of the world was not so much German control or loss of oil as it
was that the Moslem Arabs of Mesopotainia, with TurcoGerman urging,
would rise up in a Jehad, or holy war, that would spread throughout the
region from Arabia to Egypt, and through Persia and Afghanistan to In-
dia. The Basra Consul reported in August 1914. of agents leaving from
there to stir up Moslem feeling in India and throughout the campaign
in Mesopotainia the British administration went to great lengths to as-
sure the local Arabs that the British had no intention of disturbing
their religious practices. 2 As deeply involved as the British Army was
in France, the possibility of a weakening or loss of the British influ-
ence in the Middle East arid the possibility of that weakness spreading
to India was extremely frightening, as little could be done to stop a
Jehad should one begin. The importance of British control in this area
was noted by a German author in 1915, who quoted Lord Curzon's state-
ment that "The possession of India is the inalienable badge of sover-
eignty in the Eastern Hemisphere. Without India the British Empire
could not exist." For England everything centres around India, and
Arabia is the glacis for the defence of India.' 3
 Thus, the British
support of Arab movements against the Turks, tacit though it was prior
to the war, grew stronger to serve the double purpose of keeping the
'Secret tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 18 Aug hi. , FO/37l/2136/409l1.
Sketch of the Political History of Persia, Iraq and Arabia, with
Special Reference to the Present Campaign", pamphlet by Cox, Costello
Papers, Imperial War Nuseiujn,7k/80/l.
Extract from 'The Fight for Arabia between Turkey and England',
F. Stuhlxnan, published in Germany, 1916, IO/L/P&S/lO/101/B21i.1/PLI.51i.O.
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Arabs' religious feelings quiet and attempting to raise their support
against the Turks. 1 'The officials who sanctioned the desiatch of the
force in 19114, no less than those who discussed Britain's Mesopotamian
desiderata in 1915, considered that the maintenance of the status g
would serve Britain's strategic, commercial and political interests in
the region.'2
This double interest in the Arabs, for Turkish harassment and Brit-
ish stability, occupied British diplomacy in the Gulf area, and the
Turks and Germans were not blind to British fears • Subversive Arab
activities directed at the Turkish Government were suppressed by local
authorities both by the arrest of dissidents and. by counter-propaganda.
British interest was aroused when the Turks arrested an Arab national-
let, Aziz All Bey, in March 19114., a man who had connections in Egypt
with friends of Kitchener. Azlz Au Bey led a group that claimed to
haye definite schemes to liberate the Arabs from Nosul to the Gulf, and
had attempted to enlist the support of the Sheikh of' Koweit, an inipor-
tant British ally. 3 At Kitchener's request, Louis Mallet, British
Ambassador in Constantinople, made enquiries into the arrest but found
that his questions aroused Turkish suspicions. British fears of Turk-
ish hostility plagued Anglo-Arab relations prior to the war. Mallet
realised that if he took too great an interest, 'and in the event of
their plans maturing the Turkish Government oul easily jump to the
'Tel. no. 117, Mallet to Grey, 2 Mar 1k, F0/371/2131/9033.
2Cohen, p. 308.
3Tel. no. 117, Mallet to Grey, 2 Mar 1k, F0/371/213]./ 9033.
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conclusion that His Majesty's Embassy was implicated in the affair."
It was thus that British interests in the Arabs involved a precarious
stance of supporting the revolutionaries while not giving the Turks,
after 24. August, an excuse to go to war. Kitchener seconded Mallet's
desire for caution when he saw that British support of Moslem pilgrim-
ages enhanced British prestige In India and F4gypt.
The Arabs had no intention of submitting to the policy of central-
isation that the Young Turks attempted to Institute. Arab pamphlets
calling for revolt were rife throughout the Ottoman Empire in 19114.,
most using religious arguments. The standard pamphlet, after detail-
ing Turkish atrocities against Arab people and Moslem culture, ended
with something like 'the first thing you ought to do is refuse paying
your taxes and to buy arms to expel these destroyers from your country.
History has taught us a lesson which should be written In gold& "that
no nation obtained its freedom except after the ground soaked with
od." 2
 Grey saw that this hostility might be turned to good advan-
tage and recommended to the India Office that should Turkey declare
war,the India..Office should 'at once give every support and encourage-.
inent to the Arabs to possess themselves of Arabia and the Holy Places.
As helpful to the British cause as this would have been, this sugges-
tion was instituted only to a limited extent, Most of the support for
the Arabs in Mesopotamia was moral rather than physical.
The Turks and Germans responded with propaganda of their own,
1Tel. no. 117, Mallet to Grey, 2 Mar 14, FO/371/2131/ 9033.
2Translation of a pamphlet by the Arab Revolutionary Committee,
25 Aug 14, FO/371/2136/42807.
3Secret memo, FO to 10, 1 Sep 14, FO/371/2139/44923.
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mainly in Persia, with Germany trying to incite a Jehad against the
British as persecutors of Moslems, while similar attempts came from the
Turks within Ottoman territory. A pamphlet from Nasiriyah, on the Eu-
phrates River, called on Moslems from all over the world to aid Turkey
as the leader of the true faith. The pamphlet asked if any Moslems
were 'permitted by their religion to light against their brethren of
Islam . . . causing death unto them and theirs; or do they merit the tor-
ments of Hell as murderers in so doing' God Almighty knows." The
Turks became more anxious about the loyalty of the Arabs under Turkish
rule when mobilisatlon started in August 191 11., directed by Djavid. Bey,
Minister of Finance and Public Works and also Inspector of the kth In-.
spectorate (military district). When conscription went into effect,
Djavid stated that those who .did not respond 'to the invitation made
by the Muhammedan religion' to join the army would be, 'without loss of
time, shot.'2
The main hope the British held for Arab support was in the alli-
ances with the Persian Gulf sheikhs, and even this contact was threat-
ened, The Sheikh of Mohainmerah, an old. ally, reported early in Septem-
ber 19111.
 'that Turks are steadily endeavouring to arouse religious fan-
aticism. . . .if they are successful he will be able to do nothing
against them & will only keep his tribesmen out of it with considerable
difficulty.' 3 This made for rather difficult projections of policy
when leaders agreed to one position which their subjects might not
1Papers of Brig. E.W.Costello, Imperial War Museum no. 714.180/1.
2Tel, no. 825, Baghdad Consul to Mallet, 10 Aug 11., F0/371/2l11.3/
5i.l57.
3Secret tel., Hard.inge to Crewe, 7 Sep 14, FO/371/2114.1/Ll.7168.
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follow. Britain needed the Arabs' support, either active or passive,
to guard against a religious uprising. Thus, talk began in September
19114. among the British leadership of possible post-war Arab states free
from Turkish rule, yet dependent on British influence. The only way
to plan for such an eventuality was by wholeheartedly supporting the
sheikhs and hoping they could control their tribes. The Foreign and
India Offices therefore cultivated their alliances with the Sheikhs of
Mohaminerah and Koweit and the Emir of Nejd, Ibn Saud, who was 'no friend
of the Turks and disposed to be friendly toward us.' 1 To ensure their
position with the powerful Einir, the British Political Officer in Ara-
bia, Captain W. H. I. Shakespeare, an old companion of Ibn Saud, was
called out of retirement in early October to exercise his influence
(1) to prevent the outbreak of unrest or disturbances among the Arabs;
and (2) to ensure . . . that no assistance is rendered by the Arabs to
the Turkish arms.
Turkish action grew increasingly hostile through September and Oc-
tober 19114.. Enver Pasha, Turkish Minister of War, warned the Vali of
Basra to prepare for Turkish entry into the war against Britain and told
him to make ready to receive 'arms and ammunition . . . being sent to
Basra under German flag and that 32 secret emissaries including German
officers are on their way to preach Jaad (sic) in Afghanistan Baluchi-
stan and India.' 3 War seemed to be inevitable to almost everyone in
the Ottoman area except Louis Mallet in Constantinople, who seemed to
'Tel. no. 6O Li. , Mallet to Grey, 22 Sep 14., F0/371/2114.O/572311..
2Secret letter, 10 to Shakespeare, 5 Oct 11$., FO/371/2143/57141.
3Secret tel., Hardinge to Grey, 28 Sep 14., FO/37]./2l40/53904.
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make a regular practice of Ignoring or disbelieving all indications
that the Turks were about to commit themselves. He received reports,
and passed them on to London, of continued military activity, such as
the fact that the Turks would 'probably send troops to Egyptian. fron-
tier--as now indicated"or that Turkish agents were travelling through
Mesopotamia to foment Arab inter-tribal hostilities and. secure support
for the Govevrment. 2 Mallet countered that he 'did not seriously be-
lieve that the Ottoman Government seriously contemplate active partici-
pation in the war on the German side.'3
Luckily, others in powerful positions refused to be so blind. Sir
Edward Grey continued to play down Anglo-Arab relations (to keep from
providing Turkey with 'an unanswerable case before the .wor.d, and especi-
..ally the Moslem world' ') but closer relations were maintained with the
sheikhs after August by the Political Agents who made sure that the
tribal chiefs were accurately informed on the war situation, to counter
false and exaggerated items of Information published in the Basra jour-
nal . . . and spread abroad by Turkish agents and other ill-Informed or
ill-disposed persons.	 The sheikhs welcomed the arrival of British
forces in late October and gave pledges of support in case war with
Turkey should occur. 6 The political agents in the Gulf area worked to
'Tel. no, 893, Mallet to Grey, 30 Sep l4. , FO/37l/2l1iO/546l9.
2Tel. no. 1051 , Mallet to Grey, 214. Oct 1k, FO/37]./2111.O/63065.
3Tel. no. 893, Mallet to Grey, 30 Sep 14, FO/371/2l40/9i.619.
1 Tel. no. 659, Grey to Mallet, 11 Oct 14, P0/371/2142/58203.
5Tel. no. C39, Political Agent, Koweit to Cox, 19 Oct 14, p0/371/
2lL 4/82 713.
6Secret tel., Hardinge to Grey, 211. Oct 14, P0/371/2140/63562.
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keep Moslem feelings cool in the face of Turco-Gerinan propaganda, and
their efforts proved successful when war finally came. From all over
India and the Persian Gulf the British and Indian Governments received
massive amounts of assurances of undying loyalty from virtually every
trilBi and civil group.1
These promises were apparently not enough to satisfy the India Of-
floe, which undertook the military operations in Mesopotamia. Main-
taining Arab respect was throughout the campaign a major factor in de-
cision-making. The military actions preceding the outbreak of hostili-
ties centred on two strategies, designed to impress the Gulf population.
Both were designed to demonstrate British strength without provoking
an incident that the Turks could use to blame the British for starting
hostilities. Since the defence of the Mesopotatnian-Persian Gulf-Persian
oil field area had not been the subject of any planning (the India Office
stated in May l9l L. that they 'doubted very much we could spare the neces-
sary force from India to protect this area' 2) the best that could be
done on short notice was to increase the amount of patrols carried on
by the Indian Marine gunboats in the Gulf. This was instituted in Au-
gust 1914, soon after the war in Europe and Turkish military activity
in the area began to increase • In mid-August Viceroy Lord Hard.inge of
Penshurst thought that 1000 sepoys should be despatched. on these steamers
to take up defenlve positions around the oil installations, but he de-
cided that such a move would be too provocative. 3 The India Office
'Various Indian civil groups to IndGovt and British Govt, Nov 14,
IO/L/P&S/lO/518.
2Minute no. 2248, Barrow, 8 May 14, IO/L/P&S/1O/410/2248.
3Secret tel, Hardinge to ADM, 21 Aug 14, P0/371/2136/42068.
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believed that the continued presence of the gunboats was vital, since
'the political feeling of the people . . . is princilly influenced
,1by what they see.
The second strategy was more difficult to organise, and could not
be Implemented until much later. The Viceroy and Secretary of State
for India began in late September and early October to organise an ex-
peditionary force to go to the Gulf in case of hostilities. Sections
of the Indian 6th Infantry Division began to be assembled for transport
to Karachi, where they would embark for the Persian Gulf. This force
was the core of what was to become Force 'D', and its function in Bah-
rain was to give the Sheikh moral support. It was due to arrive about
23 October.2
Thus, with the Navy in action and the Army on the way, there was
not much the British could do but await Turkish moves • In mid-August
the Turkish gunboat 'Marmaris' began steaming about Basra, and the Vail
there claimed that the Turkish Government might requisition all supplies
of coal and oil in Basra. 3 Reports reached Bushire, further down the
Gulf coast, on 22 August, that Germans were attempting to sink an old
Turkish ship in the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab to bar the entrance to
British ships. By 5 September Turks were reported at the island of
Shemsumiyah, near Mohammerah, sounding the river, 5 and by the 8th guns
'Memo no. 3305, 10 to FO, 22 Aug 11!, FO/371/2136/LI-2068.
2Tel, no. HlL 69, Hardlnge to Grey, 13 Oct i/i, FO/37l/2Th3/59O6l.
3Tel., no number, Cox to IndGovt, FO/371/2l36/39348.
Te1. no. 997, Bushire Political Resident to Hardinge, 22 Aug ui.,
FO/371/2l36/42068.
5Tel. no. 697, Mallet to Grey, 5 Sep lii., FO/37l/2138/6751.
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-	 had been placed there.' The Admiralty countered these moves by order-
ing the three steamers in the area to the Shatt-al-Arab 'to patrol from
Mohainrnerah to the sea to prevent any interference with the navigation
by the Turks.' 2 Their arrival met with an immediate Turkish response.
'They declare the whole of Shatt-al-Arab and sea within six miles of
shore to be territorial waters and closed to warships. Guns at Fao will
fire on any man-of-war disregarding prohibit&on.' 3 To this the Admi-
ralty suggested that the Foreign Office inform Constantinople that as
regards warships in territorial waters, 'so long as the Turkish Govern-
ment does not intern the German War Vessels "GOEBEN' and "BRESL&U", His
Majesty's Government will maintain a Naval Force in the Shatt-al-Arab.'
Apparently Grey was losing patience with the Turks because now his or-
ders to the ships were not designed to avoid conflict, as had been his
policy in the past.
Grey ordered the ships to remain at Mohaininerah and 'to keep out-
side Turkish territorial waters, which according to the generally ac-
cetthed principle of international law, extend 3 miles out to sea from
the coast.' 5 By mid-October the Turks countered this British stand by
announcing that they would mine the Shatt-al-Aiab. The Admiralty and
Foreign Office now began to throw caution to the wind • On 23 October
they protested about the restriction of their rights to navigate
1Tel. no. 721, Mallet to Grey, 8 Sep 111, FO/37l/2l38/76OO.
2Tel. no. 160, ADM to C1nC st Indies, 10 Sep l, FO/37l/2l4l/14.851.9.
3Tel. no. 939, Mallet to Grey, 6 Oct 1L$., FO/37l/2l2/566l8.
Confidential letter, ADM to FO, 20 Sep 	 FO/371/2142/5U92.
Tel. no. 644, Grey to Mallet, 7 Oct lL, FO/371/2l14.2/566l8.
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the river, which had been reaffirmed as late as July 1913 in the Anglo-
Turkish conventions. Grey stated that the British Government would be
'forced to regard any attempt to lay mines in the river as an act of
open hostility and provocation to this country.' 1
 By the 26th the gun-
boats in the Gulf were 'to watch for any signs of mine-laying and to
be prepared for orders to prevent it by force.' 2
 On the 30th the ships
received instructions on minesweeping procedures and were told that
'should the Turks open fire . . . the mining vessel if present is to
be destroyed and further operations taken as you deem necessary.'3
As tension mounted on the water, Turkish troops began to arrive in
the area, although it is uncertain how many there were. In late August
Mallet reported the d.espatch of 1,000 men to Basra, but they were 'mu-
tinous from neglect and ill-treatment. One officer has been killed al-
ready and hundreds have deserted. ' By 2i October reports to the In-
dian Government told of 300 men and four guns on Shemsuniiyah Island,
where the Karun meets the Shatt-al-Arab at MohalTunerah. 5
 By the time
war broke out, most Turkish troops were in the west, and Indian Army
headquarters estimated that there were only 10,000 men in Mesopotamla,
some 8,000 infantry, .500 cavalry and 58 guns in the neighbourhood of
Basra. 6
 Expeditionary Force 'D' was only brigade strength, some 5,000
'Tel. no. 698, Grey to Mallet, 23 Oct 111, FO/371/2l42/62013.
2Tel. floe 242, ADM to SNO,Persian Gulf, 26 Oct 14, FO/37l/2142/
6358.
3Tel. no. 7211A, Grey to Mallet, 30 Oct 14, F0/371/2142/65507.
Tel. no. 621, Mallet to Grey, 26 Aug 14, FO/37l/2l36/43529.
Te1. no number, Bushire Political Agent to IndGovt, 24 Oct 14,
FO/371/2142/63042.
6Maj. E. Evans, A Brief Outline of the Campai in Mesopotamia,
1914-1918, (Aldershot, 1927), p. 17. -
	 _______	 __________
28
men, when it reached Bahrain. Political Agents throughout the Gulf re-
gion were told to give the 'utmost publicity to its presence, making it
known that His Majesty's Government contemplate no aggressive action.'1
The officer in command of Force 'D', Brigadier-General Sir W. S. Dela-
main, was instructed not 'to land troops on Turkish territory without
orders from[he HomeGovernmen except in case of absolute military
necessity. ,2
Whether that military necessity would occur or not depended on the
actions of the Young Turks in power in Constantinople. Mallet remained
unconvinced that they would go to war. He was sure that the pitiable
condition of Turkish finances and morale would prevent a war 'simply to
gratify the vanity of a fatuous young idiot like Enver and. a mad German
general like Limanon Sander.' 3 Mallet continued that the Turks must
'not think we are afraid of their absurd preparations, but if they go
to war . . . we shall in all probability call them to account. 
,14. 
By the
time Turkey joined hostilities on 29 October, Britain was prepared to
'call them to account.' Within a week Force 'D' was on Turkish soil
and had taken Turkish lives.
'Secret tel., Crewe to Hanlinge, 26 Oct 11, FO/37l/2l4O/65i.96.
2Memo no. 1144, Barrow, 10, to E.A.Crowe, FO, 3 Oct 14, FO/371/
2143/56196.





Although hostilities with Turkey did not lead to Indian action
until 6 November l9l )4, India had been on a war footing since August.
When Great Britain went to war, the Home Government called on India
to provide a force for France. Britain also took Indian officers at
home on leave and pressed them directly into the Regular Army. These
two actions considerably weakened the Indian Army. Force 'A', in
France, consisted of the 3rd and 7th Divisions and a cavalry division.
The Indian Army was further weakened when the War Office directed
the despatch of Forces 'B' and 'C' to East Africa and Egypt. Force
'B' consisted of a brigade of regular an:) Imperial Service troops
(at the outset) and Force 'C' was made up of various detachments to
support the troops already in F,gy-pt, and was later used in Fast Af-
rica. Military Secretary to the India Office, Sir Edmund Barrow,
minuted that 'this leaves us in India with only just sufficient
troops to form three infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade for
defence of the Frontier.' 1
 Thus, the formation and. despatch of
Force 'D' to the Persian Gulf in October 191 11. was not, at its in..
ception, a popular move in India.
On 20 September 1914, Viceroy Hardirige informed Sir Beauchamp
1Brig. Gen. F.J.Moberly, History of the Great War based on
official documents The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918, rLon-
don, 1923-27), 4 vols., vol. 1, pp. 80-81.
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Duff, Commander-in-Chief in India, that he was worried about how far
they. could go in meeting Imperial requests without leaving India to-
tally unprotected. Hardirige wanted to stand fast against any weaken-
ing of the Frontier defence force, and he thought that any British
battalion that left the country for overseas duty ought to be accom-
panied by an Indian battalion. India should get 'a fair and adequate
proportion of Territorial regiments in exchange.' 1 The reason he wanted
equal representation was owing to the fear in India of possible reli-
gious disagreement with the war against Turkey, should she join in,
Hard5ae had been warned by British officials in the provinces that
they were anxious over 'the possible effect on Mahommedan feeling in
India of any action which the Entente . . . may be forced to take in
regard to Turkey.' 2 The religious question plagued the Indian flovern-
inent continually through the war, although it was a fear realised only
on rare occasions.
The British feared a holy war that would, under Turkish direction,
spread through Nesopotamia to Persia, Afghanistan and India. Thus,
the Indian overnnient kept close watch on the activities and attitudes
of the Persians. Hardinge informed the Foreign Office in September
that he planned to seize the Gulf ports if Persia moved to ally her-
self with Turkey, but he hoped to ?preserve her integrity and actively
support her administration in the south '3 while the Tussians need
'Letter, Hardinge to Duff, 20 Sep l!4.,Hardinge Papers(mY) 101/2/308.
2Letter, GOv.-(en. Bayley to Hardinge, lLi Aug 111, HDG88/l/144.
3Pv-t. tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 10 Sep l, F0/371/2480/4855l.
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fear nothing as long as they remained passive in their northern zone
of influence. The Persian Prime Minister assured the British Ambas-
sador in Teheran that Britain could rest assured of Persia's syinpa-
thies, as sympathies were 'all . . . she had left to fight with.' 1 If
war should break out, he would declare Persia neutral. The Persian
authorities held good to this promise, discouraging Turco-Gerrnan ac-
tivities2 and announcing their neutrality on 4 November 94•3
The deteriorating diplomatic situation with Turkey forced Britain
to order a demonstration at the head of the Persian Gulf with Force 'D'.
In addition to halting the spread of Jehad preaching, Britain had to
move into the Gulf because she was, according to Barrow, 'morally
bound to protect' the Gulf sheikhs who. had been such long-standing
British allies. 'I think we should have lost face tremendously if we
had not done so, and the Arabs would certainly have thrown In their
lot with the Turks.hhl This is the first but by no means the last time
that 'saving face' was used as a reason for action in Mesopotaniia.
The idea of impressing the Arabs was an ever-present driving force in
decisions which expanded this campaign keyond the limits of its original
intentions. The Mesopotamian Arabs respected nothI1g but victory (as
shown by their merciless treatment of defeated troops), and the British
and Indian leaders, rightly or wrongly, grew to equate forward motion
with victory in order to persuade the Arabs to iemain passive.
'Tel. no. 247, Townley to Grey, 1 Sep 14, FO/371/2480/1i.51126.
2i•rel. no. 292, 'Pownley to Grey, 2 Oct 14, FO/371/211.80/55375.
3Tel. no. 411, Knox to IndGovt, If Nov 14, FO/371/2144/8823l.
4Mesopotamia Commission (Meso Conun)prooeedings, Barrow, 21 Aug 16,
CABJ19/8, floss 240- 144. All Neso Comm proceedings are contained in GAB/
19/8, so only date of testimony and numbers of questions cited hereafter.
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In September 19111, however, British intentions in the Persian Gulf
were still limited. On 26 September, Barrow minuted to the Secretary
of State for India, the Marquess of Crewe, that British agents in the
Gulf were convinced that some form of action was needed to convince
the Arabs of British support in order to secure their favour. Barrow
stated that an Indian force sent imined lately to the Shatt-al-Arab
would serve this function. 'We can easily do so at the present moment
without arousing any suspicion. . . . The Expedition, if despatched
under sealed orders, could arrive at the Shatt-al-Arab without a soul
knowing any-thing about its despatch for this purpose. 	 When the Meso-
potamia Commission questioned Barrow on this point, he stated that the
possibility of such a move had been contemplated in India for many
years and Indian military authorities 'had no doubt prepared plans. ,2
General Sir O'Moore Creah, formerly Commander-in-Chief in India (1910-
19111), told the Commission that in 1912 he had submitted a report de-
tailing a campaign in Mesopotamia entitled 'Overseas operations in
the event of a war with Turkey, either alone or supported b Germany.'3
Duff stated that he knew nothing of such a report. According to an
agreement between the War Office and the Indian Gen pral Staff, the
former formulated plans for Arabia and Mesopotarnia while the latter's
authority ended with the Persian Gulf and Basra. What little was
known of the Shatt.-al-Arab area, however, was collected and added to
the orders that Brigadier W. S. Delamain opened when his 16th Brigade
1Minute by Barrow, 'Iole of India in a Turkish War', 26 Sep 111,
WO/l06/52.
2Meso Comrn, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, nos. 186-88.
3Meso Cornin, Duff, 
.5 Dec 16, floss lLi636-li.O.
Moberly, vol. :i, pp. 69-70.
33
was sailing for the Gulf. This brigade of the 6th Infantry Division
was assembled at Bombay and departed from the port on 16 October.
Delamain' s orders directed him only to occupy Abadan Island, in order
to protect the oil facilities and assure the Arabs of support. If
hostilities began, then he was permitted to expand his hold as far as
Basra while awaiting the remainder of the division.'
Hardinge was dubious of the wisdom of this action while the ten-
uous peace with tmurkey remained. Hardinge was still unsure, in early
October, of the Persian overnment's attitude, and he feared that the
Abadan operation could not be carried out 'without the risk of a pro-
test from the Persian Government and without in the event of war vio-
lating Persian neitmlify. Both these results would be regarded un-
favourably by Indian Mohainmedans, ,2 not to mention giving the Turks
an excuse to violate that same neutrality and gain a commanding posi-
tion. The Viceroy advocated gaining Persian permission to land troops
near Abadan, as the island itself might be considered to lie in Turk-
ish waters. Thus, any move by Turkey would result in their breaking
international law, not Britain. 3
 Arthur Hirtzel, the India Office Po-
litical Secretary, thought Hardinge's fears 'overstated'. Since the
oil works were British-owned, and their policing was the concern of
a British ally, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, than any Indian force occu-
pying Abadan would merely be protecting their own property from pos-
sible Turkish interference.4
'Orders to Brig. Delamnain from CGS md, 8 Oct 14, WO/106/880.
2	 tel., Viceroy to Crewe, 5 Oct 14, IO/L/MIL/5/768.
3Letter, Hardinge to Crewe, 15 Oct 14, Crewe Papers (cRW), C/24..
4Memo by Hirtzel, 8 Oct 14, wo/107/877, p. 5.
The question soon became academic. The 16th Brigade; at Bahrain
since 23 October, received notification of war and directions to pro-
ceed to the Shatt-al-Arab on 30 October. The force arrived at the bar
across the entrance to the Shatt on 3 November and waited there for
two days while mine-sweeping operations were carried out • On the 5th
Delamain received confirmation that Britain had declared war on Tur-
key. 1
 Delamain's Plans of Operations were fairly open-ended, probably
because India could not really know what to expect. 'The local con-
sular and other authorities will, it is hoped, be able to assist you.'2
He was warned to expect some 3,000 semi-trained Turkish troops in the
Basra icinity. later sources state that some 5,000 men of the Turkish
38th Division, with 32 guns, were above Mohamxnerah; tbese were mostly
Arab troops, with one Anatolian battalion.3
Hardinge anticipated little trouble In dealing with this force.
	 *
In spite of his anxiety over creating an incident that would provoke
the Turks, he ias more than ready to fight them flow that hostilities
had actually begun. 'I should be glad for an incident to arise so that
the whole situation might be cleared up, especially as I think we
should have no difficulty whatever in taking Basra and raising the
whole of Arabia against Thrkey,' he wrote to Lord Crewe, Crewe's
directions to Force 'D', however, Ignored Hardinge's comment on an
Arab uprising and their consequent friendliness. Although the politi-
cal agent with Force 'D', Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, informed
1A.J.Barker, The Neglected War, (London, 1967), p. hi.
2Letter, CGS md to Delamain, 8 Oct iLl, WO/l06/880.
3Quetta Staff College, Critical Study of the Campaign inMesopo-
tamla	 to April 1911, (Calcutta, 1925), p. 5.
lLetter, Harlinge to Crewe, 29 October iLl., CRW/C/24.
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the Secretary of State that the Gulf sheikhs' attitudes ranged from
'coidia].' to 'staunch' , Crewe reiterated that nothing should be done
to provoke the local tribesmen. He directed Haxdinge to impress on
Force 'b' the 'necessity of conciliating Eh Arabs In every possible
way.'2
As the 16th Brigade advanced, the Indian Government had to urge
caution first on Delamain, then on Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Bar-.
rett, who arrived to take command of the force with the remainder of
the division on 15 November. This caution was invoked not only to
keep the tenuous foothold secure, but also to watch closely the polit-
ical situation in Persia and among the Arabs. Although Persian neu-
trality was official from 4 November, the British knew that the Anglo-
RusslánallllLnce, strengthened by the outbreak of war in Europe, was not
popular In Persia. While Force 'D' strove to avoid provoking Persia,
the Foreign Office also put pressure on Russia to avoid any possible
conflict. Sir eorge Buchanan in St. Petersburgh requested Serge Saz-
onov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to direct ussian per-
sonnel in Persia to maintain a 'benevolent attitude' in view of the
outbreak of war with Turkey. 3 Although there was little harmony in
Turco-Persian relations, it was recognised throughout the Middle East
that Turkey was the last remaining Moslem Power, and war against a
co-reli,gtonist night, it was feared in London and Simla, transcend
Turco-Persian enmity. Accordingly, Sazonov instructed his personnel
that any 'act that may arouse resentment against us and awaken Moslem
1Tel. no. 378, Cox to FO, 12 Nov 14, FO/371/21114/71276.
2Tel. no. 1375, Crewe to Hardinge, 16 Nov 111, IO/L/MIL/5/748.
3pvt. tei., Crewe to Hardl.nge, 2 Nov 14, FO/371/21L$4/82713.
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fanaticism which would be highly dangerous from our point of view also
must be carefully avoided1'1
The main source of possible trouble in Persia seemed to be the
minorities, such as the ICurds in the north who might embark on guer-
ril].a actions against the Russians. 2 This threat was counteracted,
however, by the possibility of an Armenian uprising in support of the
Russians, as the Armenians had long suffered at Turkish hands. 3
 The
Foreign Office believed that the best way to control these elements
in Persia would be to bring that country into an alliance against Tur-
key. Grey was prepared to offer, in conjunction with the Russians,
'political, territorial or economic inducements' 4
 to convince Persia
to join the Allies. Grey's main concern with this cheme was with
prestige and world opinion. In order to attack Turkish troops and
protect British interests in Persian territory, it might be necessary
to traverse her soil to do so. Grey did not want any unfortunate par-
allels drawn with Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. 5 Russian
authorities disagreed with Grey's idea, Buchanan pointing out that,
since Persia. had no army, she had little to offer and would thus be-
come a liability should Turkish troops invade. Sazonov proposed that
a simple assurance to the 'Persian Government of friendly sentiments
animating Russia and. Great Britain' 6
 would suffice to secure 'Pe!siá's
friendly neutrality. Thus, throughout the war, Allied operations
'Pvt. tel, Crewe to Hardinge, 5 Nov 114, P0/371/2144/82713.
2Tel. no. 296, Townley to Grey, 8 Oct 14, FO/371/21411./57458.
3Letter, Francis Kirby (late Acting Vice-Consul, Rostov) to Grey,
6 Nov 14, FO/371/2146/68443.
'Tel. no. 1006, Grey to Buchanan, 10 Nov 111, FO/371/2480/69647.
5Tel. no. 1015, Grey to Buchanan, 12 Nov 14, F0/371/2480/70280.
6Tel. no. 645, Buchanan to Grey, 14 Nov 14, P0/371/2480/71281.
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through Persian territory were allowed while Teheran protested against
Turkish actions which infringed Persian neutrality.
Indian Army moves in 1914 and early 1915 were slow and deliber-
ate, though this was dictated by necessity as much as by policy. Del-
amain quickly attacked Fao on the morning of 6 November, but the sub-
sequent debarkation of troops on the 8th at Sanniyeh was a two-day
operation from ship to shore, there being no docking facilities avail-
1
able. With Barrett s arrival, operations began In the direction of
Basra. On 15 November Delamain and three battalions 'successfully ac-
complished after a sharp engagement' 2
 the occupation of Saihan on the
right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab below Mohaimnerah • Crewe told Harilnge
the next day that if the 'political situation as regards Arabs Is fav-
ourable, and If	 military situation renders immediate advance both
practicable and advisable' , then Barrett had Cabinet approval to
capture Basra • Once taken, Basra 'should be considered a friendly and
not an ellemy town, and every effort made to restore confidence.'4
With these orders, Barrett advanced up the Shatt. On the 18th
his forces marched nine miles and defeated a force of 4,500 Turks at
Sahil. Barrett Informed India that a hospital ship was 'much needed'
a request that, coupled with the lack of river craft, foreshadowed fu-
ture problems of movement on the rivers of Mesopotamla. This was em-
phasised on 20 November when Barrett reported difficulty in landing
1Barker, glected War, p. 42.
2Tel., no number, COC'D' to Crewe, 15 Nov 14, F0/371/2l144/71853.
3Tel. no. 1375, Crewe to Hardinge, 16 Nov 14, IO/L/MIL/5/748.
4IbId.
rel. no. 311G, COC'D' to OS md, 18 Nov 14, W0/95/4965.
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troops and stores, a condition aggravated by the ships' deep draught
and the activities of Turkish artillery. 1 Dependent on shipping for
supplies, the capture of Basra became a necessity if Force 'D' was to
remain operative. Determined to push through to the city by force on
22 November, Barrett was saved the trouble when word reached him the
day before that the Turks had evacuated Basra and the town was being
looted by Arabs of one of the desert tribes. An advance force
steamed up-river immediately and the remainder entered the town on
the 22nd, accompanied by Navy ships firing salutes as the Union Jack
was raised.
Barrett reported that local Arabs who had been pressed into Turk-
ish service had refused to follow the Turks up-river, being 'much dis-
satisfied with their treatment by Turks.' 2 Hoping to exploit this
dissatisfaction, Cox read a proclamation to the assembled citizens that
Britain had not desired war with Turkey, but had been forced into it.
She had no desire to fight anyone except the TUIkS, so Basra would en-
joy the 'benefits of liberty and justice both iii regard to your re-
ligious and secular affairs.' 3 The proclainalion also stated that the
former Turkish administration was to be replaced by a British one, a
move later interpreted as the first stage of annexation. The inhab-
itants of Basra. seemed content that the British would protect them
from the Turks and assumed that the previous administration would never
return.
'Tel. no. 47G, GOC 'D' to Crewe, 20 Nov 14, FO/371/2l144/73932.
2Tel. no. 57G, GOC'D' to Crewe, 24 Nov 14, FO/371/2lL4/74868.
3Basra Proclamation by Sir P.Z.Cox, 23 Nov 14, W0/95/14.965,
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At this point, a mere two weeks and seventy miles into the cam-
paign, the idea of capturing Baghdad first appeared. No sooner had
Percy Cox entered Basra than he wired to Hardinge that he 'found it
difficult to see how we can avoid taking over Baghdad.' 1 This 1da was
seconded by the Sheikh of Koweit who telegraphed Cox on 25 November:
'Your victories have delighted me; next, please "od, you will take
Baghdad and what is connected with it.' 2
 Cox's telegram of 22 November
is generally regarded as the first mention of the idea of a longer
advance, but in reality the move had been considered when Britain
first declared war. Hard.inge wrote to Crewe on 5 November that Basra
should fall easily, then 'it will be time enough to consider what fur-
ther action we can take in the direction of Bandad.' 3 In another let-
ter that same day, he admitted that the 500 miles between Baghdad and
Basra was a 'serious matter' but he thought it possible that the Arabs
could capture and hold the city. with the flussians operating in the
Caucasus, the Turks could not afford to spare the troops to recapture
Thus, Cox's proposal fell on sympathetic ears.
By the 25th, Cox and Barrett were studying the 'topographical de-
tails tearing on the question . . . in case that course should be de-
cided on.' 5
 Cox thought that the lack of high-quality Turkish troops,
the reportedly pro-British population of Baghdad, and the good weather
all argued in favour of immediate action while the effects of the
1Stephen Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, (London, 1953), p. 78.
tel., Sheikh of Koweit to Cox, 25 Nov 1k, F0/37l/2k79/1081.
3Letter, Hardinge to Crewe, 5 Nov 1k, CRW/C/211..
4Letter, Hanlingeto Sir Valentine Chirol, 5 Nov 1k, HDG/93/2/244.
5Pvt. tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 2.5 Nov 1k, I0/L/MIL/5/7k9.
opening British victories were still, fresh. Baghdad could only serve
as an irritant in Turkish hands, and as a base for further hostile op-
erations. he latest reports stated that the city was held by only
2,000 troops. 1 Hardinge supported the idea to some extent, telling
Duff that taking Baghdad would assure Arab cooperation and would 'make
urkis expulsion from Arabia almost a certainty. 2 Nevertheless, he
realised the possible disaster that could occur should suth a quicic move
with inadequate forces be thwarted. Thus, the first hint of expansion
In Mesopotamian policy began to form: 'What a pity It is that we ever
wasted any of our troops in East Africa' ,3 a glimpse of future attempts
to secure the return of Indian troops fighting in other theatres. Har-
dinge also theorised about the possible return of two brigades from
duty in Egypt If the General Staff thought the Baghdad advance feasible.
He realised that, in spite of the vast political advantages that would
accrue, the 'military aspect comes first, the political situation is
dependent upon it. '' Duff agreed. 'Politically it offers much advan-
tage and if I were in a better position In regard to available troops
I should not,hesitate.' 5 Thus, Cox had support of his belief in 'the
impossibility of getting down to a purely passive defence if the Arabs
of Iraq were to co-operate with Great Britain.'6
Luckily, London overruled such plans. While all Cox's political
'Tel. no. 616, Cox to 10, 25 Nov 1k, F0/371/2l114/7532l.
2Letter, Hardinge to Duff, 25 Nov 1k, HDG/102/2/805.
31bid.
kLetter, Hardinge to Duff, 25-26 Nov 1k, 1-nY/lo2/2/807.
5Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 25 Nov 3k, HDG/l02/l/968.
Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox, (London, 19k]-), p. 182.
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arguments, echoed by Hardinge, rang true, the authorisation to advance
could have produced no more chance of success than did the attempt a
year later, and. for the same reasons: not enough transport, not enough
troops. Although the transport difficulty had not yet made itself
widely felt, the first hints of it have already been noted. As for
the troops, Crewe conunented on this. 'In the absence of extensive
power to reinforce we must not cut more cake than we can eat." Crewe
favoured control rather than forward movement as the means to maintain
a hold on Mesopotamia. Although the India Office would frequently
preach caution over the following months, more arid more authority be-
gan to fall on the 'man on the spot', which was to cause much debate
at the Mesopotamia Commission. Nevertheless, on 27 November 191k Crewe
ordered plans for Baghdad to be dropped 'as there are grave international
considerations involved', 2 although an advance to Kurna was authorised.
This advance was supported by Barrow in a lengthy minute to the
Secretary of State. Again, the argument infavour of the advance was
'prestige.' Barrow's first point in his 27. November minute stated that
'a policy of passive inactivity is to be deprecated if we are to con-
tinue to impress the Arab and Indian world with our ability to defeat
all designs against us.' 3 Further, and more to the point tactically,
Kurna's position at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates, where
they form the Shatt-al-Arab, controlled the entire waterway to the
Gulf that deep-draught ships could employ. Possession of the area up
to Kurna gave the British control of extensive telegraph lines and all
Meso Comin, Crewe, 111. Sep 1 , statement.
2Tel. no. 1418, Crewe to Hardinge, 27 Nov 1k, FO/371/2l44/82l90.
3Minute by Barrow, 27 Nov 14, wO/106/877, pp. l011.
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the most fertile Mesopotamlan land. Barrow also noted that Persian
Arabistan would be 'completely' covered and safeguarded from Turkish
intrigues. (This notion of 'bomplete' coverage would be used again to
support thrusts to Ahwaz, Amara, and Kut-al-Amara.) Strategically, it
would give London the time necessary to gauge Arab sentiment and 'frame
a policy for the future.' 1
 As it was to turn out, although the time
was available for careful planning, it was not done by either India or
the India Office, and disjointed control of the cam.ign was to end in
its almost total disintegration after Ctesiphon.
However, with short-range policy in hand, Barrett quickly moved
on Kurna. A force of some three battalions embarked and steamed up-
river on the evening of 3 December. It arrived and immediately de-
ployed to attack the following morning. Well-concealed Turkish ar-
tillery kept the force at bay and little progress was made. The de-
tachinent was reinforced to five battalions with supporting guns on the
5th and another attack on the Turkish positions ensued the following
day. The troops were barred from the town by the Tig±is as much as
by the Turks 1
 and It took a river crossing above the town on 8 Decem-
ber and a concerted two-pronged assault to surround the Turks and
force their surrender. 2
 Thus the site attributed to the Garden of
Eden became British property, as did the entire Shatt-al-Arab and its
environs. Barrett ordered the occupation of Shaiba on 4 December as an
anchor for the desert flank.
An Indian Government report on the campaign's inception later
'Minute by Barrow, 27 Nov lZi, W0/l06/877, pp. 10-11.
2Barker, Neglected War, pp. 51-55.
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stated: 'Our prestige was restored. A pbsition of great strategical
importance had been secured with little loss. The friendly Arabs were
confirmed, at least for the time being, in their loyal attitude, and the
oil works at Abadan had been saved from destruction.
	 with every-
thing settled militarily, temporarily anyway, a British administration
began to be organised. Order had been restored upon British arrival,
and several Arabs caught looting had been hanged. Cox and Barrett
recommended a military administration and appointed officers to direct
mä±tial law. 2
 Cox assumed that India would be the final administrative
authority, and Crewe confirmed this on 11 December, on the grounds that
local control should be handled on the spot, rather than from London,
as 'Sir B. Grey will not wish to be consulted regarding administrative
matters which do not raise international questions.' 3
 The new author-
ities found that 'the area was in an indescribably filthy condition
with plague, smallpox, cholera, dysentery, malaria and typhus, endemic,
no sanitary system, and the river and creeks the sole source of water
supply.'4
As the local administration began to deal with these problems,
larger plans were being conceived for the area as a whole. These plans
concentrated, not surprisingly, on impressing local Arabs. Sir Wil-
liam Wiflcocks, who had extensively surveyed the area before the war,
suggested to the India Office that a railway line should be built. He
claimed that the Baghdad Railway had strongly impressed the inhabitants,
and that a British line would inspire the Arabs to 'more readily go
1 'Precis of Correspondence Regarding the Mesopotamian Expedition:.
Its Genesis and Development', WO/106/877, p. 8.
2, tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 5 Dec 14, FO/37l/2l1I4/79149.
3Letter no. P4726/14, Holderness to FO, 11 Dec 14, FO/37l/2lL4/8l737.
4G. Buchanan, The Tragedy of Nesopotamia, (Edinburgh,1938), p.5.
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against the Turks, whom they hate like poison.' 1
 Wilicocks stressed
that the railway would lead to the idea of a permanent British occupa-..
tion. Sir Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office wrote on L December that
lower Mesopotamia not only represented a vast commercial interest
worth claiming, but annexation would convince the Arabs that the Brit-
ish meant to bar the return of 'the hated Turkish overlords.' He re-
commended that Cox study the situation and submit a report on the best
method of establishing British influence.2
Cox recommended immediate annexation of Basra. Hardinge seconded
this, saying that British supreaacy in the Gulf would be permanently
established, the oil works would be safeguarded, the local sheikhs
would be more strongly tied, the Baghdad Railway terminus question
would be resolved, and the area's commerce would prove profitable.
F'urther, to abandon the area after even a temporary occupation would
destroy Arab faith in Britain, 3
 assuming there was any faith in the
first place. Hardinge wrote private]y to Lo:M Curzon stating that the
Shatt-al-Arab area was easily defensible owing to the navigation and
supply difficulties any invading force from up-river would undergo.4
Cox proceeded with the argument that the iimnediate need was to pacify
the Arabs if 'we wish countryside both here and Et Kurn to settle down
quickly.'5
It was the 'grave international considerations' which led to the
'Letter, Wilicocks to 10, 30 Nov ill., FO/371/2480/].4l3.
2Minute by E.A.Crowe, FO, 4 Dec 111, FO/371/2144/7866l.
3pvt. tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 7 Dec 14, FO/371/2l144/85892.
4Letter, Hardinge to Curzon, 114. Dec 14, IO/L/LUR.MSs./112/1o6.
5Tel. no. 88, Cox to IndGovt, 10 Dec 14, FO2'37]./2482/1412O.
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veto of the Baghdad advance, and which also stopped the announcement
of permanent occuation. Crewe telegraphed Hard.inge that such a proc-
lamation 'would be regarded as definite breach of the understanding
between allies that final settlement must await
	 end of the war.'1
At this early stage, no promises could be made to Russia or France as
to annexations, especially of Constantinople, which Russia greatly de-
sired, although that reluctance would change in time. December 191k
was still too early to make promises: '. . . although we are abso-.
lutely confident of ultimate result, the war has not reached a state
which justifies annexations 2 Sir Edward Grey agreed totally with
Crewe's answer and reasoning, 3
 but Cox consistently argued that some-
thing concrete had to be offered to the Arabs. }Iardinge was finally
able to secure permission for Cox to unofficially and privately tell
the local sheikhs and. notables that the Turks would not be allowed to
return to reinstate their pre-war authority.1
In spite of the attempts by both the Foreign and India Offices
to calm the exansionis± desires directed towards Mesopotarnia, the
official proziouncements did little to curb speculation about the pos-
sibility of gaining territory, especially Baghdad. Perhaps Hardinge
and Cox were somewhat encouraged by Crewe's explanation of the Cabi-
net's refusal to sanction the early advance. The tone of Crewe's pri-
vate telegram to Hardinge was one of regret at circumstances forcing a
delay, for Crewe stated 'I quite agree as to our permanent Interest there.'5
1Pvt. tel., Crewe to Hardinge, 9 Dec 14, FO/371/2144/85892.
3Letter no. 81737/14, FO to 10, 15 Dec 14, FO/37l/21k4/81737.
4Letter no. 85892/14, FO to 10, 2.5 Dec 14, FO/371/2144/8 .5892; pv-t.
tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 19 Dec 14, F0/371/2l44/85892.
5pv-t. tel., Crewe to Hardinge, 30 Nov 14, I0/L/MIL/5/749.
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Cox began to alter his arguments for the city's capture from a quick
action to a methodical advance. 'We might . . . expect to gain with-
out bloodshed and by negotiation possession of Arriara and so on by
stages to Baghdad: our communications being made good as we go." Cox
depended heavily on cooperation by the Tigris Arab tribes. He advocated
ignoring the hostile Euphrates tribes as much as possible while using
the offices of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and. Koweit, plus the threat
of possible Russian domination from the north, as openings to friendly
relations along the Tig±is. Further, if the decision against the
Baghdad advance was really due to lack of troops instead of the avowed
political considerations, Cox had an idea to counter that point. He
wrote to Hardinge that, after studying Crewe's telegrams on the sub-
ject, it was 'difficult to avoid conjecture that His Najesty's Govern-
ment do contemplate in abstract ultimate control of British in Mesopo-
tamla' ,2 and he had a fairly easy answer to the problem of a shortage
of troops. He reasoned that among the millions of men engaged in
France, 'the presence of a Division, more or less, of Indian troops
• . . could hardly have any appreciable effect on the ultimate issue
of the war iii Europe. '3
There was probably no one more imperialistic where Mesopotaania
was concerned than Sir Percy Cox, but he was not alone in his fixation
with Baghdth. While he was arguing with India and London in November
and December, the question of Baghdad was being quietly and unofficially
discussed among top-level personnel. Grey was approached by Lord
1Tel. no. 82-B, Cox to IndGov-t, 3 Dec iLl, FO/371/2Ll79/17000.
2Letter, Cox to Hardinge, 18 Dec iLl., HDG/102/l/lill.
3Ibid.
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Inchcape, who had considerable dealings with the river commerce in
Mesopotamia before the war. Inchcape pointed out the suitability of
Cox, in his key position as Chief Political Officer, as agent for
bringing Mesopotanda 'under civilised and decent Government.' To con-
trol Baghdad would control the trade centre of Mesopotaniia and would
weaken Turkish prestige while it would raise that of the British. 'Now
is our chance to get hold of the Baghdad-Busreh section of the Baghdad
Railway . . . and to make the Gulf what Lord Lansdowne said it ought
to be, a British lake." Grey passed these arguments on to the India
Office, showing that even at the highest governmental levels Baghdad
could rt be forgotten. In spite of the official line of 'grave in-.
ternationa]. considerations', Crewe admitted that he would 'be prepared
to consider that step to Baghdad in due course. But for the moment
military considerations predominate. 2
Crewe reiterated this in a letter to Curzon dealing with Baghdad
and Mesopotamia. The shortage bf troops dictated a cautious policy,
both personal and political. Grewe noted that since Mesopotamia was
the only campaign directed entirely by his office--' our Indian ewe-
lamb'--it was regrettable that so nany troops had gone on to other ex-
peditions under War Office control. Thus he could not risk defeat so
far inland, following which 'we should have to slink back towards the
Gulf, which would be humiliating and quite destructive of our credit
locafly.' Thus Kurria became the objective rather than Baghdad
. . it gives us a good winning position in the game of chess, if
not quite so brilliant a one as the possession of Baghdad would.'3
1Letter, Lord Inchcape to Grey, 3 Dec 14, FO/37]./2144/7866l.
2Letter no. P4796/14, 10 to FO, 12 Dec 14, FO/37l/2lL4/82l9O.
3Letter, Crewe to Curzon, 4 Dec 14, IO/L/EUR.MSS./F112/106.
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So Baghdad was again pushed aside for the moment as Kurna fell and
the British consolidated their hold. on the Shatt-al-Arab. Apparently
their fear of a religious uprising was groundless, at least temporar-
ily. In late November the Sultan in Constantinople declared a Jehad,
but the effect in Mesopotamia and. Persia was negligible. Cox informed
Hardirige that 'the appeals which emanated from the Mujtehids of Meso-
potamia are regarded by local sheikhs as having been issued under for-
cible pressure by Turkish authorities and the idea is ridiculed of
there being any.cause for a holy war.' 1 The proclamation was also
ridiculed in Constantinople, where Liman von Sanders noted that 'the
holy war bore the appearance of unreality because Turkey was allied
with Christian States and Gernan and Austrian officers and men were
,2
serving in the Turkish Army. Thus, any Arab answering the call of
Jehad coiild technically have fought against either or both of the op-
posing forces in Mesopotamia. As it was, the Arabs could be defined
as friendly or hostile depending on their proximity to the battle line;
and most of the Arab troops fighting in the Turkish Army were either -
imported or impressed. ]ln Saud was the only major Arab leader in
the Mesopotamian area to form a new alliance with the British, 3 but
he never actively supported them in hostilities. His stand may, how-
ever, have influenced other tribes into passivity, if not open support
of Force 'D', but this is open to speculation.
The attitudes of the Arabs varied from tribe to tribe, so the
British could never be sure of any place being continually hospitable.
'Letter, Cox to Hardirge, 18 Dec i li, IO/L/EEJR.MSS./Fl12/106.
2Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, (Annapolis, 1927), p. 35.
3Tel. no. P4767, Hardinge to Grey, 29 Dec 14, FO/371/2479/20l630.
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Taking this into account, it s not surprising that, soon after the oc-
cupation of Kurna, other Arab strongholds became the subjects of dis-
cussion as possible military targets. Th'ei local sheikhs from Ainara as-
sured Cox that the Arabs could disperse the Turkish force on the Tig-
ris and give Ainara to Force 'D' without a fight1 1 'The Ainara town
possesses considerable commercial importance and. from an administra-
tive point of view it would be convenient if the district came under
ou± control', Cox explained to Hardinge, but Cox could not make a full
recommendation until he had 'fuller knowledge than we now possess as to
present and ultimate intentions • • . of His Majesty's Government.'2
This lack of a formulated policy did not deter Barrow from advocating
moves to pacify Arab tribes • Whereas Cox looked to Ainara and Arab co-
operation, Barrow concerned himself with possible Arab hostility on
the Euphrates. Barrow saw Nasiriyah as a point of departure for a
Turkish flanking attack on Basra, a manoeuvre which actually took
place in March and. April 1915. Nasiriyah in British hands would give
Force 'D' control of the Euphrates, which flowed to Kurna and Basra.3
Hardinge opposed any such move, as Kurna was strategically sound and
any move from there involved a reat increase in th& lines of communi-
cation.4
 This was, unfortunately, the last time Hardinge would object
to an advance for this reason.
The question of an advance was not forgotten, but as the new year
began those ideas were held in abeyance for a few weeks as the situation
'Tel. no. 93-B, Cox to IndGovt, 12 Dec 14, F0/37l/2482/14l20.
2Tel. no. 108-B, Cox to IndGovt, 20 Dec 14, F0/37l/2482/14120.
3Minute by Barrow, 111. Dec 14, I0/L/MIL/5/749.
4Letter, Hardinge to Chirol, 17 Dec 14, HDG/93/2/27o.
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concerning Persia and the Arabs remained unsettled. Both the Turks and
the Allies still courted Persian support. Owing to a military neces-
sity, Russian troops were withdrawn from part of northern Persia where
they faced a Turkish force • Sazonov urged the British Ambassador in
Teheran to make all the political use he could of this withdrawal,
giving out that it was a voluntary move in order to meet the wishes
of the Persian Government • Thus, the Persians would have reason to
protest against the presence of Turkish troops who . remained in the
area, perhaps even bringing Persia to the point of severing relations
with Turkey. 1 The troop. withdrawal onJy concerned a few hundred men
being transferred to another front, but the Russians did not want it
construed as a Turkish victory. This move apparently had little ef-
fect, as Hardinge noted that rumours of a Turco-Persian military alli-
ance were still rife. Given that Persia had no military capability,
Hardinge speculated that a British war against her could be profitable,
Since he saw Britain keeping as much of the Gulf area as possible, the
Viceroy wrote that such a conflict 'will give us the opportunity of
seizing the islands or anything that we may consider desirable from
that moribund, state.' 2 In the light of his constant complaints con-
cerning lack of troops, for offence or defence, it is fortunate that
Hardinge kept such opinions private. Cox was able to keep a balance
between the two diverse ideas of Hardinge and Sazonov, reminding the
Indian Government that Persia was too difficult to defend with avail-
able forces and that her neutrality, aided by British 'material as-
sistance', remained the most advantageous alternative.3
1Pvt. tel., Crewe to Hardinge, 4 Jan 15, FO/371/2479/17000.
2Letter, Hardinge to Nicolson, 6 Jan 15, FO/800/377.
3Te1. no. 31-B, Cox to ndGovt, 8 Jan 15, FO/37l/2479/17000.
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Persia remained, however, a target for Turkish propaganda, es-
pecially of a religious nature. One editorial of the time spoke of
an l89i. speech of Gladstone's in which he blamed the Koran for upset-
ting world peace, and it claimed that the present British Government
maintained Gladstone's attitudes by waging war against Moslem nations.
'This she does to find profitable markets for her avaricious traders,
carrying out her policy under religious pretexts so as to secure for
herself the support of her fanatical 	 , 1 (The author refrained
from mentioning that the Jehad was announced with much the same reli-
gious pretext to support ermany's economic and military goals.) The
British still feared the possible spread of holy war and even conducted
discussions with the Fr.ench to map out religious strategy. 2 Sources
in the Gulf region had. a more realistic view. The Koweit Political
Agent 'stated definitely' that there was never any question of the
Arabs fighting a holy war declared from Constantinople. He reported
that everyone realised the political rather than the religious nture
of the war. In fact, the Arab upper classes, who knew the factsof
the situation, sympathised with Great Britain. The sympathy was due
'partly to past experience of Turkish misrule, and partly to the con-
viction that the Turkish official who systematically robs pilgrims to
Mecca . . . cannot be regarded as a good Moslem. '
Whether for political or religious reasons, the Turks considered
the Arabs unreliable. They had originally planned to employ the major
Arab tribes from the Gulf to the Suez against the British, but actions
'Tel. no. 279, Townley to Grey, 1 Jan 15, FO/37]./211.78/352.
2Letter, Bertie to Grey, 1 Jan 15, FO/37l/2Ll8O/l942.
3Tel. no. C-57, Political Agent, Koweit to IndGovt, 6 Jan 15,
FO/37]./2L1.83/216 61i.
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of the Sharif of Mecca nd Ibn Saud effectively secured the British
hold on both east and west. 1 The revolt led by the Sharif of Mecca
never directly affected the Mesopotainian Arabs, but the support, albeit
rather passive, of Ibn Saud was believed to be a major political vic-
tory for the British • Ibn Saud' s battle against the Turkish-supported
Ibn Rashid in late January was somewhat inconclusive, but it did manage
to keep Rashid from supporting Turkey to the exlent Constantinople had
hoped. The India Office foresaw Saud's possible importance in post-
war Arabia and urged the Foreign Office to conclude a treaty with him
not only for 'the immediate services which he is expected to render
but also for the political power for mischief which . . • he will pos-
sess and if permanently estranged will doubtless exercise.' 2
 Although
a treaty that Ibn Saud had made with the Turks the previous May was
discovered, Hardinge claimed that the Turkish hostilities directed by
Germany effectively abrogated that treaty. He urged the conclusion of
a treaty guaranteeing Saud's independence and. maintenance in return
for a most-favoured-nation status
As the political inanoeuvrings of early January followed their
course, the military situation remained fairly quiet. Kurria was rein-
forced and strengthened, but came under intense sniping and harassment.
On 20 January Barrett ordered a raid on Turkish positions up the Tig-
ris, both to show the locals that the force could and would keep fight-
mug, and. to keep the troops from becoming stale through inaction.4
Te1. no. S.1316, XS md to Wa, 19 Jan 15, FO/371/2479/1l837.
2Letter no. P350/15, Ia to FO, 30 Jan 15, FO/371/211.79/11837.
3Pv't. tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 29 Jan 15, IO/L/MIL/5/749.
4Moberly, vol. 1, pp. 163-65.
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Although the harassment eased immediately afterwards, the Turk were
far from finished with their assaults on Force 'D' • Barrett's men at
this time had to concern themselves with three possible avenues of at-
tacks the Euphrates, the Tigris, and toward the Karun. A 23 January
intelligence report stated that a 12,000 strong force from Baghdad was
dividing to cover each of these three routes.' This information was
followed a week later by a Russian report that Baghdad was being rein-
forced from Aleppo in the west and Bitlis in the north. 2
 Such reports
only served to support the opinions that Cox and Barrow had advanced
earlier that further action had to be taken along the rivers. As to
Barrow's suggestion of an advance to Nasiriyah, Hardinge opposed it as
too dangerous in the face of possible Turkish reinforcement. He noted
that such an advance 'would take us directly toward Kerbela and the
Holy Places, which might be used by the Turks to excite religious op-
position,' 3
 Hardinge preferred to await developments.
Cox remained insistent about Ainara, however. Political1r, Amara
in Turkish hands could only hurt the British position. Being within
thirty miles of the Persian border, the Turks could easily use it as a
base for operations and proaganda. In British hands, Amara could be
used as a base to control the Ben! lam tribe, the most influential of
the area and a constant threat to both Nohaininerah and. the oil interests.
It would also revive the Basra-Amara-Ahwaz trade route, the maintenance
of which would be an economic inducement to the Arabs to remain quiet.
Further, it was a promising region to begin the irrigation project
'Tel. no. 1595, Crewe to Hardinge, 23 Jan 15, I0/L/MIL/5/79.
2Tel. no. 116, Buchanan to FO, 30 Jan 15, F0/371/2477/11352.
3Tel. no. H2705, Hardinge to Crewe, 20 Jan 15, I0/L/L/5/79/609.
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surveyed by Wi].].cocks prior to the war and recommended to Constanti-
nople by the local Turkish officials.' Cox later added that an ad-
vance would do much to placate Arabs who were gradually becoming rest-
less, thinking that the British were lacking in determination. Again
Hardinge opposed such a move on the grounds of military weakness.2
This weakness must have weighed heavily on Hardinge, for on 27
January he informed Crewe that the possible increase in Turkish num-
bers 'in our view denotes further pressure on General Barrett', so he
asked permission to reinforce Barrett with another brigade. 3
 Crewe had
also received the intelligence reports, so he immediately approved the
action. Crewe noted the possibility of an attack on Ahwaz and the
oil works, and this reinforcement was to aid in defending them. Cox
supported the probability of trouble on the Karun, reporting the fol-
lowing day that local officials could not guarantee the support of
area tribes or the protection of the European personnel. 5
 Crewe grew
increasingly worried about the situation, and suggested an immediate
transfer of troops from Basra to Ahwaz, since other troops (the 12th
Brigade en route from India) had no chance of arriving in time to
6forestall a possible uprising. Hardirige opposed this Idea also. Basra
and Kurna were more important than the oil fields, he thought, and to
'Tel. no. 12-B, Cox to indGovt, 3 Jan 15, F0/371/2482/1L,120.
tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 20 Jan 15, F0/371/211.79/l2518.
3Pv-t. tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 27 Jan 15, HD(/102/2/1O6l.
Tel. no. 1603, Crewe to Hardinge, 27 Jan 15, I0/L/MILf5/7L1.9.
re1. no. 137-B, Cox to IridGovt, 28 Jan 15, IO/L/MIL/5/711.9/L1.922.
6Tel, no. 1607, Crewe to Hardinge, 29 Jan 15, HDGf1O2/1/1296.
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weaken one or the other to protect Ahwaz would threaten his base of
operations. Hathirige conceded that Barrett could make the move if he
thought it feasible, but it should be his decision, as he was the 'man
on the spot' and could gauge local needs where India could not . The
position of 'man on the spot' here makes its appearance in making strat-
egy in Mesopotamia. 11 was a position often to be invoked in the corn-
ing year.
Since Crewe had made the point of Force 'D's' extra responsibil-
ities on the Karun, Hardinge saw the opportunity of perhaps gaining
some reinforcements from outside India to meet those responsibilities.
He asked for the return of a division from Egypt. He also wrote pri-
vately to Crewe that although the situation was not critical, an extra
brigade would be helpful. He reiterated that Ahwaz was not important
enough a possession to be protected. To show how little weight the
Viceroy gave to the oil interests in Persia, Hardinge wrote that the
troops were too few in number 'to allow them to be dissipated in small
parties to protect British interests at points which are not vital to
us.' 2 Crewe appealed to the War Office for more troops. The India
Office asked for eight battalions of Territorials, which could finish
their training in India while on garrison duty, thus freeing trained
troops for service overseas. 3 The controversy over British military
aid to India would continue for quite some time, but meanwhile the
Secretary of State and Viceroy had reached the conclusion that the 12th
- 1Tel. no. 107, Hardinge to Crewe, 30 Jan 15, HDG/102/2/1079.
2Letter, Hardinge to Crewe, 30 Jan 15, CRW/C/24.
3Letter no. 1610, Barrow to Wa, 30 Jan 15, IO/L/MIL/5/79.
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Brigade alone would be insufficient to meet Mesopotainian heeds and re-
inforcements to two full divisions should be instituted.' With this
decision, Hardinge's objections to advances on the Tigris and Euphrates
were dropped, and. Hardinge decided that he should go to Mesopotamia
himself to discuss future plans and settle administrative details.2
Hardirige's ten-day trip to Mesopotamia resulted in a marked change
in his attitude towards operations there. Whereas prior to this trip
he advocated holding the Shatt-al-Arab area and going no further, his
outlook thereafter became one of expansion. Hardinge inspected the
otposts at Kurna and Shaiba, and perhaps the intense sniping and. har-
assinent he experienced persuaded him that Force 'D' was far from se-
cure. He told the Mesopotamia Commission later that while in the field
he decided to support Barrow's proposal for a move to Nasiriyah, which
he realised would instigate further advances elsewhere. 3
 In order to
expand the hold on southern Mesopotamia, however, Barrett would require
more troops, ièich were In short supply. As the month of February
progressed and the threat of Impending Thrkish attack grew, a great de-
bate raged between India and London over the questioti of who would pro-
vide the reinforcements.
It was not a new question. As early as 27 November Duff had told
Hardinge that 'short of abandoning India altogether, we have done ev-
erything possible to help in both France and gypt and must now con-
fine our efforts to replacing wastage as best we can--and even that is
far from easy.' 4
 With an eye to possible trouble on the Northwest
1Pvt. tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 31 Jan 15, HDG/102/2/1079a.
tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 28 Dec 14, CRW/I/20/l.
3Meso Comm, Hardinge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16437.
4Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 27 Nov 14, HDG/102/l/982a.
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Frontier, Duff recommended, that India 'must close down the liberal
help we have hitherto given freely to the Empire.' 1
 Thus, Hardinge
had to try elsewhere to get his troops. While in Mesopotamla, he tele-
graphed to Crewe for help from Britain but, although Crewe agreed that
Force 'D' needed to be strengthened, he could not get any help from
the War Office. 2
 Crewe's main concern was defence, however, and the
worsening situation on the Karun inspired his support of the expansion.
He asked Hardinge to provide the manpower from India. The Viceroy re-
plied that the War Office should reconsider, because 'when troops are
required to avert a danger which is threatening her security, India
has a first claim on the Indian Army.' 3
 Hardinge's suggestion was to
reinforce at the expense of the East African campaign, a theatre he
had opposed from the begimiing.
Having reached an impasse, India and the India Office both started
casting about elsewhere for troops. Barrow transferred three battalions
from China, but their arrival in Mesopotamnia would be delayed, so he
urged India to send. replacements 'on credit', so to peak, to meet the
present danger while the troops from China were en rou+e to replace the
troops Hard,inge sent. The India Office also went to the Admiralty
for troops. After explaining the situation, Crewe enquired 'whether
considering the important naval interests involved at Abadan and in
the Gulf generally, the Lords of the Admiralty are disposed to send.
one or more battalions of Marines.' 5 Since the shipment of 20,000
1Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 29 Nov lLI, HDG/88/l/1143.
2Tel. no. 1628, Crewe to Hardinge, 
.5 Feb 15, IO/L/MIL/5/749.
3Tel. no. H3321, Hardinge to Crewe, 16 Feb 15, HDG/1O2/2/llLl2.
Te1. no. l661i, Barrow to Hardinge, 22 Feb 15, IO/L/MIL/5/7L1.9.
5Letter no. 1672, 10 to ADM, 26 Feb 15, IO/L/MIL/5/768.
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Marines to East Africa had just been cancelled, surely the force could
sre some men to defend Admiralty interests. The Admiralty 'regretted'
that none could be made available.
H.rdinge stood firm in the face of these refusals. Since India had
been so generous at the start of the war, he reasoned, now it was Bri-
tain's time to return the favour. In response,) Crewe asked him to put
together a brigade of Territorials just in case of emergency, to be on
hand in case of need.' A disturbance near Ahwaz in early March con-
firmed Crewe' s fears and he finally perauadM the Cabinet to permit
the increase in Force 'D'. Hardinge was directed on k March to send
the brigade of Territorials to Mesopotamia immediately, and the re-
sulting deficiency in India would be made good from Egypt or East Af-
rica.2
 Crewe altered this order to a mixed brigade rather than an
all-Territorial force • He hoped to allay the Viceroy' s fears of de-
creasing India 's defence force by stating that Hardinge and Duff were
'entirely relieved of responsibility for consequences of further reduc-
tion of Indian internal defences for this purpose.' 3
 He sought to
further lessen Hardinge's worries by assuring him of the quick arri-
val of replacements from Egypt. In spite of these assurances, Har-
dirige expressed his anger in a private letter to Crewe. He complained
that he was being ignored and India was being forgotten. He was shocked
that London expected him to send Territorials to fight in Mesopotamia,
which 'betrays such an absolute disregard by the Cabinet of the views
'Tel. no. 1682, Crewe to Hardinge, 3 Mar 15, IO/L/NIL/5/750.
2Tel. no ' 1683, Crewe to Hardinge, l . Mar 15, IO/L/NIL/5/750.
3Tel. no. 1689, Crewe to Hardinge, 5 Mar 15, IO/L/MIL/5/750.
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of the Govt. of India, and of Indi&s needs, that I really despair not
only of the future but also of the present' if London could not even
grant a request for a few troops.'
Nevertheless, troops left India for the Gulf, and. their arrival
was timely. The situation in the oil fields had. been deteriorating.
Although India tried to ignore the Ahwaz front, London could not. Crewe
conceded that Basra and Kurna were important, but a defeat at Ahwaz
would lay Basra open to a flank attack and ruin any chance of tribal
support in the area. As the debate over the troops went on, Barrett
was forced to send a detachment north to meet 'the Turkish threat.2
There was doubt in London that without a larger commitment to the oil
field defence, a Turkish invasion of western Persia might touch off a
tribal revolt throughout the frontier area • Barrow told the Foreign
Office that Britain 'may have to submit tamely to the annihilation of
both our prestige and our material interests in Persian Arabistan.'
That, coupled with a Turkish build-up along the Euphrates, 'Turkish in-
trigue, Gerinan gold and fanatical influences may cause the defection
of one or more of our leading chiefs. '3 Barrow suggested the immediate
despatch to India of a division from one of the new armies to free
trained Indian troops for action.
Barrow's minute painted a gloomy picture, and justifiably so. The
Europeans at Ahwaz had evacuated the town and British gunboats had,
with tacit Persian permission, steamed up the Karun followed by a
1Letter, Hardinge to Oree, 9 Mar 15, CRW/C/24.
2Tel. no. 1615, Crewe to Hardinge, 1 Feb 15, wO/106/877, p. 16.
3Minute by Barrow, 1 Feb 15, FO/37l/214.82/ll975.
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regiment of Rajputs. The Sheikh of Mohamrnerah aided this with a thou-
sand of his own tribesmen 'whom he hopes will be against jehad." Har-
dinge, in a long telegram to Crewe on 3 March, echoed Barrow's appre-
hension; not only was the Karun front troublesome, but the Tigris and
Euphrates lines were also being threatened by Turks with the aid of
Arab auxiliaries • The Viceroy feared the extent of the Arab movement,
and doubted the ability of Barrett's 14,000 men to handle the situa-
tion. 2 General Robinson's command of six companies and a few guns on
the Karun fought an engagement against a vastly superior force on 3
March 1915 and were forced back with heavy losses. 3 Intelligence re-
ports stated that a large force was also gathering some sixteen miles
west of Basra and an 'attack on Basra by this force may be expected at
'4
any time.
Thus, with the situation deteriorating on all sides, the Cabinet
decision to strengthen Force 'D' to two divisions was a wise one. Al-
though Crewe privately thought that reports of vast numbers of enemy
troops were overrated, he had to bow to superior military authorities
who believed in the approaching danger. 5 Nevertheless, he realised
that Basra was too important to risk, and he supported the increase of
troops for Mesopotamia's defence. Hardinge, as stated earlier, had
been looking for troops to expand, rather than merely defend, the hold
on lower Mesopotainia, and. with the size of Force 'D' enlarged to a
'Secret tel., Hardinge to Crewe, 7 Feb 15, W0/106/877, p. 16.
2Tel. no. 3517, Hardinge to Grey, 3 Mar 1.5, F0/371/2482/25893.
3Moberly, vol. 1, pp. 183-85.
4Tel. no. 382-B, Cox to P0, 4 Mar 15, F0/371/2482/25893.
5Letter, Crewe to Hardinge, 12 Mar 1.5, CRW/C/22.
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corps he knew it would soon be time to	 . Although present circum-
stances indicated that the force would do we].]. to hold its own, Hardinge
supported the appointment of Lieutenant-General Sir John E. Nixon to
command of I.E.F. 'D', a general well known for his support for offen-
sive strategy. His arrival and supersession of Barrett in early April
191.5 marked a drastic change in the nature of the Mesopotm1n operations.
CHAFPER 3
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BASRA VILkYE'T
APRIL--OCTOBER 1915
Force 'D' expanded to two divisions arid supporting troops when
the War Office agreed in early March to despatch the 30th Brigade di-
rect from Egypt to the Persian Gulf. Crewe suggested that as a re-
sult of this increase It might be necessary to expand 'eneral Bar-
rett's staff to assist in the administration of three brigades, which
could be too 'heavy a charge in addition to his other responsibili-
ties.' 1
 Barrow stated that the expansion of the staff to corps size
was unnecessary considering the distribution of the force. The Indian
Government disagreed with Barrow, stating that the existing arrange-
ment 'constituted a grave danger to efficiency', 2
 so Force 'D' was
organised as an Army Corps. Although Crewe objected that the shortage
of 'experienced officers and impossibility of replacing them from Eng-
land makes It Imperative to economise', 3 Hardinge stood firm by Duff's
decision to reorganise the force and place it under the direction of a
new corps commander. Duff later told the Mesopotamia Commission that
appointing General Sir John Nixon was a natural decision, as he had
been General Officer Commanding the Southern Army, whose troops made
up Force 'D'. He further stated that he thought Nixon to be an excellent
'Tel. no. 1700, Crewe to Hardinge, 10 Mar 15, L/MIL/5/750/1700.
2Tel. no. H.37Li.3, Hardinge to Crewe, 18 Mar 15, HD/102/2/1068.




Barrett's supersession as G.O.C. Force 'D' caused immediate con-
troverzy. Crewe later stated that he was surprised by the move and
'felt there was no particular reason for it.' 2
 Barrow later testified
that he thought the Indian 'overnment was going too far in replacing
Barrett, but, since India was technically in charge of the campaign's
administration, they were within their rights to appoint Nixon. 3 The
news came as a surprise to Barrett, as Hardinge had made no hint of it
during his visit to Mesopotamia. He assumed that the Commander-in-
Chief had been displeased with his command and, upon hearing of his
replacement as G.0.C., resigned his divisional command on medical
grounds and left the country Mithin twenty-four hours • Barrett told
Cox just before he left that 'he had no reason to think that his con-
duct of the campaign with limited resources available had failed to
satisfy higher authority.' 4 He further believed that he was being
sacked for deploying his forces according to political advice rather
than by military necessity. That he did so can hardly be denied, but -
he did it on the orders of the Indian Government or the Secretary of
State. Hardirige, in a letter to the G.0.C. Force 'A' in France, stated
that Barrett 'has been dissipating their strength by sending driblets
to various places' 5 but Barrett's lack of troops and transport necessitated
'Meso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec -16, nos. 15706-78.
2Meso Cornin, Crewe, 14 Sep 16, no. 3047.
3Meso Comm, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, nos. 4.56-70.
4Pvt. tel., Cox to Viceroy, 7 Apr 15, HiX/89/l/239a.
5Letter, Hardinge to Willcocks (GOC'A'), 20 Mar 15, HDG/93/2/307.
his sending 'driblets' on errands up the Karun and against Arab raiders.
Haiinge's change of attitude after his visit to Mesopotarnia is
reflected in his support of Nixon's appointment. His original conser-
vatism had changed to an attitude of expansion, even though the India
Office's outlook remained unchanged. Crewe admitted that Barrett was
'not as I understand of the dashing school of officer', but since Crewe
had a 'general prepossession against advancing, at any rate in a hurry,
I felt sorry that the change was made.' 1
 He told the Commission that
he had originally believed it was done to give Nixon some active cam-
paigning, since the Northern Army G.O.C., Sir James Wilicocks, was in
France. Crewe knew Nixon's reputation as a 'fighting pushing kind of
general. And that did, I confess, make me a little nervous of devel-
opments. . . . if the matter had been in the discretion of the India
Office the change would not have been made.' 2 Cox felt that Barrett
'was probably better fitted to solve the Mesopotamian military problem
than his dashing successor.'3
The replacement may have been necessary anyway, as Barrett's med-
ical certificate stated that his resignation was owing to heart palpi-
tations and a severe case of dysentery. The Assistant Director of Med-
ical Services stated he did not think that Barrett's heart could have
stood up to the rigours of coiniand in the heat of the Mesopotamian sum-
mer.k There was never any official complaint about Barrett's command;
1Meso Coinm, Crewe, 1k Sep 16, no. 3011.7.
3Graves, p. 190.
kTel, no. HL1.393, Hardinge to Crewe, 23 April 15, IO/L/MIL/5/750/8013.
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Hardinge knew of no dissatisfaction at military headquarEers. 1
 The
shift of Indian attitude towards the conduct of the campaign itnmedi-
ately following Hardinge's visit, however, points clearly to the change
from Barrett, 'with rather less than average initiative or dash', 2 to
Nixon, with 'a high reputation as a fighting pushing officer.'
The Secretary of State was officially informed of the arrangement
of the II Indian Corps on 1 April; Nixon as Corps Commander, Barrett
as 6th Division Commander (until 7 April), Major-General George F. 'or-
ringe as 12th Division Commander, plus the 6th Cavalry Brigade and
corps troops. 3 Barrett resigned his post two days before Nixon's ar-
rival, and his place was taken by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend,
who arrived in Basra on 23 April. Crewe told Hardinge that the num-
ber of additional staff officers seemed large, especially in the light
of the expected limitation of movement during the hot weather. ' Thus,
three times, on 10 March, 19 March and 5 April, the India Office be-
rated the Indian Government for forming a corps organisation, yet In-
dia paid little or no heed, lending credence to the supposition that
they were envisioning a change of policy in Mesopotamia. Privately,
however, Crewe's disapproval of India's actions was waning, but not
for strategic reasons. He told Barrow that he was 'disposed to give
them as much of a free hand with their private war as I can. Otherwise,
they will believe that either we or the V.0. are perpetually nagging
1Pvt. tel., Hardinge to Cox, 10 Apr 15, HDc/89/2/149a.
2Letter, Crewe to Hardinge, 29 Apr 15, CRW/C/22/2.
3Tel. no. H.3952, Hard.inge to Crewe, 1 Apr 15, IO/L/MIL/5/750/6772.
Tel. no. 1761, Crewe to Army Dept., IndGovt, 5 Apr 15, lO/L/NIL!
5/750/1761.
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them, and relations will become difficult.' 1 Thus, Crewe gave in to
save Indian feelings, although he and Barrow repeatedly stated their
opposition to the 'need for this Napoleonic staff.'
That India's attitude was changing is further shown by the orders
that general Nixon received when he left Simla on 24 March, and the
way in which they were issued. Nixon's orders contained four main
points: he was to protect the oil works, if such operations did not
conflict with the 'main operations'; he was to present plans for oc-
cupying the entire Basra Vilayet and a subsequent advance on Baghdad;
and he was to respect Persian neutrality 'so far as military and polit-
ical exigencies permit.' He was further to examine and report on the
state of the Cavalry Brigade, the animal and mechanical transport, the
possibility of a light railway, aircraft, and river gunboats and trans-
ports both available and en route. 2 These orders were given to him by
Sir Percy Lake, Chief of the Indian (eneral Staff, on 24 1iarch, but
Duff, for reasons of his own, did not send them to London until 7 April,
and then they were sent by post, thus delaying their arrival until
early ?ray. Therefore, for some six weeks, the India Office had no
knowledge of Nixon's orders and assumed that he was still operating
under those issued to Barrett, which they had approved.
The orders were much wider in scope than those earlier issued,
but that can partially be justified. Since the War Office planners
had not fulfilled their pre-war duty to prepare contingency plans for
Mesopotamia, and those made by the Indian General Staff covered opera-
tions no further up-river than Basra, then it was logical to expect
note, Crewe to Barrow, 4 Apr 15, IO/L/NIL/5/750.
2Orders, OSInd to Nixon, in Letter no. H4059, Hardinge to Crewe,
7 Apr 15, IO/L/MIL/5/750/8109.
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some sort of planning to take place, even if only theoretical. Since
there was no official information concerning the interior of Mesopo-
€amia, it is natural that Nixon, being on the spot, should prere
plans. Barrow and. Duff both pointed this out to the Commission, stating
that some arrangements had to be made for eventualities. The basic
fault of this reasoning is that the only contingency plans called for
were offensive, and this was in direct contradiction to Crewe's policy.
To give such orders to a general like Nixon could hardly be justified
as mere speculative planning. Nixon himself believed the orders indi-
cated a change in policy. 'I should say that the orders given to me
when I was appointed to command were to take the offensive rather than
remain on the defensive."
A common description of' Nixon is that he 'revelled in responsibil-
ity', whereas Barrett merely 'could take responsibility.' 2 'General
Nixon, not unnaturally, read into the instructions of the Commander-
in-Chief an intended change of policy, nor was his staff . . . likely
to be able to advise restraint to a commander whose chief characteris-
tics were . . . to accept personal responsibility for every decision.'3
AU comments on the change of command, both at the time and in various
histories point out the difference between Nixon and Barrett, and. one
of the most astute comments on the situation is made by Sir Arnold Wil-
son, later Mesopotamian Civil Commissioner: '. . . had arret re-
tained command many things would have been done differently.' 4
 The
'Meso Coinin, Nixon, iLl. Nov 16, no. 11703.
2Sir Arnold Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 19 14-1917, (Oxford,1930), p. 33.
3Evans, pp . 26-27.
Wilson, p. 311.,
68
major differences would have been that the cautious Barrett would have
more closely followed the spirit of the Secretary of State's policy
and, even with orders such as those given to Nixon, would have consol-
idated the area in a much more methodical and, it can be assumed, lo-
gistically safe manner. Instead, Force 'D' was led by a man who con-
sidered. 1 inilitary affairs purely from the fighting point of view, leav-
Ing administration to arrange itself as economically as it could.
Such an attitude boded ill in a country characterised by its extremely
harsh conditions.
Nixon's arrival on 9 AprIl coincided with a Turkish attempt to
recapture Basra. The Turks were threatening Force 'D' along the
three river lines, and the most important threat to the security of
the British position was along the Euphrates to the south and west of
Basra. Intelligence reports In early April described the concentration
of a Turkish force in this area which was expected to attack within
ten days. 2
 A force of some 12,000 Turks and 10,000 Arabs, under the
command of Suliman Askari, attacked the British position at Shaiba on
12 April. Shaiba had first been occupied in December when Barrett or-
dered a force there to secure the British left. The position, held by
some 7,000 men, was cut off from Basra by the rising waters of.the
spring floods. The fighting took place over three days, with the
Turkish force fighting from poorly pre.red positions fronting Barsi-
jiyah Wood, some four miles in front of the Shaiba position. After
Inconclusive fighting on the first two days, and In extreme heat, Major
General Charles Meliss, coimnanding the 30th Brigade, ordered an attack
'Evans, p. 26.









on the 14th that dislodged the Turks. The cavalry, placed on the
right flank near the flooded area, were unable to follow up the vic-
tory, but the Arabs previously fighting alongside the Turks changed
sides and, chased their former allies, with rather more vigour than
was absolutely necessary.'
The victory was by no means complete. later analysis of the bat-
tie criticised the placing of the cavalry near the water instead of
on the open flank where they could usefully fulfil their roles of
reconnaissance and pursuit. 1 econnaissance was licking, as aeroplanes
had not yet been employed and the mirage was rticularly bad at that
time. Further, the lack of transport hurt both the supply of the gar-
rison and its ability to pursue the defeated enemy. 2 At a cost of
some 1,200 casualties, the British inflicted over 2,400 casualties and
captured over 700 men. Although it was not a complete victory, it
was by no means an unimportant one. Sir George MacMurin, later Inspec-
tor-General of Communications under Maude, wrote: 'Some day, when the
Lord' of Hosts makes up His jewels, Shaiba will be recognised as one of
the decisive battles of the War, if tiot the world.' 3 In his view, a
British defeat there would not only have put the Turks in a flanking
position of both Basra and Kurna, it would have inspired the Turkish
forces throughout the Ottoman Empire (especially at Gallipoli) and, al-
most certainly, would have led to a rising of the Arab tribes In
southern Mesopotamia against Force 'D', and probably in other areas
as well. Whether the British would have been able to maintain their
'Evans, p. 25; Barker, Neglected War, pp. 67-75.
2Quetta Staff College, pp. 21-23.
3Sir George MacMunn, Behind the Scenes in Many Wars, (London,
1930 ), p . 212.
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position along the Shatt-al-Arab is problematical, but it certainly
would have been difficult considering the lack of reinforcement.
Another, and less desirable, outcome of this battle was the effect
it must have had on Nixon's attitudes towards the Turkish troops. Even
excluding the large number of Arab auxiliaries with the Turkish force,
the British garrison was outnumbered, and its defeat of the larger
enemy force must have influenced his outlook on their relative fighting
abilities. A. J. Barker states that 'this first flush of victory may
well have contributed to the underestimation of Turkish fighting cap-
acity that he undoubtedly formed.' 1 This attitude could only have
been reinforced by further British victories. From the opposite point
of view, he must have taken increasingly for granted the British and
Indian soldiers' ca.city for fighting under difficult circumstances.
He never seemed to give a thought to the extremely trying conditions
his troops had. to face, more from the country than from the enemy. He
consistently ordered his troops to march and fight in conditions of
extreme heat, with poor water and food supplies. It is a tribute to
the men that they fought so well in the circumstances, but to order men
to do so, given the relatively unimportant position of Nesopotamia in
grand strategy, can only reflect on the callousness of the coirinander.
Almost nowhere in the command hierarchy was Tesopotamia considered a
sufficiently important theatre that such demands on the troops could
be justified. Nixon later stated that when he first got to Mesopota-
mia what bothered him the most 'was that they were very much imbued
with this defensive idea.' 2 The fact that this was India Office policy
'Barker, Neglected War, p. 76.
2Meso Comin, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, no. 10780.
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never seemed. to occur to him. While it may be true that defence does
not win wars, the secondary role of Mesopotamia in the Allied grand
strategy dictated at the time the relatively weak forces assigned to
it, and their role, made clear by that weakness and. official policy,
dictated a holding action and not an offensive one.
That Nixon was determined to pursue an offensive course was abetted
by the Indian Government. This is shown not only by Duff's orders to
Nixon, and, the delay in notifying Crewe of those orders, but also by
their treatment of orders from London. Crere notified Hardinge on 19
April that the Adinira].ty were anxious for the early retair of the pipe-
line, which had been so damaged by Arab raiders as to cut off oil sup-
ply totally from the Anglo-Persian Oil Comany's fields. 1 Nixon's or-
ders placed the oil works on a subsidiary plane vis--vis the opera-
tions to control the Basra Vilayet, 'but Crewe still considered, as
did the Admiralty, the defence of the oil works to be of prime impor-
tance. The Indian Government assed Crewe's telegram on to Nixon 'with
the intimation that he was to use his own discretion', 2
 although Crewe's
telegram stated clearly that the 'expulsion of Turks from Persian Arab-
istan Ea politically very desirable.' 3 Barrow told. the Commission
that the Indian Government looked on the Karun sector as a side-show,
but 'that was not the view taken here because the Admiralty, at all
events, considered it the most important art of the operations.k
Nixon and Cox had in the meantime decided that the best way to
1Tel. no. 1796, Crewe to Hardinge, 19 Apr 15, IO/L/MIL/5/750/1796.
2Quetta Staff College, p. 25.
3Tel. no. 1796, Crewe to Hardinge, 19 Apr 15, IO/L/MIL/5/750/1796.
4Meso Comm, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, no. 39L.
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protect the oil fields was to capture Amara on the Tigris, thereby
cutting off the lines of communication between Arabistan and Baghdad.
To this end, Nixon requested the reinforcement of another cavalry bri-
gade. Crewe refused the request as it suggested an offensive movement,
which he had forbidden. On 24 April he sent a telegram that stated
his policy perfectlys 'Our present position is strategically a sound
one and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending it un-
duly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.' 1
 Such a message
confused Nixon, as it contradicted his orders from India. When ques-
tioned about the conflict, Duff told the Commission that 'no one knows
better than General Nixon that if there is a conflict between the two,
the Secretary of State's orders prevail.' 2 As it turned out, they
prevailed for only a shore time, and the 'safe game' was soon over.
For the present, however, Nixon postponed his plans for operations on
the Tigris to comply with Crewe's directionsa 'I assume Nixon can con-
centrate 10,000 men near Ahwaz by the end of April, for these opera-
tions' to consolidate the possession of the oil facilities.3
Nixon sent General George Gorringe of the 12th Division and some
9,000 men up the Karun on 22 April. A mixed Turco-Arab force withdrew
before them, and the local tribes, impressed by the size of the force
and the recent Shaiba victory, were eager to cooperate with the Brit-
ish. 1he Turks left the Karun for Illa on the Karkha River, some twenty-
five miles northwest of Ahwaz. Gorringe's force never brought the
Turks to battle, as the extreme heat and lack of water forced restric-
1Meso Comm, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, no. 4.92.
2Neso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15097.




tions on his movements. The force was further hampered by a lack of
accurate maps, although the area had been well surveyed before the war
and maps were available in India, Bushire, Mohammerah and Ahwaz, but
were classified as 'Confidential' and were therefore not made available
to the troops. 1
 In mid-May a force was detailed to attack some settle-
ments of the Beni. Taruf tribe, who had actively supported the Turks
and consistently harassed the troops and the pipeline. Again, the heat
restricted operations and the mission was only partially successful.
The entire action, however, fulfilled its purpose of securing the area
and restoring the services of the pipeline. By 22 May the oil was
flowing again. 2 The Admiralty wrote to the India Office the following
day urging 'the great Importance of-keeping the line safeguarded in the
future. he interruptian has already cost the State a very considerable
sum. . . . It is therefore considered of extreme urgency that no other
breakdown should be experienced. '3 The Admiralty wrote in a similar
vein again in July, but the threat to the fields had by then disappeared.
While Gorringe was operating near Ahwaz, Nixon was busy planning
for a thrust . up the Tigris against the Turkish positions outside Kurna.
Crewe had stated in his 2 April 'safe game' telegram that 'an advance
to Ainara with the object of controlling the tribes between there and
the Karun River might be supported because it adds to the safety of the
pipeline.' 4
 Thus, on 10 May Nixon ordered Townshend. to draw up plans
for an advance, which he completed by the next day. Gorringe was to
1Wilson,pp. 40-41.
2Quetta Staff College, p. 26; Barker, Neglected War, pp. 81-83.
3Letter no. M03918, ADM to 10, 23 May 15, IO/L/MIL/5/768/M039l8.
4Meso Comnin, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, no. 492.
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advance west from Ahwaz toward Amara while the 6th Division moved up
the Tigris. At this time of year, the land on both sides of the river
was a vast shallow lake owing to the spring floods. The water was too
deep for the troops to wade through, but too shallow to accoMmodate
steamships. Townshend. therefore proposed an advance toward the Turk-
ish positions, on several hills, by way of bellums (shallow native
boats). Nixon kept India informed of the proposed operations, but
Crewe knew nothing until 23 May, when Hardinge told him that Nixon
planned to attack on the 211.th. Hardinge explained that no reinforce-
ments were necessary and India did not intend to interfere with Nixon's
plans. 1
 Naturally, this created some confusion. Crewe was angry, but
Barrow pointed out to him that the occupation of Arnara did protect the
route to Ahjaz, though the advanced position in the light of the forth-
coming summer heat might be rather difficult to support. Nevertheless,
'Geni. Nixon has rather forced your hand.' Crewe would have to send a
message 'to make the best of it . . . uJ prevent any further rash
movement.
Crewe sanctLoned the attack, provided Nixon was convinced that he
could hold Amara against Turkish counter-offensives. Believing Nixon
to be acting on his own initiative, Crewe pointed out that the request
for permission was extremely late: '. . . I hold that he should have
submitted his proposal before the last moment. Questions jointly in-
volving political and military policy should under present circumstances
only be decided by the binet. '3 Crewe was irritated at being partially
1Pvt. tel., Hard.inge to Crewe, 23 Nay 15, IO/L/MIL/5/751/8301.
2Pvt. note, Barrow to Crewe, 23 May 15, IO/L/MIL/5/751.
3Tel. no. 1857, Crewe to Hardinge, 23 May 15, IO/L/MIL/5/75l/]M57.
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forced into agreeing, but he later held. that the advance to Amara was
'a decision on military grounds, and I have always strongly held that
a taste for amateur strategy is the most dangerous that a Minister can
acquire.' 1 Nixon was surprised at Crewe's response, as he must have
assumed that his extended communication with India about the attack
had been forwarded to the Secretary of State. He thought 'that the
Indian Government was trying to force the hand of the Home Government.'2
His statement to the Nesopotanila Commission read: 'The note I made at
the time was that it looked as if India were trying to lay down a pol-
icy behind the back of the Secretary of State and the Cabinet.' 3 Duff
answered that Nixon's statement was 'so utterly incorrect that it is
really difficult to say it was not knowingly incorrect. ' It is not
easy to agree with Duff's denial, considering his orders to Nixon and
the manner in which the Indian Government seemed to keep Crewe pur-
posely uninformed.
Whatever the truth of the machinations, the advance up the Tigris
was authorised, although it did not begin on the 24th as Hardinge had
said it would, but a week later. By the time it was mounted, Crewe
had been replaced as Secretary of State by Sir Austen Chamberlain
(Crewe became Lord President of Council in the coalition Government of
May 1915). On 28 May Chamberlain sent a telegram to Hardinge asking
for a status report from Nixon and an outline of his plans for the
summer months, which he assumed would be spent inactive, starting again
'Neso Conun, Crewe, 14. Sep 16, statement.
2Neso Comnin, Harclinge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16439.
3Meso Comm, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, statement.
4Meso Comxn, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15106.
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in the autumn. 1 Hardinge replied non-coiniiiittally,in the hope, presum-
ably, of preventing the London authorities from exercising too much
control. The Viceroy stated that once current operations were com-
plete, then Nixon would have time to submit detailed plans for the fu-
ture. 'We feel that while military operations are actua].ly in progress
and in present quite uncertain military situation in Lower Nesopotamia
it would be undesirable and even dangerous to tie him down with precise
orders which might not fit in with the local situation.' 2
 For the time
being, Nixon was free to do as he pleased.
Amara, eighty-seven miles up the Tigris from Kurna,. was 'a modern
town, a good supply centre, and with a very much better climate than
Basra, and, moreover, was the centre link between our line of comnmuni-
cation and. that of the Turk--beyond Ainara our transport troubles become
greater than those of the Turk.' 3 Amara also covered the route toward
Ahwaz and Persia used by agents attempting to raise an Arab revolt 
•hi
It was hoped that the advance would not only cut the link between Bagh-
dad arid Persia, but also impress the Arabs sufficiently to guarantee
their passivity in the vicinity of the oil fields. Hardinge believed
that if the advance had been nade earlier, 'we should have been spared
all the recent trouble in Arabistan • The Arabs did not understand why
we did not go on, and they regarded it as weakness and therefore joined
the Turks.' 5 As with every move thus far, the necessity of maintaining
arker, Neglected War, p. 84.
2Tel. no. H5264, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 Jun 1 5, IO/L/NIL/5/
751/8409.
3Buchanan, p. 19.
4Meso Comrn, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, no. 432.
5Letter, Hardinge to Nicolson, 25 May 15, FO/800/378.
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restige with the Arabs is cited. Mac?unn wrote that it was 'worthy
of note that in every advance the necessity for controlling or placat .-
ing the tribes in front of us was put forward as a reason, the fact
being that one might as well try and control or placate a pack of jack-
als or hyenas as any Arab tribe.' 1 This statement seems to reflect
the attitude of those most familiar with the area, but it was never
quite grasped by those who were supposed to be directing strategy.
Nixon's instructions to Townshend on 10 May were 'not only to
drive the enemy from his present positions and to capture his guns, but
to push him up river and occupy Amara--the operation to be continuous. 2
The battle outside Kurna was to become one of the most unique in his-
tory. The strength of the defending Turks is not recorded, but for -
four months they had been emplaced on a series of hills on either side
of the Tigris. Owing to the spring flooding, these hills had become
fortified islands. In order to assault these positions, Townshend had
sufficient native bellums to transport the 17th Brigade, with their
guns and gunboats in support. The boats were poled along like punts
by soldiers with some six weeks' training, so the entire operation was
carried out by water-borne troops against entrenched Turks--a none too
promising situation. 'Had the Turks stood resolutely to their guns,'
Townshend wrote, 'I think we must have suffered a real disaster, such
as Pakenham at New Orleans, for example.' 3 Whether because of the sur-
prise of the attack at dawn on 31 !'ay, or because of the strangeness
of the method of assault, the Turks put up little fight, and the British
'Buchanan, p. 22.
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advanced and captured the Turkish emplacements with relative ease.
As strange as was the assault, the pursuit was stranger still.
The assault and occupation of the Turkish positions some ten miles up
the Tigris took three days, and by dawn on 3 June only the gunboats
were far enough forward to carry on the pursuit. The force of four
sloops and a lighter arrived at Arnara with a total force of forty-one
men and a handful of officers, including both the Senior Naval Officer
and Pownshend. This miniscule force received the surrender of some
600 soldiers and the town of Ainara with its population of 10,000, arid
held the town from 1330 on the 3rd to 0630 on 4 June. 'Townshend's
Regatta' proved to be a masterpiece of planning and execution of an
extremely daring operation. The placement of the supporting guns on
rafts with the advancing bellums was the key to victory, as their accu-
racy cleared the Turks from their places and left a fairly easy task
for the occupying soldiers. The entire operation cost the British a
mere four killed arid, twenty-one wounded, while inflicting on the
Turks 120 killed and wounded and 1,773 prisoners.' Townshend wrote
that Nixon 'warmly congratulated me on the success of the operation,
in which I succeeded without having a butcher-bill.' 2 Nixon's report
to Hardinge claimed credit for the victory, and presaged future offen-
sives: 'I was extremely glad to prick the bubble of the Purkish posi-
tion in front of Kurna, .it had become an obsession and the people shook
their heads about it and thought it would be very difficult and so on,
a lot had been too long sitting down and thinking it impossible.'3
1Moberly, vol. 1, pp. 253-65; Townshend, pp. 60-72.
2Townshend, p. 72.
3Letter, Nixon to Hardirige, 6 Jun 15, JjX/89/1/322a.
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Thus Nixon made clear that he had no intention of 'sitting down' and
the Amara victory seemed to justify his attitude. 'It was war, and it
was magnificent; it came, too, at a welcome moment . . . Small wonder
that after these operations the Generals should reel that they could
do anything."
Barrow in London thought differently. Immediately after the vic-.
tory he wrote that 'it is hoped they will now be able to settle down
for the hot season and obtain much needed rest. 2 He hoped that every-
thing was being done to make the troops comfortable while awaiting the
cooler weather. Such was not to be. It appears that the only people
who seemed to realise the terrible effects of the hot weather on the
fighting men were in London, and their advice on this subject was treated
as lightly as were their instructions on policy.
Duff asked Nixon immediately after the Amara victory to define
the limits of the Basra Vilayet and his plans to occupy it. Nixon was
rather surprised at the first request, since he had assumed that when
his orders were issued to secure the Vilayet the Indian Staff knew
where it was. He replied that the limits of the Vilayet were Amara on
the Tigris and Nasiriyah on the Euphrates, and as he now had the one
he proposed to secure the other. 3 The capture of Atnara gained the
temporary loyalty of the local tribes, but to ensure their security,
as well as Ainara's, it would be necessary in the short term to occupy
Kut-al-Amara, and in the long term to promote irrigation and agriculture.
'Wilson, p. 119.
2Menio, Barrow to W0, 6 Jun 15, w0/159/4/2a, no, 1a.
3Meso Cormu, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, nos. 10808-09,
ITel. no. 1225, Nixon to IndGovt, 111 Jun 15, F0/371/2Li.89/8l178,
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To fulfil his orders Nixon had to defeat the roughly 7,000-strong
Turkish force at Nasiriyah.
Immediately after this appreciation, Nixon' s hint of an advance
on Kut-al-Airara raised the question of Baghdad again. The Indian Gen-
eral Staff subrnitted an appreciation on 7June calling for an advance
as soon as possible, given the demoralised state of the enemy, the
likely effect on the Arabs of Baghdad 's capture, the need. to occupy
'Baghdad before the Russians arrive anywhere near it', and the improb-
ability of Turkish reinforcements arriving soon enough to garrison the
city sufficiently. 1 To achieve the occupation, all that would be needed
was three brigades, one each of infantry, cavalry and artillery. 2 The
Director of Military Operations stated that the capture of Kut-al-
Ainara was essential, but if an ad&ance as far as Baghdad was sanctioned
by the Cabinet, then the sooner it could be Instigated, the better.3
Rather than Initiate these plans immediately, Hardinge supported Nixon's
proposal to attack Nasiriyah.
In spite of the increasing heat, and the lack of provision for
coping with it, Nixon determined that Nasiriyah should fall to British
arms as soon as possible. The permission for this attack was obtained
in a somewhat similar manner to that used prior to the Ainara campaign:
namely, that India informed London what Nixon was going to do and
stated their concurrence, and then waited to see if the Secretary of
State would overrule them. Hardinge telegraphed to Chamberlain
on 13 June that h propoed to let Nixon advance on Nasiriyah to
'Meso Comnin, Duff, 7 Dec 16, memo by Indian General Staff, 7 Jun 15.
21bid., memo by Indian General Staff, 5 Jun 15.
3lbid., memo byD.M.O., 8Jun15.
etablish control over the local tribes along the Euphrates, 1 who had
been more hostile than those along the Tigris. Duff agreed with the
Commission's later assessment 'that the Indian Government . . . clearly
originated proposals and expected the Home Government to veto or assent
to them.' 2 He claimed first of all that, since India managed the cam-
paign, then it was her business to make the proposals, but he blamed
Nixon for initiating 'every forward movement.' Duff further stated
that the orders he gave Nixon in March were 'not a direct indication
for him to go ahead', 3 but that can hardly be believed.
Nixon answered that he was just obeying orders, of which capturing
Nasiriyah was just a part. He stated that the Arabs behind the British
lines 'have all the time been favourable to our side as far as I know,
but . . . up to Bai from Nasiriyah the tribes were always hostile.'
Wilson believed that Nixon's fear of the Arabs in the south was much
overstated. 'The nightmare of Ajaimi he local sheiks and his thou-
sands of Arabs, acting under Turkish instigation and supported by Turk-
ish troops, operating against us on the Shatt-al-Arab and LOwer Tigris,
should have been dispelled by our knowledge of the part played by Arabs
at hai and elsewhere.' 5 Nevertheless, Ajalini had been causing
trouble ever since his looting of Basra in November 19]Ji ., and as a re-
sult Duff approved Nixon's plans. Conduct of the operations fell to
Ceneral Gorringe's 12th Division, lately so sorely tried by their
tel., Hardinge to Chamberlain, 13 Jun 15, Io/L/NIL/5/751/8532.
2Meso Cornrn, Duff, 7 Dec 16, 15133.
3Ibid.
Meso Coinin, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, no, 10821.
5Wilson, p. 52.
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expedition up the Karun and actions via Bisaitan in support of Town-
shend's attack on Arnara. Gorririge arrived back In Basra on 16 June,
and he had. ten days to assemble his forces and secure as much water
transport as possible. It was assumed that the Euphrates and the ad-
joining HaTnrnar Lake were deep enough to acconunodate sufficient shipping,
but the lack of craft, and the lake being more of a marsh, led to fur-
ther privation for Gorringe's troops. The approaches to Nasiriyah were
interspersed with small creeks and progress was slow.
This was perhaps the worst of the battles fought in Yesopotamia.
It took until 25 July to capture NasirIyah, and the troops fought the
elements as well as the Turks most of the way. 'No animals could be
employed: consequently the fighting troops had to do all the handling
of stores, guns and aiimiunition.	 The troops had to fight creeping
forward, yard by yard, from sodden trench to sodden trench, in a shade
temperature of 1200--a moist swampy heat--eaten alive with insects.'2
Losses on both sides in the final engagement before Nasiriyah were
about 500, the Turks losing an additional 1,000 prisoners. The victory
attracted Royal attention; the King's message of 28 July ald that the
'splendid achievement of General Gorringe's column in spite of many
hardships and intense heat fills me with admiration.' 3 All this effort
was expended for an objective of dubious 'balue. It was assumed that
Nasiriyah covered the southern end of the Shatt-al-Hai, a river con-
necting the Tigris and Euphrates during the rainy season, but in fact
the Hal runs dry some thirty miles north of that town. Further, the
'Quetta Staff College, p. 3l4.
2Evans, p. 33.
3Iioberly, vol. 1, p. 298.
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Muntefik tribe never recognised British authority and continued occa-
sional harassment until the end of the war, although it was more bother-
some than dangerous. The town, a fairly modern one, was extremely dirty,
and the rising number of sick troops could find little comfort there.
Besides the wounded, almost 400 men had been sent to hospital because
of sickness during the Nasiriyah campaign, and the number of sick
was high in other parts of ?4esopotamia. Townshend was invalided to
India after the battle at Amara, and he did not return until mid-August.
He wrote that 2,400 men were in hospital when he left Ainara. 1 Large
amounts of supplies, including fresh vegetables and ice, were supposed
to be available to the troops, but in actuality there were none, not
even in the hospitals.2
It is amazing that Duff and Nixon, men of such long experience in
Indian and colonial campaigns, could have been so blind to the needs
of their army. All the troops had received to ease their burdens were
congratulations. The hardships and privations that Nixon, et. al., re-
ferred to in their glowing descriptions of the troops? bravery were to
a large extent the fault of these same commanders. True, they could
not control the heat or humidity from which all suffered, but it was
little short of cruelty to force the troops to fight for so long in
such conditions without respite. With the stability brought by Cor-
ringe's actions on the Karun in May, the British position was suffi-
ciently secure to be held easily until the cooler weather in the au-
tuinn. The Turks had to suffer exactly the same priv4ions with short
1Townshend, pp. 84-85.
2Barker, Neglected War, pp. 97-98.
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supply, so they too would have remained inactive through the hot sea-
son, just as they did in the summers of 1916, 1917 and 1918. Not only
did the constant expansion weaken the troops, it also weakened the seçur-
ity of the British hold on the area.
By the end of July 1915, Force 'D' was spread over five major p0-
sitions, from Nasiriyah to Ahwaz, none of which were mutually suppor-
tive. This further stretched the already hopelessly inadequate river
transport. Bucha.nan noted that both land and river transport were 'taken
away from the main scene of operations on the Tigris and the strength
of the main army dissipated by leaving a whole brigade as a permanent
garrison at Nasiriyah, supplies for which had to be brought from Basra."
The Indian r overnment had known of the transport problems since Bar-
rett' s arrival on the Shatt-al-Arab in November, yet little was done
about it • A few steamers from Egypt, India and Burma had been ordered
by the time Nixon took command, 2 but he made no mention of shipping
until 24 June, and it was months before they could be built, much less
delivered • Nixon cannot have been ignorant of the virtually impossible
conditions his troops had to face, and he more than anyone else was in
a position to relieve the situation. He nevertheless consistently or-
dered his men to greater dangers in ever-worsening conditions rather
than make his force strong and, hence, as battle-worthy as possible.
For one considered to be 'Napoleonic' in his attitudes, he ignored the
dictum that an army travels on its stomach.
In spite of the increasingly strained conditions of the troops,
'Buchanan, p. 18.
2Neso Comm, Nixon, 14 Nov 16, statement.
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and the means to supply them, Nixon's offensive nature manifested it-
self almost immediately upon the fall of Nasiriyah. Two days after its
capture, Hardinge told the Secretary of State that 'the occupation of
,1
Kut-al-Amarah is considered by us to be a strategic necessity. 	 Kut
is situated at the junction of the Shatt-al-Hal. and the Tigris, and
thus the need to secure it became apparent only after the dubious un-
portance of Nasiriyah's position at the other end of the Hal drew the
British to that city. Nasiriyah, required to protect Kurna and Basra
from a southern flanking niove,was itself in a position to be out±'lanked
by an attack down the Hal, a factor unnoticed or ignored when Nixon
planned its capture. The usual arguments about the need for local
trilal control and the safeguarding of the route to the oil fields were
reiterated. Chamberlain was 'pressed at his most vulnerable points--
prestige, Persia, and the oil supply.' 2 All that was needed to ac-
coinlish this task was more troops (the 28th Brigade at Aden was nom-
inated), but how these troops were to be maintained was not explained;
perhaps flardinge was totally ignorant of the extreme situation along
the lines of communication, which is . possibility owing to Nixon's lack
of regard for it.
Although Nixon did send what he termed 'a very strong communication
relating to river transport' 3 on 21 June, it does not seem that the
grnvity of the situation quite registered on him. His troops were
getting enough food and ammunition to enable them to keep fighting,
and that apparently satisfied Nixon. However, the troops rarely saw
rel. no. H6582, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 27 Jul 15, w0/106/877, p.28.
2Evans, pp. 35-36.
3Meso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no, 15180.
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the necessary extras so essential to health and morale, such as fresh
fruit and vegetables, ice, tobacco, etc. Nixon's telegram of 211 June
seems to be little more than a passing reference to the supply trouble
rather than a definite realisat ion of the need for its strengthening.
This is most clearly shown in his reaction to queries concerning the
transport. Nixon, in the above mentioned telegram, informed India
that a problem in going to Kut would be the resulting extension of the
lines of communication by 153 miles. Taking into account this obser-
vation and. the request for more transport, Duff asked Nixon 'if he was
convinced that with his troops then available he could hold Kut under
all conditions of river, feed and maintain all the troops he might
place there, to which he replied that he could.' 1
 This indicates that
Nixon was not thoroughly familiar with the extent of the problem. How-
ever,now that Duff had been advised of the shortage, his complicity
in the forthcoming disaster mounted.
None of the shortages or drawbacks were communicated to London in
Hardinge's telegram of 27 July, urging an attack on Kut. He told the
Commission that Nixon's telegram concerning the shipping 'may have been
sent on, but I have nothing to show whether it was sent on in its en-
tirety. I think merely the gist of it was sent.' 2
 Even if it was not
forwarded, the India Office was not nearly as enthusiastic as was Har-
dinge about the Kut advance. Barrow believed that 'the reasons given
by India for going to Amara were, I think, sound. . . . my own personal
1Meso Coinm, Duff, 12 Pec 16, no. 157211.
2Meso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15183.
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opinioi is that beyond Ainara it was risky.' 1
 Chamberlain, continuing
Crewe's cautious policy, echoed Barrow's doubts. He reiterated the
impossibility of reinforcement, and stated that 'a cautious strategy
is imposed by us.' 2
 However, he recognised Nut's possible strategic
Importance. The Secretary of State realised that holding Kut would
lessen the need for a large garrison at Nasiriyah and enable Nixon to
concentrate along the Tigris, although such outposts as Ahwaz ar1 Bu-
shire also had to be maintained. 3 Nixon replied that such a suggestion
was practically 'identical with those I submitted in my secret -despatch
dated June 211.th (the river transport telegram), supporting the sup-
position that the telegrams London received were not exactly the same
as the ones Nixon sent to Simla. On 6 August-Chamberlain agreed with
Nixon's proposals, based on his assurances that he could concentrate
at Nut and maintain sufficient supplies. Chamberlain's only proviso
was that he be assured of the distribution of troops on the Karun to
protect the oil.5
Hardinge assured Chamberlain that the oil works were safely de-
fended. At Ahwaz there were six cavalry squadrons and. a horse artil-
lery battery. Nixon refused to allocate any more troops to Persia,
suggesting instead that sufficient 'subsidies' would keep the Bakhtlari
'Meso Comm, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, nos. 528-29.
2Tel. no. 1797, Chambe].a±n to Hardinge, 30 Jul 15, I0/L/MIL/5/752.
3 'Towards the end of June India made me responsible for the defence
of Bushire, and it seemed to me very much on a par with the situation
which would have been created If Lord French in France had been respon-
sible for the defence of Gibraltar against an attack by the Spaniards.'
Meso Comm, Nixon, 1k Nov 16, statement.
4Tel. no. H6793, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 5 Aug 15, IO7'L/MIL/5/
752/10160.
rel. no. 3002, Chamberlain to Hardinge, .6 Aug 15, IO/L/MIL/5/7.52.
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tribe quiet, and such an agreement sho1I1 be concluded with the Bawl
tribe to the west. Furthermore, Nixon thought the presence of too many
troops would be an irritant to the tribes and might arouse their hos-
tility, an interesting argument considering that the major section of
his army was moving Into hostile territory in order to control the lo-
cal tribes. Hardinge concurred with Nixon's views and reiterated his
1
support of the advance on Nut. On 20 August Chamberlain accepted
Nixon's arrangements and gave final permission to advance. 2 TJithln a
few weeks a financial arrangement was made with the Bawl tribe, so
Nixon's rear was covered. 3
 Nixon could now ignore Persia; in his opin-
ion, the best way to keep things quiet there was to move against the
enemy elsewhere..
Townshend's return from India on 21 August was well-timed, as
Nixon Immediately ordered him to prere plans for the attack. At this
time the question of the ultimate goal of the engagement was discussed
On 10 August, while still In Simla, Townshend had spoken to Duff about
this. He assured the Commander-In-Chief that he could defeat the troops
under the Turkish commander, Nur-ed-Din, lately Turkish Chief of Police
for the Basra Vi1ayet, but he did not want to go any further up-river
with his present force. "ownshend told Duff of 'the grave risks of
'Tel. no. H7094, Har1irge to Chamberlain, 18 Aug 15, IO/L/MIL/5/
752/10281.
2Tel, no. 3020, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 20 Aug 15, W/1O6/877, p. 30.
3Moberly, vol. 1, p. 308 'The subsidies to the Bawl tribe were,
however, never paid, as Sir Percy Cox, who had. not been consulted when
they were proosad Dointe1 out that they would weaken the Shalth of
rionamznerah s autriotity, aria woula serve no useiui. purpose now tnat
the Turkish menace was disposed of.'--.Wilson, p. 80.
4Barker, Neglected War, p. 106.
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continuing the strategic offensive with inadequate forces and with no
troops on the Line of Communication.' Duff agreed with this, and
stated 'Not one inch, Townshend, shall you go beyond Kut-al-Arnara un-
less I make you up to adequate strength.' 1 With this directive, Town-
shend net Nixon at Basra on 25 August, but he told Nixon that, given
the opportunity, he would chase the Turks to Baghdad on his own author-
ity. 'My official instructions Erom NixoJ were clearly to destroy and
disperse Nureddin's force and to occupy Kut-al-Arnara. But in order to
destroy a force, one must pursue.' 2 This difference In interpretation
of orders, on the one hand to secure the objective, on the other to
defeat the enemy, will be the pivotal factor in the ensuing discussion
on the advance to Baghdad.
Townshend held conflicting attitudes on the Nesopotamian campaign.
Firstly, he was a field commander and, as such, had a duty to his su- -
periors to act In that capacity to the best of his ability. In his
role of 6th Division commander, he concenti-ated all his aims on the
tasks before him. Privately, his views off grand strategy contradicted
those he was-ordered to Implement. In letters to Lord Curzon, Lord
Privy Seal arid previous Viceroy In India, Townshend argued vehemently
against all the 'side shows.' A Napoleonic student to the core, Town_
shend quoted his dicta frequently, both In his letters and orders, and. in
his views on strategy and tactics. 'The princIpal offensive field is




my eyes nothing can justify an expedition to the Dax1anelles--certainly
no political reason. For history is here to prove how fatal it is to
let politics enter the field." He thought the Egyptin, Nesopotamian
and the .st African campaigns unnecessary; each area should be held
'by a minimum force while everything else went to France, including him-
self. Townshend. thought himself stuck in a backwater and longed to be
in the major theatre. He wrote after Kut that he hoped Kitchener would
notice his achievements, apparently wishing for a transfer to France
after proving his worth.2
In order to prove that worth, Townshend had to win, and he tackled
the problem of Kut with all his energies, knowing it would be difficult
to repeat his brilliant success at Amara. As with the Arnara operation,
Townshend had complete control over planning and execution, Nixon con-
tri'buting nothing but his approval. It would take all his ability to
triumph at Kut, since Nur-ed-Din had developed 'the strongest forti-
fled position I have ever seen, 12 miles of works a.stride the Tigris"
located .some eight miles down-stream from Kut at Es Sinn. Nur-ed-Din
commanded three divisions of some 9,000 regulars and 5,000 Arabs, plus
twenty-four guns. He placed them in a strongly entrenched position
anchored on the right by the Tigris and on the left and centre by mar-
shes. A further section of trenches extended into the desert from the
right bank (facing down-stream) of the river. To assault this position,
'Pownshend had some 3,100 British and 8,000 Indian troops. He proposed
1Letter, Townshend to Curzon, 1. Sep 15, I0/EtJR.MSS./F112.163.
2Letter, Townshend to Curzon, 7 Nov 15, I0/EUT.MSS./Fll2.l63.
3lbid.
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a holding attack on the oentre while a mobile force, after a night
march, moved around the northern marsh and rolled up the Turkish left
flank. The move was difficult, considering the necessary speed of the
march, the movement at night with virtually no distinguishing landmarks,
and the distance from the water supply of the Tigris.
Townshend wrote later of other difficulties he had to face. First
was Nixon's inability to grant him any more transport, of which he corn-
rnented that it became difficult 'to exaggerate the danger. . . . It was
the old story of making bricks without straw' 1 The medical arrange-
ments were expected to be strained, owing to the difficulty of the ob-
jective and the extreme heat, anywhere from 1100 to 1200 during the
daylight hours. The wounded were expected to suffer accordingly, and
his justification of this is a fitting comment on the advisability of
the entire campaign: '. . . if you tried to provide for your sick and
wqunded during a desert campaign as you did in the North of France, it
would have been Impossible to have moved the expedition beyond Basra
and Kurna.' 2
 He detailed the shortcomings of his force: too few troops,
no reinforcements, unsteady supply, lack of transport, and long lines
of communication. The 6th Division had 330 transport carts plus 70
animals, eleven steamers and twenty-three barges and lighters. A week
after the authorisation of the advance, the force was short of 150 pack
mules, 150 carts and 300 draught mules. 'When operations started, the
force was 300 mules short of what was required. . . . there were no






-	 ,1drinking water.	 The six-month supply cache that Townshend had re-
quested for reserve at Amara was vetoed by Nixon, who quoted regula-
tions that called for only a six-week reserve. 2 As far as morale was
concerned, it seemed to be shaky. The extreme heat had taken its toll,
but Townshend noted that there were fewer on sick call as the battle
neared • On the other nd, the troops had been extremely disappointed
that, after ten months of uninterrupted action in the field, no deco-
rations had been awarded and little official notice had been taken of
their efforts. 3 Chamberlain said he was doing all he could to oblige,4
but it would be months yet before such honours appeared. All this goes
to show that, physically and morally, Force 'D' was courting disaster
if there was no victory soon; as will be seen later, they courted di-
saster even further because such victory was achieved.
After a month of preparation, the attack started on 2'c September.
The force encamped within two and a half miles of the Vurks, and began
their deception to convince the tmurks that the major thrust would be
along the river. On the 27th, feints were made along the line, and
Nur-ed-Din took the bait, reinforcing his position near the river. On
the night of the 27th, two brigades under Delamain and Hoghton moved
north. Delarnain's 16th Brigade positioned themselves for an attack on
the Turkish left, while Hoghton's 17th Brigade proceeded further north
to skirt the Ataba Marsh and outflank the position. At dawn on the
28th, the Division attacked all along the line, but Hoghton's arrival,
'Quetta Staff College, pp. 39-40.
2Barker, Neglected War, p. 106.
3Tel no. 27/8/7, Nixon to Hardinge, 19 Sep 15, IO/L/MIL/5/7.52/10639.
4Tel. no. 3062, Chamberlain to Nixon, 21 Sep 15, I0/L/MIL/5/752/3062.
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though late, caught theTurks unawares and their position began to
crumble. By the end of the day, the northern end of the Turkish line
was in British hands, but the stiff resistance to the attack of Fry's
18th Brigade along the river had, maintained the Turkish right. Ex-
treme thirst and the onset of darkness prevented any further envelop-
nient, and in the night the Turks abandoned Es Slim and began their re-
treat past Kut toward Baghdad.
'The pursuit will be continued by day and night without regard to
the exhaustion of men, horses, as long as the enemy's force remain in
the field • All pursuing troops must act with greatest boldness and be
prepared to accept risks which would. not be justified at other ti'res.''
Thus read Townsherid's orders of 25 September, and on the morning of the
29th the 6th Division began their pursuit 'to destroy and disperse' the
Turks. The lack of transport now made itself felt • As the Turks by-
passed Kut and made directly for Ctesiphon, outside Baghdad, only the
cavalry and gunboats were able to follow them. Kut was occupied by 30
September, and the cavalry caught up with the Turks' rearguard the fol-
lowing day forty miles past Kut, where they were forced to halt owing
to lack of supplies. The cavalry found the Turkish withdrawal to be
orderly and covered by well-disciplined troops. The choice now had to
be made, in light of the fact that they were not chasing mere remnants
of the Turkish force, to obey Duff's verbal directive of 'not one inch
past Kut' or Nixon's orders to 'destroy and disperse.' One logical con-
clusion presented itself. 'The maintenance of the force had now become
almost impossible; reorganisation of the administrative services was
imperative. Therefore, because it ou1d not be maintained, the pursuit
'Report by 'Townshend on the Kut Campaign, 18 Oct 15, App. 3(b),
Ceneral Instructions, No. 2 in the Case of Victory and Pursuit, 25 Sep
15, W0/158/656.
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was abandoned; administration, for the moment, controlled strategy.'1
The pursuit stopped at Aziziyah, sixty miles past Kut, with Townshend
and the 18th Brigade there by 7 October. The Basra Vilayet was in
firm British control with the occupation of Kut on 30 Septenaber, although
the cavalry pursuit had failed to destroy the retreating force. There-
fore, unable to smash the Turks, the British should not have reinforced
the cavalry at Aziziyah. This exceeded not only London's authorisa-
tion, but India's as well, especially as Hardinge ordered the pursuit
to be stopped on 5 October. The tactics of chasing the defeated force
were pushed past normal effectiveness, and. the reinforcement of the
cavalry patrols to create an advanced post constituted a grave stra-
tegic error as well as insubordination on Nixon's part.
That Force 'D' was pressing its luck is clear in retrospect, but
it was also realised by many at the time, including Townshend, who soon
made his objections known. Anyone looking at the situation with a dis-
passionate eye could have seen the same. The problems had been growing
increasingly difficult since Shaiba, but apparently success totally ob-
scured weakness. Take first the transport problem. Barrett in November
l9lL. complained of a lack of river craft • At Shaiba in April 1915, the
bulk of the defeated Turkish force was able to escape to Nasiriyah be-
cause the British lacked transport to support a pursuit. In the oper-
ations around Ahwaz, Gorringe's troops were unable to operate effect-
ively because they lacked the necessary ability to carry sufficient
supplies of drinking water. In the advance to Amara, the lack of
river shipping forced Townshend to hold Ainara and 600 Turkish prisoners
1Evans, p. 37.
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virtually alone while waiting eighteen hours for the arrival of the
main force. The sheer audacity of Townshend enabled him to maintain
control there, and this characterised Nixon's attitude toward all oper-
ations.
Nixon's belief that elan made up for a lack of logistics was proved
again In 1ttle at Nasiriyah, where the water-logged state of the coun-
try made animal transport impossible and the lack of river transport
was woefully apparent to the troops who had to be stevedores as well
as soldiers. In the Kut operation, the lack .of water forced the cur-
tailment of the final movements of the flanking force, while the cav-
alry pursuit was ineffective because of its dependence on water trans-
port to keep it supplied. Owing to climatic conditions, the Tigris was
quite low and the river craft had extreme difficulty in traversing the
river as it grew ever more meanderingin its course. To make matters
worse, at each advance in the campaign, the line of supply became in-
creasingly longer but, because the river craft were not correspondingly
supplemented, the supply of food, ammunition, extra provisions, etc.,
was increasingly slow in appearing at the front, when they appeared at
all. By river, Kut was l0 miles from Amara, which was some 90 miles
from Kurna, which was again 90 miles from Basra, which, to make mat-
ters worse still, had unloading facilities so poor that they could
hardly be dignified with the description of 'port.' Further, river
craft had to be diverted from the main force to Ahwaz and Nasiriyah,
thus weakening the offensive even more. Wilson wrote that, with the
occupation of Kut, 'no additional river transport was at the time avail-
able, or even on order, and the amount of pack transport at our disposal
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was wholly inadequate for extended movements by land. Such considera-
1
tions appear to have weighed very little with general Nixon.'
The aftermath of Kut found Force 'D' in a precarious position.
All the indications were that the basis of the British victory was
weak. Those few who saw this were unable to influence the course of
events. That Nixon could not see the problem is virtually unthinkable,
but whether it really registered on him is doubtful. Major-aeneral
George Kemball, Nixon's senior general staff officer, investigated the
transport situation in June with Nixon's permission, and gave the re-
suits in early July in the form of an extensive memorandum. 2 Kembali's
report was forwarded to India with a request by Nixon for nine more
steamers, eight tugs, forty-three barges, and six launches. This shows
clearly that Nixon knew the exact state of his supply line, and yet he
kept on recommending offensive operations in spite of the knowledge that
they could not be maintained. Apparently, it was a case of 'out of
sight, out of mind' once his application.to India was made. That In-
dia was now fully aware of the problem only increased their responsi-
bility for supporting all Nixon's recommendations, more so because these
reports were not passed on to London.
The inability to maintain a proper logistical system was the
major, but not the only, problem Force 'D' had to face. The condition
of the troops by late September 1915 was an uncertain factor. The 6th
Division had been in action since early November 191 11. without a break
--either from fighting or from the front lines. The system of rotating
1Wilson, p. 80.
2Moberly, vol. 1, p. 311.0.
102
troops from the trenches in France on a periodic basis was unknown in
Mespotamia, and the only way to leave the front was via the hospital.
The constant expansion and consolidation was worsened by the lack of
comforts, both physical and moral. !il was slow in coming and outgoing
mail was heavily censored. The rations were unvarying and. rarely sup-
plemented with anything fresh, except what could be bought in the ba-
zaars or foraged from the countryside. And there was, above all, the
heat • When in bivouac, the troops worked only in the early morning
and late evening, and 'between seven in the morning and six at night
just lay arid sweated; sleep, with myriads of flies hovering over them,
was out of the question.' 1
 When fighting, the troops had to endure the
scorching heat in the midst of battle, and the lack of water away from
the rivers enforced strict rationing which made the heat of battle hot-
ter still. The fact that the men were able to go into battle at all
is amazing, but their ability to constantly dislodge the Turks from
defensive positions, in nnny cases well-prepared ones, is little short
of miraculous. Perhaps the utter boredom of garrison duty inspired
their fighting ability, a battle perhaps being at least a break in the
monotony. It was the fact that they could. suffer almost beyond belief,
yet still defeat the Turks at every turn, that no doubt inspired Nixon
and. the Indian authorities to take ever-increasing risks.
'Barker, Neglected War, p. 103.
CHAPTER L.
THE DECISION TO ADVANCE TO BA(HDAD
OCTOB]IR-DECENBE 1915
The situation immediately following the battle at Kut-a].-Amara is
indicative of the almost hopeless turmoil in the chain of command that
controlled (if that word can be used) the activities of Force D. All
the shortcomings of the previous eleven months of campaigning finally
drew together to create one of the great disasters of World War I. No-
where does the conflict of personalities, the lack of communication,
the muadle of logistics, and occasional sheer blindness conspire more
against suôcess than in the debate on the advance to Baghdad. Although
it seems that by this time an attack on the city was a foregone conclu-
sion, no one at the time cared to admit it, even if the repeated ref-
erences to Baghdad's capture since November 19111. point to its being
just a matter of time before the attempt came about. How the decision
was reached to permit the advance is a model of bureaucracy at its
worst, and the resultant committees, conferences and reports were all
devised to give an official façade to the desire, whether emotional or
political, to capture the ancient city of the khalifs.
Although by the time of the ?esopotamia Commission hearings there
was a general rush to deny any complicity in the shortage of transport,
supply, or medical services that turned the operation into a dbacle,




action up to and including Kut-al-Amara was basically defensive. This
is borne out to the extent that the control of the Basra Vilayet was
necessary for the complete defence of the oil works, as Nixon's orders
of 211. March intimated. It would be difficult to justify taking Baghdad
as a defensive manoeuvre, other than to argue that it would deny the
Turks an advanced base for operations against the British (and such an
argument was again made). However, that had been an excuse for captur-
ing Kurria, Nasiriyah, Amara and Kut, and it is probable that it could
be used as an excuse for advancing to Samarra, Mosul, and so on. mhere
were myriad reasons and proposals offered in addition.
First, consider the disposition of British troops after Kut. By
3 October Townshend was in Aziziyah, some sixty miles by road from Kut.
The pursuit by the cavalry and the 18th Brigade had reached this point
when TowriShend decided that the Turkish force had retreated beyond his
reach and had lodged themselves in the defences at Ctesiphon. He con-
sidered th tactical pursuit following the Kut victory as complete, and
wanted to return to Kut to consolidate his positlan, as Duff had di-
rected him to do in August. This was not only Duff's policy, but that
of the Indian C,overnment. Hardinge had informed Sir Thomas Holderness,
the Under-Secretary of State for India, on 27 August, that, although
Kut might prove a good point of departure for a Baghdad advance, 'once
we arrive there I trust we shall entrench ourselves securely and await
events. We are not strong enough to press on to Baghdad.' 2
 To stand
at Kut was the stated policy, but the implied policy was to consider
Neso Cornm, Duff, 7 Dec 1 , no. 15138.
2Meso Comm, Hardinge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16619.
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moving forward. Nixon's original orders directed him to prepare a con-
tingency plan for such an operation. After the fall of Amara, when
Kut was first mentioned as a possible target, the Indian aeneral Staff
prepared an appreciation in favour of the advance. On 30 August, a month
before the capture of Kut, Nixon's memorandum supported the idea. Thus,
the avowed military policy for Mesopotamia was openly subverted in the
hope of changing It.
Nixon's appreciation went to 'leneral Sir Percy Lake, who added it
to his own of 6 June and forwarded them both ta iuff on 9 September.
The General Staff memorandum made the unsupportable claim that the dif-
ficulties of getting to Baghdad that had been listed in response to
Cox's November 1914 proposal had since been overcome. 'Then we had but
litt.e river transport, the Turks had more; now we are well equipped
with river transport, the Turks have little." The city could be held
with a garrison of one brigade and a striking force of one cavalry and
four infantry brigades. Nixon's appreciation pointed out the Importance
of Baghdad as a supply depot, and echoed the Staff point that any Turk-
ish transport, either overland or by river, not only had to travel dif-
ficult routes but had further to go without intervening stops before
it came within striking distance of Force 'P' thus safeguarding the
British position once the city was captured. 2
 Hardinge also began to
voice his private opinions on the subject. He wrote to Sir Arthur Nicol-
son at the Foreign Office 'that if we are unable, for a long time to
come, to force the Dardanelles, it becomes a question whether we should
'Yemo, Lake to Duff, 9 Sep 15, WO/106/893.
1Temo, in tel. no. 308-110-0, Nixon to Lake, 30 Aug 15, 1O/l06/893.
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not strIke a blow somewhere, and we could do this quite easily by taking
,1
Baghdad.	 Thus, even before Kut was captured, many were taking its
fall for granted.
So, when Kut was captured, those who had thus far favoured expan-
sion (Hardinge, Duff, and Nixon) were prepared to keep moving up-river
with hardly a pause. Not everyone, however, shared their enthusiasm.
The most important of the disbelievers at this time was Townshend. Al-
though many times blamed for initiating the Baghdad advance, this is an
accusation which cannot be supported. Both privately and publicly he
spoke against such a move. Although not present to give testimony to
the Mesopotamia Commission, Pownsher's aide-de-camp, Major H. V. Bas-
tow, did speak on his behalf, and he related that Towrihend repeatedly
spoke of Duff's directive not to go past Kut. Bastow claimed that mown-
shend. did not even want to go past Amara, but that if ordered to go to
Kut 'that was the furthest possible limit he considered safe to ad-
vance, considering the smallness of the force and the great dearth of
artillery, ships, and land transport.' 2
 Thus, when he realised at Azi- -
ziyah that It was Impossible to catch the Turks, he was prepared to re-
turn to Kut. Nixon thought otherwise. He informed Lake on 2 October:
'In my opinion a pursuit even though it has been slow owing to circum-
stances which could not be avoided, will have a demoralising effect on
the Turks and a corresponding good effect on the political situation
in this portion of Asia.' 3 This was an opinion he developed without
1Letter, Hardinge to Nicolson, 23 Sep 15, FO/800/379.
2Meso Comm, Maj. H.V.Bastow, 30 Jan 17, statement,
3Ibia., rio. 21332.
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consulting Townshend, who did not agree with it.
Townshend noted in his diary that Nixon did 'not seem to realise
the weakness and danger of his line of communications. . . . Thus I
felt it my duty to give my opinion plainly to the Army Commander whether
he likes it or not.' 1
 Therefore, on 3 October, he sent to Nixon in
Nut his appreciation of the situation, not only from the military po-
sition as field commander, but from his physical position with the ad-
vanced force. He had already complained to Nixon's Chief of Staff,
Kernball, that he wanted no more reinforcements coming into Aziziyah.
'I do not want you to send these troops up here because I do not ap-
prove of holding on at Aziziyah. . . . If' we are not to go beyond Kut
we ought to come tack; we are too far ahead.' 2 His 3 October telegram
created much controversy during the Commission hearings. Townhend
first described the improved condition of the Turks' morale and the
strong position in which they were entrenched at Ctesiphon.
My opinion, if I may be allowed to express one, is that
up to the battle of Kut, our objective has been to occupy
strategical position of Nut, and to consolidate ourselves in
the Vilayet.
Ctsiphon is now held by the defeated Turkish Forces.
Should it not be considered politically advisable by Govern-.
ment to occupy Baghdad at present on account of doubtful sit-
uation at Dardanelles and possibility of our small forces
being driven out of Baghdad by stronger forces from Anatolia
which would compel us to retire down a long line of communi-
cations teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile,
whose hostility would become active on hearing of our re-
treat, then I consider that on military grounds that we should
consolidate our position at Kut. The sudden fall of water,
which made our advance difficult, slow, and toilsome, upset
our plans of entering Baghdad on the heels of the Turks while
'Meso Coimn, Bastow, 30 Jan 17, no. 21333.
2Meso Comm, Kemball, L Jan 17, no. 1711.58.
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they.,were retreating In disorder. If on the other hand It is
the desire of toverrTnent to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great
risk is to be run, it is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary
that the advance from ICut should be carried out riethodicafly
by two Divisions or one Army Corps or by one Division closely
supported by another complete Division, exclusive of the gar-.
risons of the important places of Nasiriyah, Ahwaz, nd Amara.
It is now quite impossible for laden ships to go up.
Basf ow stated that 1Cem1.11 had confirmed receipt of the telegram,2
and !Ce'nball said he was sure Nixon must have seen if. Nixon, however,
claimed he could not remember ever seeing the telegram. 'If he says
that he sent It In, I suppose that he did, . . . Personally I have no
recollection of that appreciation, and I am not at all sure that It
arrived, I never saw It.' 3 Apparently, no one else any further up
t'e c'hain of comnand. saw it either. ven if they had seen It, tHe Cam-
1ssio learned they •o'ild 'ave inore it, in India at least. 'uff
stated that such a counication gould carry no weIght at all in Ms
opinion. 'I never take t1 opinion of a junior officer in a case of
that sort who had no more responsibility than a lance-corporal. I would
as soon go to th officer commanding a battalIon.' The fact that
Townshend was second-In-command In ?'esopotamia and the man who alone
drew up and Implemented all offensive plans along the tmlgrls, the man
who had de facto control in the field, meant absolutely nothing to Duff.
ardinge later fold Chamberlain that he 'did not think It was incumbent
on 'eneral Nixon to regard or forward opinions by subordinate commanders
1Pvt. tel., Hardirige to Chamberlain, 9 Apr 16, IO/L/''ttL/5/768.
eso Comm, Bastow, 30 Jan 17, no. 21337.
'eso Comnrn, Nixon, lIt. Nov 16, no. 10830.
4yeso Comin, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 1531t.3.
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with which he was not in agreement. We were deliberately and rightly
guided by Nixon's opinion alone, as he alone was responsible to us for
results.' 1
 Thus, Townsherid's opinion was lost in the mass of communi
-
cations which Corps Headquarters received every day. One of the key
appraisals of the real situation was never seen in London, by those who
finally had to decide whether to permit the advance. Parrow +old the
Commission thaf if "ownshend's vie .rs had been known in London it would
most certathly have affected their decision.2
They were not known in London, however, because Nixon stated that
-	 he did not know of Townshend's objections. On that same day, 3 October,
Nixon wired to India that he thought the Thrks sufficiently der'ioralised
and disoranised to justify a rapid avarce to Ctasip-on in order to
finish them off. 'Iith this ±n mind, 'e planned on concertra+in at
Aziziyah. ie made this claim in ignorance of 'o,rnshend's appraIsal and
without inifiating a reques+ to Thw's'-end for information, thus makin?
a judement on the capabilities of is force based on pure speculation.
'ownshd never again mentioned his doubl-s, mainly because of Kemball's
reply to his telegram. Kemball answered that Nixon 'understands another
Division will be sent here from France.' 3 't'ownshend responded that he
did not know, when writing his rsport, that reinforcements would be
available 'and that makes all the difference in my appreciation.' Town-
shend stated in his memoirs, however, that tbat statement was made in
a sense of resignation to the situation. Hejnew that even if a division
Lpvt. tel., Hardinge to Chamberlain, 6 Apr 16, IO/L/MIL/5/768.
2? Teso Comzn, Barrow, 22 Aug 16, no. 685.
3Tel. no. 308/191/0, Kemball to ownshend, 3Oct 15, ?eso Comm,
App. XLIII.
"el. no. 128(, Townshend to Kemball, 3 Oct 15, Neso Cornm, App. LXIII.
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was despatched from France, it could not possibly arrive before Thrkish
reinforcements. 'It seemed to me useless to try to argue any lorer.
•	 . when ixoE saw that by warning him I had doubts of success, I am
of the opinion that he should have taken command himself and used me
under him in the battle.' 1 Further, "ownshend had salved his consci-
ence and fulfilled what he considered to be his moral duty by submit-
ting the report in the first place. If Nixon did not see fit to accept
his warnings, that was his prerogative, and mownshend could then func-
tion in his role as second-in-command without second thoughts. He
wrote in his memoirs
My duty was to warn my superior; and having done so, I was
ready to carry out any order given to me. . . . Herein lies
the great distinction between military and civil suborlina+e
situa+tons. If, in a civil office, the suboinate differs
aterial1y from his superior, he ought to resign; but In
'ilitari or naval appointments It is the duty of the subor-
dinate commander to assis+ his superIor in the manner In
which that superior 'ray deem his services most advantageous.
hat is the principle on which I acted in this affair, 2an' on
which I &iould act on a future occasion, if necessary.
7hen the 'esopotamia Commission held their proceedings, one of
their main functions was to discuss who initiated the plan for an ad-
vance past ICut to Baghdad. Fownshend cannot be blamed because, even
though he drove his pursuing troops sixty miles past Kut, it was strict-
ly a tactical operation. He had every Intention of returning to Kut
If he could not catch the Turks. This withdra'.ral was overridden by
Nixon, and it seems that most of the blame must be placed on him. Duff
must shoulder some responsibility owing to the orders he issued wherein




Although Duff pointed out that that was merely a contingency plan,
Duff drafted them on his own, and Nixon believed them o be a statement
of policy. He agreed with the Commission's analysis that the order to
submit such a plan was 'something more than a hint to a general that
h was rather expected to get to Baghdad if he could.' 1 As Field Mar-
shall Sir W. 11. Robertson observed later, 'These instructions it will
be seen went very far beyond anything which had. yet received the sanc-
tion of either the Indian or the Home Government.'2
Nixon was convinced that a policy change had been instituted. 'It
must be presumed that the matter had been discussed between the Secre-
tary of State and the Viceroy before the instrictions given me were
approved by the Co'Trnander-in-Ghief, as the policy enailed in +he±r
performance was entirely different from that un'er whici my preeces-
sor as acting. ' That the Secretary of State had not been consulted
never entered his mind when his orders were issued. Robeikson wrote:
The instructions ought, moreover, as on all occasions when
a commander in the field first takes up his duties, to have
been drafted, or at any rate approved, by the Government.
Instead, of that they were issued without being referred
either to the Viceroy or to the India Office, who were
therefre in ignorance of what General Nixon had been told
to do.
However, the Secretary of State's telegrams to Nixon prior to the Kürna-
Amara operation (berating him for not submitting his plans earlier) and
the continual references to defensive policy to protect the oil supply
should have, and to an extent did, register n hint that there was a
'Meso Comm, Nixon, 14 Nov 16, no. 11746.
2Sir I. 1 .'obertson, Soldiers and. Statesmen, 2 vols., (London, 1926),
vol. 2, p. 30.
3Meso Comm, Nixon, 1LI. Nov 16, statement.
4Robertson, vol. 2, p. 31.
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discrepancy. Although the divergence of views was never cleared up,
Nixon continued to operate on his orders of 2 arch, no matter how
much London complained. It can, of course, be argued that at any time
Crewe or Chamberlain could have ordered a halt, but they, as politicians,
acceded to the military opinions from India and Mesopotamia that the
advances were necessary. The India Office was guilty of the sin of
omission, in that t'e officials there accepted almost blindly India's
analyses and continually shifted their policy attitudes to accommodate
these military desires. At India's door must the sins of commission
lie. The original directives came from there. Although Nixon was a
willin follo'er, 1e as partially justified in his claim that he was
only oi'ig w'at he was told.
Thus, in oer o fulfil that he thouht to e hi ore, Tion
sent his 3 October telegram to India claiin. his ability to open the
road to Baghdad and his intention of doing so. Although nixon stated
that he had no intention of initiating policy, his decision to concen-
trate at Aziziyah rather than at Kut, where Duff told Townshend to stay,
changed the situation entirely. Nixon must have assumed that the order
to advance on Baghdad would come or he could not have justified his de-
cision to reinforce Aziz1yah. Indeed, Kemball told Townshend on 3 Oc-
tober that 'it is the Army Commander's intention to open the way to
Baghdad', 1
 yet Nixon told the Commission that 'until the 8th I had no
glimmer as to what policy might be required after a successful battle
while we were in pursuit.' 2 This statement can hardly be believed in
1Tel. no. 308/191/0, Kemball to ''ownshend, 3 Oct 15, eso 00mm,
App. XLIII.
2 'eso Coimm, Nixon, l Nov 16, no. 10830.
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the light of his actions and his adnission t'at he believed his orders
directed him to advance. His telegram of the 3rd to India was forwarded
to London, where its arrival 'forced the authorities in England to con-
1
aider immediately the question of an advance.'
The notion of moving on Baghdad was not unexpected. in London.
Other than the occasional references to it since the inception of the
campaign, Sir Edmund Barrow submitted a minute to Chamberlain on Oc-
tober, before Nixon's telegram arrived from India. His analysis of the
pressure that would be brought to bear on the British Government to
sanction such an advance was amazingly accurate. He foresaw the re-
quests that would come front Nixon ari3 Cox, as rell as from the press
and from c""'iercial interests. He knee t'at political pressure gould
be great and that many of the reasons gIven rould I'ave rent. !owever,
he wrote that 'it Is with extreme reLcance at I advocate a policy
of caution, which will certainly be u"popular, an' perhaps difficult
to justify in the minds of those who are not intimate with the intrica-
des of the problem.' 2 Barrow pointed out the present weakness of
Force 'D' and the deterioration of the situation if Baghdad was cap-
tured. The thin spread of forces would be just too weak to maintain
everything they held. If a serious counterattack succeeded in dislod-
ging the force from Baghdad, the entire theatre could collapse owing
to inferior forces and the hostility of the Arabs. Further, the ap-
proaching winter would force the Russians in the Caucasus into inac-
tivity and free Turkish forces there to join those on the Tigris.
1
obenly, vol. 2, p. 7.
2Minute, Barrow to Chamberlain, i. Oct 15, •iO/106/877.
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in India.
Iith the appreciations of the Indian eneral Staff in June, and of
Nixon on 30 August, Lake was able to frame an outline of the reasons
why Baghdad should be attacked, and this he submitted to T)uff on 5 Oc-
tober. tmhe possession of Baghdad would (1) deprive the Turks of their
main point of concentration; (2) place the British in a defensive po-
sition able to defeat in detail Turkish forces sent down either the
Tigris or 2uphrates; (3) deprive the Turks of steamers and materials
of war; (4)increase prestige; (5) Interfere with enemy operations in
Persia and Afghanistan; and (6) keep the Arabs quiet. 1
 All that was
needed was an Indian division returned from France. The arunents were
famIliar ones.	 o reasons were cited here that had not been used time
and again in the past eleven months, and, as always, more en were
needed than coul' be supplied from India. Now, with the prize of agh-
dad al-os+, within theIr grasp, the Indian authorities looked far afield
for troops. - -
Duff proposed that 'ardinge request London to ask the Japanese
Government to send two divisions of Infantry. Duff thought that such
troops could be obtained if the Japanese were offered sufficient corn-
pensation, either in money or territory. With two extra divisions un-
der his command, Nixon could take Baghdad with one and cover the Ger-
mans in Persia with the other, 2 although it seems wasteful to employ
an entire division to isolate a comparative handful of agents. This
idea was not followed up because Hardirge did not have the money to
1Memo, Lake to Duff, 5 Oct 15, W0/l0/593.
2"eso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec l, no. 15257,
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pay the Japanese Government and refused to give up any territory. He
decided instead to press for the return of the Indian troops in France.
These had. not performed too well in the previous winter's cold and
their cavalry remained unused. Hardirige wrote that without those men,
the Indian Government would not let Townshend past Kut. 1 This became
India's main arguments Force 'D' could capture Baghdad immediately
but could not hold it without reinforcement. 2 This was based on Nixon's
appraisal, which, since Hardinge had no knowledge of Townshend's ob-
jections, was accepted as final.
Knowing that on 3 October Nixon claimed he w strong enough to
capture Baghdad, the Secretary of State asked on the 8th how many more
men he would need to hold the city. Nixon's answer became the basis
of all the decisions during the following two weeks. He claimed that
he could beat the Turks in front of him and capture Baghdad with his
present force, but he should require one division and a cavalry regi-
ment to 'watch both the Tigris and Euphrates line of communications
and defeat the enemy as he comes within reach.' 3 This telegram shows
the main reason why.. Nixon must receive the greatest portion of the
blame for the disaster that occured in the Baghdad advance. Nixon
claimed at the Commission hearings that the request from Chamberlain
on 8 October was the first time he realised that a policy change to
include the capture of Baghdad might occur. With so important a deci-
sion about tobemade, it seems only logical that an opinion which would
'Tel. no. H82Z15, Hardinge to ChaTrberlatn, 6 Oct 15, IO/L/MIL/5/
753/10761.
tel., Hardinge to Chamberlain, 6 Oct 15, CAB/21./1, App. III.
3Tel. no. 308/218/0, Nixon to Chamberlain, 8 Oct 15, WO/l06/877.
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affect that decision ought to be well-considered. Yet Nixon answered
Chamberlain immediately, without conferring with any subord.iriates.
It has already been shown how Townshend. viewed the question of an
advances that Nixon would fail to consult him is almost inconceivable.
Townshend. had coinnnded all the offensives thus far on the Tigris and.
had been told to lead the next one (on 3 October Nixon had ordered. him
to prepare plans for the advance 1 ). Since Townshend had to have the
most essential information with him in order to prepare those plans,
it is oiiy logical that he should best know 'Force 'D' s' needs and abil-
ities. Still, Nixon did. not call on him, as both Nixon's Chief of
Staff and. Thwnshend.'s AD.C. subsequently testified. 2 '7'his was even
more i'nportart an oversight considering the information 11ownshend had
at his disposa1 ,whch had coie to light since hts +legram of objec-
tion. Of major importance as the corUtion of the troops. Dela'nain
reported to Townshend that during the battle of Fut, many of the IndIan
troops performed without spirit, and. those who fought well lost tre-
'nendously, on battalion losing forty-five per cent. casualties. 3 Fis
British formations suffered likewise. 'My three British battalions were
the backbone of my division. I relied on them for victory--and they
rere at a strength of less than half a battalion each. '4 Indian Army
battalions at full strength numbered some 850 men, but after Fut, one
of them, the 2nd Dorsets, had only 297. By the time they marched on
'Tel. no. 308/191/0, Kemball to Townshend., 3 Oct 15, Meso Comin,
App. XLIII.





Ctesiphon they were only at three-quarter strength, and the drafts were
Territorialswith little or no training. Townshend commented 'I have
never seen such a wretched class of recruits in the whole of ny Indian
experience, and the battalion commanders did not mince their words on
the matter.' 1 Duff told the Commission that by 1 October aU the Brit-
ish battalions were overstrength, but this was grossly incorrect. Har-
dinge expressed amazement at such an 'impossible' statement and said
'we had not received a single draft since the beginning of the war.'2
Further, Nixon seemed to overlook other important subordinates in
his haste to answer Chamberlain. The Commission observed critically
that he apparently failed to consult either his Quarterrnaster-'eneral
or his Surgeon_reneral. His transport, which had. been deteriorating
rapidly, was near complete collapse, yet he made no mention of t'is to
Chamberlain. He told the Commission 'If there was one thing that was
never out of our minds at any moment it was the question of ships--
river transport. It was absolutely in'possible in such a case that it
should ever escape one's thoughts for a moment.' 3' He repeatedly told
the Commission that he was ever mindful of the shipping shortage. In
his opening statement he named transport as the main reason for the
defeat at Cteslphon. If he could be as thoroughly conversant with the
difficulties as he later claimed to be, why did he not realise that
what he . was asking of his logistical staff was virtually impossible
But, without consulting anyone, Nixon claimed that he could go on. He
1Townshend, p. 143.
Neso Cornin, Hard.inge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16512.
3reso Comrn, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, no. 10829.
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told the Commission 'we had got thse troops up there and we were going
on fighting. I did not think and I do not think now the risk was any
more than it had been the whole time.
	 The only way - that he could have
thought such things was because he did not go to the trouble to find out
the truth. Sir Percy Lake confirmed this rather bizarre attitude. When
asked if the Quartermaster-General was consulted, lake replied: 'It might
have been desirable, but I do not think it would be necessary.'2
This attitude reflects one of the most surprising aspects of Nixon's
response to Chamberlain. For some inexp]Jcab1e reason, Nixon, and
others in authority, seemed to see the logistical and tactical ques-
tions as independent, rather than interdependent entities. When asked
why Nixon did not mention the transport difficulties in his 30 August
recommendation for the Baghdad advance, he answered that it 'was a
purely military appreciation of the advance', 3
 as if to suggest that
keeping one's troops maintained and mobile was not a military duty.
Lake fully supported Nixon's response, believing that the 'eneral's
word was all that was necessary, not those of his staff. 4 Kemball
echoed this reasoning. He stated that Nixon's report dealt with a
'question of policy not of means.' He went on to play down the crucial
nature of the situation. 'We assumed that we could find some way and
that it was only a matter of time. If we had not the steamers we would
have to advance slower.' 5
 His comment that Nixon's report was a matter
1Meso Comrn, Nixon, lL$ Nov 16, no. 11565.
eso Comm, Lake, 11 Jan 17, no. 18695.
3Meso Comm, Nixon, 111. Nov 16, no. 11891.
4Meso Comrn, lake, 11 Jan 17, no. 18694.
5Meso Comm, Kemball, 4 Jan 17, nos. 17402-05.
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of policy supports the contention that Nixon was exercising too much
responsibility; so, too, does his comwent to Townshend that it was the
'Army Commander's intention to open the way to Baghdad' on the very
day Townshend spoke against it. This was five days before Chamberlain's
request for a resume of his reinforcement requirements on the 8th, at
which time Nixon claimed 'he had no glimmer as to what policy might be
required.' It is difficult to reconcile Nixon's actions with the tes-
timony in his defence and his contention that 'in no step was the pol-
icy of advancing mine." His unfounded claim that Force 'D' could
handle the Turks was so persuasive, however, that it kept the (overn-
ment from questioning the extent of the army's true ability.
By taking Nixon's assurances at face value, the policy-makers in
London worked on the assumption that everything was in order, with the
exception of reinforcements. They could not know of the transporf sit-
uation,especiafly as the Indian authorities did not press for more
river craft. Hardinge forwarded Nixon t s l September request for ship-
ping with a note of his own urging that their arrival be expedited-2
Here, however, the bureaucracy successfully buried the request. The
note was addressed to Chamberlain, who passed it on to Barrow, but he
was absent from the India Office for a week in late September when the
note came through. It was sent to the Department of Stores without
hte seeing it. Once in the Department of Stores, it was treated as a
matter of routine. The Stores section went through all the red tape
-	 Yeso Comin, Nixon, lL Nov 16, statement.
2Tel. no. H8095, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 28 Sep 15, Hfl"/103/2/]f171.
eso Comm 1
 Barrow, 27 Feb 17, no. 22399.
121
of forms, plans, estimates and contract bidding, and. the construction
was so delayed that the arrival of these craft in Meco:potarnia by late
November, when they were needed, was a physical impossibility. Nixon
apparently had no idea. of the amount of time it would take to fulfil
the demand, for on 9 October he wrote to Simla urgently asking when the
craft would arrive.' None of his concern for the craft ever showed it-
self in any of his despatches regarding the advance, however, and once
the earlier requests had been sent on to Stores, the India Office for-
got about them. 'T'hus, Holderness was able to tell the Commission that
all correspondence concerning the advance that London had received from
Nixon and India 'contained no hint of transport being insufficient and
had no suggestion that the proposals to capture and occupy Baghdad were
conditional on the existing transport being increased. ,2 He therefore
made no mention at all of Nixon's earlier requests when he sat on an
inter-departmental committee considering the Baghdad advance.
This committee, appointed on 5 October, met on the 7th, 9th and
16th to discuss the basic strategy questions involved in an advance on
Baghdad. It was assembled at the direction of the Prime Minister, and
contained representatives from the India Office, War Office, Foreign
Office and Admiralty. The points under discussion were: (1) whether
an attack should be made on Baghdad; (2) the ability to defend the city;
(3) could the Turks operate in lower 1'esopotamia without possessing
Baghdad; (4) the effect Baghdad' s capture would have on murks fighting
on other fronts. 3
 The committee had reached provisional conclusions
1
Meso Comm, Kemball, 4 Jan 17, no. 17385.
2Neso Cornm, Holderness, 1 Feb 17, statement.
3 'Precis of Correspondence 1 egarding the Mesopotamian Expedition:
Its (enesis and Development', WO/106/877, pp. 35-36.
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on these questions by the end of their session on the 9th, and they
passed these on to the Dardanelles Committee on the 11th. They were
as followsi first, military and political considerations., indicated the
desirability of capturing Baghdad, but no attempt should be made with-
out Force 'D' being sufficiently strengthened to maintain itself there.
Second, Baghdad was not an ideal defensive position, but the occupation
of the surrounding area by a sufficient force would offer strategic ad-
vantages. Third, the Turks could operate in lower Nesopotamia without
Baghdad in their possession, but their retention of the city would
favour their operations. Fourth, the effect of Baghdad's fall on other
theatres was impossible to predict, but in order to recapture Baghdad,
the Turks would certainly have to weaken themselves on other fronts
The Dardanelles Committee met on 14 October to consider these con-
clusions. It was unable to reach definite agreement, so the Admiralty
and Imperial General Staffs were directed to prepare a joint apprecia-
tion of the question, 2
 which they submitted on the 19th. They stated
that the operation was feasible, but ii order to hold the city Force
'D' would have to be stronger. Further, if Baghdad was occupied, its
defence would have to be in the hands of the military, with the prerog-
ative of withdrawing should military considerations so direct, regard-
less of political considerations. 3 The joint report finished with the
opinion that the operation should remain entirely Indian. As for re-
inforceinents, the two staffs emphasised that 'under no circumstances
must troops which might otherwise be employed in Europe, be diverted
1
Meso Comm, Holderness, 1 Feb 17, statement.
2Minutes of the Dardanelles Committee 14 Oct 15, GAB/42/4/9.




from the primary theatre of war for the purpose of conductinp a cam-
paign which cannot appreciably influence the decision as between the
armies of the Ailied and. those of the Central Powers." This Indian
responsibility could be heavy; the Staffs predicted a possible 6o,000
Turks concentrating to recapture Baghdad 'by January 1916.
In India, the Government was considering the responsibility their
forces might have to bear. The appreciations dealt with how India
could justify the advance; there was no criticism of such a move from
any level. Hardinge wrote that the 'capture of Baghdad arid the destruc-
tion of the Turkish steamers would effectively put an end to ''urkish
activity in Mesopotamia. . . . It would be a very suitable ending to
what has so far been a most satisfactory campaign. ,2 lake detailed the
advantages just as he had done on 5 October. He told the Comriission
that the Indian authorities believed the Turks could riot concentrate
too strong an army against Force 'D'. They were already over-committed
in Gallipoli, in the Caucasus, and in Syria. 'Our calculation was I
think that she could not assemble any very serious forces against us
then.' 3
 Duff echoed many of Lake's reasons, but added that he could
not support operations in the area unless he held Baghdad, and Force
'D' could not defend Itself In any position between there and Kut.'
The justifications put forward by these men were enough to con-
vince Barrow that Force 'D' could capture the city. He Informed Cham-
berlain on 15 October of his support for the Indian proposals. He
1Report of the r,eneral and Admiralty Staffs, 19 Oct 15, 1O/1O6/893.
2Letter, Hardirige to Nicolson, 14 Oct 15, FO/800/380.
3Meso Comm, lake, 11 Jan 17, no. 18831.
4Memo,Duff to Hardinge, 19 Oct 15, HIC/90/1/187.
would drop his objections of k October if Force 'D' were brought up to
proper strength. A 25,000-man army would be more than able to meet
the 60,000 Purks that the general Staff indicated might be assembled
by January. He believed this War Office projection to be inflated.
If the Gallipoli operations continued, then the urks could not trans-
fer troops to ?esopotamia. Even if allipoli were abandoned, it was
doubtful that a large Turkish force could be assembled elsewhere before
April. Even if such reinforcement did arrive, 'at the worst we should
have to retire to Kut-el-Amara, having first deprived the ene' ? y of many
of the advantages Baghdad would ordinarily confer', and it would be
some time before the "urks could redevelop Baghdad into a strong sup-
ply centre. 'Fu'ther, having for all those months interrupted the com-
munications between Baghdad and Persia, we should have emasculated the
t errnan movement in Persia and postponed trouble on the Indian frontier.'
Barrow considered the risk justified now, and the advantages of going
to outweigh the disadvantages of retiring. If forced to retire, it
would be well into 1916 and Kut would, by then, have been made into a
'formidable '1'orres Vedras. . . . In fact I may summarise the policy
herein advocated as "frappez fort nais frappez vite."
With the India Office and India willing to take the risk, the de-
cision finally rested with the Dardanefles Committee, which met on 21
October. 2
 The Ccimrnittee had three alternatives from which to choose.
First, Force 'D'cou1d consolidate at Kut and go no further. This was
supported by Lord Curzon, because he feared a possible defeat later and
1Ninute by Barrow, 15 Oct 15, IO/L/MIL/.5/769.
2Present at the meeting were Asquith, Crewe, Lansdowne, Curzon,





thought the risk of withdrawal outweighed the advantages of advance.
Curzon believed any withdrawal from Baghdad would so damage British
prestige as to make it impossible to regain her present status. The
second alternative was to conduct a raid to destroy Turkish steamers
and	 , folowed by a return to Kut. This was favoured by Kit-
chener and Crewe, because they, too, feared a loss of prestige and
thought that a rapid advance and withdrawal would cripple the Turks
without harming the British position. Last, there could be an advance
followed by a full occupation. This was favoured by Churchill, Bal-
four and Grey, for the political effects of capturing the city.1 Kit-
chener argued forcefully for his point of view. He thought a raid had
everything to gain and nothing to lose. It would not require rein-
forcement, it wotild cripple Turkish logistics, and it would not hurt
prestige if the withdrawal was immediate arid voluntary, demonstrating
clearly that there was no intention of occupying the city permanently.2
Bonar Law observed that this was 1:aslcal].y in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the General and Admiralty Staffs. He remarked that 'the
main consideration seemed to him that we wanted a victory now badly
and as cheaply as possible, but that we should have to take some risks
in order to gain a success.' 3 He therefore chose the occupation al-
ternative.
Churchill followed this by saying that considerations other than
Baghdad had to be taken into account, such as how the action would be
viewed elsewhere in the Middle Fst • Grey stated that the Arab world
Meso Coma, Crewe, 14 . Sep 16, nos. 3217-32.
2lbid., no. 3073.
k/15. 
3Minutes of the Dardane].].es Committee meeting, 21 Oct 15, CAB/k2/
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as a whole was on the verge of choosing whether to support the Allies
or the Central Powers, and that if Baghdad were taken it would tip the
scales in the Allies' favour, since Baghdad would be the first major
enemy city to fall to Allied arms. Churchill conjectured that if the
city was not taken, then Persia would join Turkey. At this, Curzon
observed that such a move by Persia would force Nixon to weaken his
forces at Baghdad in order to protect the oil supply. This surprised
Balfour and Churchill • Since the inception of the camaign, the India
Office had defended this area at Admiralty request, and it had figured
prominently in the decisions made concerning advances along the Tigris.
Now, Ba].four told Chamberlain that the oil fields were not vital, and.
Churchill added that 'so far as he knew no oil was actually being
drawn from Persia. The Navy had other sources of supply. 1 This was
hardly in keeping with the official pleas from the Admiralty through-
out the spring and summer to keep the oil flowing.
A point not raised in the discussions of the Dardanelles Committee,
but surely in the minds of the members, concerned the secret agreement
being negotiated at the time between Russia, France and Britain. Ens-
sia bad stated that in return for possession of Constantinople, she
would support British and French claims for territory in the Middle
Est. In an Inter-departmental conference held in June 1915, it was
decided that Britain should claim Baghdad in order to protect the trade
outlet at Basra. That such a decision had been made and was in the
process of becoming Allied policy could hardly have been forgotten by
1Minutes of Dardanelles Committee meeting, 21 Oct 15, CAB/k2/4/15.
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those on the Committee, all of whom had representatives at the confer-
1
ence.
In opposition to all the advantages that would accrue from cap-
turing Baghdad, there were two main problems to be faced. First, the
Turks might possibly assemble as many as 60,000 men to counterattack
within three months. Second, Force 'D' was und.erstrength to meet such
an offensive. On the available evidence, the Committee could hardly
decide other than to advance, and also to withdraw the two Indian di-
visions in France for use on the Tigris. This move easily met the
possible disadvantage of a large enemy force gathering in Mesopotamia.
For them to have decided otherwise wxi].d have been foolish. How could
they know that the evidence was incomplete? Hardinge and. Duff passed
on Nixon' s shipping requests and then forgot them. In London, the re-
quests went to the Department of Stores and the decision-makers re- -
mained ignorant of them, Since no one else mentioned any difficulties
to them, the Committee made the wisest possible choice, not realising
that the military authorities in Mesopotamia and India could be so mis-
taken. As Chamberlain stated, 'the Government at home took every step
they could to see that this was a sound military operation before they
ordered it • ,2 However, as Lord Hugh Cecil, a member of the Nesopotamia
Commission, summed up, 'there was this great drawlack In coming to a
wise decisioni the Home Government, the War Council with their expert
advisors, the Indian Government with their expert advisors, and General
1See De Bunsen Committee minutes, CAB/27/l; also Z.A.B.Zeman, A
Diplomatic History of the First World War, (London, 1971), et. al.
2Meso Comm, ChamberlaIn, 21 Dec 16, no. 17162.
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Nixon, and none of the three knew the whole problem.'1
When the Commission's Report was released in 1917, the question
of the political nature of this decision was much discussed. Chamber-
lain, in his resignation speech, detailed the efforts of the Cabinet
to ensure military feasibility. Asquith also nade this point. 'I would
say at once, in the clearest and most explicit terms, that I cannot re-
cal]. any step taken in this War which was more completely warranted by
every relevant consideration of policy and strategy, and which was more
strongly fortified in advance by an absolute concurrence of expert au-
thority.' 2
 Asquith denied that the Baghdad advance was strictly for
the purpose of covering up the Dardanelles fiasco • He commented on the
charge 'that the Cabinet at that time were anxious for what is called a
"political success"--by which is meant political success to restore their
wavering fortunes at home--and, therefore, what followed--that they de-
liberately subordinated military to political considerations. That is
a calumny; it is a vile calumny. '3 That all reasonable precautions
were taken militarily, however, does not preclude a political basis for
such a decision. Busch comments that '%he most persuasive point
was the relatively simple natter of sheer prestige of the capture of
Baghdad, comparable only to the fall of Constantinople.' 1
 Surely Ba]-
four's statement to the Dardanelles Committee that 'we wanted a victory
now badly and as cheaply as possible', which no one denied at the time,
1Meso Comnm, Lake, 1]. Jan 17, no. 18885.
2Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), Fifth Series, (Hansard),
vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 2361.
3lbid.
1 Briton Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, l9l? -l92l, (Berkeley,
1971), p. 32.
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points to the assumption that, as The Times wrote, 'They saw the disas-
ter ahead at Gallipoli, and they clutched at Sir John Nixon's absurdly
confident telegram as drowning men clutch at a straw. 1 A. J • P. Taylor
comments that 'the advance was speeded up to atone for the failure at
Gallipoli. 2 Surely the Dardanelles defeat figured in the Cabinet
thinking, but one cannot blame the failure to capture Baghdad on that
reason.
It is misleading to say that the Dardanelles Committee sanctioned
the advance, for it never officially did so. chamberlain did it on
his own authority. On 21 October, when the discussion described above
was finished, and with the Committee in general agreement, Chamberlain
told Hardinge of the Staff recommendation that a withdrawal on military
grounds had to take precedence over political considerations should a
Turkish advance make such a move necessary. He then told the Viceroy
that the Committee was prea.red to order the attack 'unless you con-
sider that the possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against
the	 . ' 3 Hardinge, of course, responded favourably. He admitted
the possibility of a large Turkish counteroffensive 'and although the
bad effect of a possible withdrawal in the future cannot be ignored,
I am confident that the right policy at the present time is to take the
risk.' 4 With this response, Chamberlain gave permission, though with
reservation. 'Nixon may march on Baghdad if he is satisfied that force
The Times (London), 27 Jun 17, p. 7.
Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, (Oxford, 1965), p. 49.
3Meso Comm, Chamberlain, 21 Dec 16, no. 17134.
4lbid., no. 17135.
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he has available is sufficient for the operation. Reinforcements will
take time owing to relief and transport arrangements, but two divisions
will be sent as soon as possible.' 1 While a najority of the Committee
seemed to approve the advance, no final official decision was made con-
cerning permission to advance or the length of stay in Baghdad once
they got there. Chamberlain sent the order by his own choice, and.
Crewe stated that 'my impression is that he felt justified from the
genera]. trend of the discussion at the War Council ardanelles Committe,
on the 21st October after the Viceroy's telegram, in sending this.'2
He claimed that at the next meeting, on 25 October, they 'did not a].-
lude to Mesopotamia at all.' They only gave tacit permission, but the
phrasing of Chamberlain's telegram gave the final decision once again
to the 'man on the spot.'
As positive as Nixon was that he could get to Baghdad, he knew
that Force 'D' could not stay there unless it was much stronger. Work-
ing on the assumption that it would take three months for the Turks to
concentrate sufficient forces to attaëk Baghdad, Nixon thought that he
could hold the city with his present force if reinforcements arrived
within one month of its capture. The General Staff at the War Office
calculated that seven weeks was the minimum time it would take to
transfer troops from France • However, they recommended that the two
divisions necessary to hold Baghdad should also be there to capture it,
to 'meet the possibility of the Turks assembling greater forces at
Baghdad than is at present anticipated, and to ensure that sufficient
3Tel. no. 3099, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 23 Oct 15, WO/l06/877.
2Meso Comm, Crewe, ui. Sep 16, no. 3 237; minutes of Darda.neUes
Committee meeting, 21 Oct 15, CAB/Zi.2/4/15.
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force will be available to overcome the maximum resistance which it is
estimated that the enemy can offer at Baghdad.' 1 The Dardanelles Corn-
inittee had not yet come to a decision as to whether to despatch the
troops from France when this recommendation was made, so the possibil-
ity of India having to provide the troops was strong. Chamberlain tele-
graphed to Hardinge on 12 October that he was trying to get one whole
division transferred from France, but Kitchener had not yet received
them from General French. 2 Chamberlain had mentioned on the 8th that
'the Cabinet is prepared to send two divisions sooner than lose this
opportunity and sooner than run any undue risk in pursuing it.' 3 He
therefore asked India to supply a division tempomri1y.
Duff advised Hardinge to refuse. 'It is clear that the Home Coy-
eminent are very anxious that Baghdad shQl].d be taken, and they will
send us the required force if we hold out, but they will give us no-
thing if the least sign of willingness to find reinforcenents is shown
by us, and we shall have to do it all by ourselves. ' Two brigades had
been set aside for emergency use, but Duff refused to part with them.
Hardinge therefore told Chamberlain that India could not spare any
troops. He believed that 'the Indian sponge is squeezed dry and it
will be very difficult to find more troops to send anywhere without ex-
posing ourselves to most serious risks. . . . Consequently, the advance
'General Staff report, 12 Oct 15, IO/L/MIL/5/753.
2	 tel., Chamberlain to Hardinge, 12 Oct 15, HDG/103/l/l936.
3Sir C. Petrie, The Life and Letters of the Right Honourable Sir
Austen Chamberlain, K ,P.C.,M.P., (LoMoiTO), vol. 2, p. 37.
11.Letter, Chamberlain to McKenna, 1st Lord of Treasury, 10 Oct 15,
Balfour Papers, Vol LIV, no. 11.9736.
5Meso Comin, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15298.
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in Mesopotamia is hanging fire and nobody seems to know quite what to
do.' 1
 Duff was afraid that with or without reinforcements, events on
the Tigris might determine policy before London decided what to do. He
thought that the Turkish activity around Zeur might presage an attack
and tho* might have to launch a preventative assault to forestall a
Turkish concentration. 2
 Hardinge wrote that 'my conviction is that
before we know where we are we shall hear of Nixon being in Baghdad.'3
Townshend refrained from attacking Zeur in force with anything other
than a small raiding party (which he oonduoted against the post in
early November), aM the Mesopotamian situation remained static while
they awaited reinforcements. India's stand had forced the Home Govern-
ment to order the Indian troops to be sent from France. The two re-
serve brigades in India, therefore, were not despatched until the emer-
gency for which they were detailed had passed, and they could do no-
thing to help Townshend • Nixon believed that 'had they arrived in the
beginning of November the result would have been other than it was.
Force 'D' had enemy reinforcements to worry about as well as their
own. Throughout late October and November intelligence reports told of
contingents of Turkish troops heading for Baghdad from the Caucasus,
Smyrna and Constantinople. Nixon, 'finding that certain of these tele-
grams were not very reliable, pushed them to one side,' 5 because they
1Letter, Hardinge to Roos-Keppel (Chief Commissioner, N.W.Frontier
Province), 20 Oct 15, HDG/90/2/2411..
2Letter no. S-24472, Duff to Hardinge, 17 Oct 15, WO/106/893.
3Letter, Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 20 Oct 15, HDG/9O/2/2L4.
Meso Comm, Nixon, iLl. Nov 16, statement.
5Meso Comm, Gribbon, 2 Nov 16, no. lO5l5.
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did not support his plans. It was Nixon's practice of choosing which
reports to believe that further caused disaster at Ctesiphon. It is
unclear when the General Staff estimate of 60,000 Turks reached Nixon,
but indications are that he chose not to heed the estimate, even though
local sources substantiated those reports delivexedto the General Staff.
Major W. H. Gribbon, of Nixon's Intelligence staff, claimed that he
knew the estimate before the sanction to advance was granted. Chamber-
lain said. that he sent the estimate to the Viceroy on 23 October, and.
Duff believed Nixon had been informed at the same time . Nixon claimed
he knew nothing of the estimate until just before the battle of Ctesi-
phon. All that he had to work with were the regular weekly .ntel1i-
gence reports, and. he said that although he knew the Turks were re-
ceiving reinforcements he thought he could still defeat them.
Again, this is an estimate of the 6th Division's capabilities
based on inadequate information, as Townshend again was not consulted.
Indeed, Townshend's intelligence came from Nixon's headquarters only,
and he had. no access to War Office intelligence unless Nixon's staff
made it available to him. Before leaving from Aziziyai for Ctesiphon
Townshend queried Nixon's staff about rumours of Turkish reinforce-
ment on a large scale, and. he was told that they had also heard the -
rumours, but they were not officially confirmed. 2
 Gribbon's estimate
of Turkish strength at Ctesiphon was 13,500 to 23,000, quite a varia-
tion, but he told Townshend l3,OOO. (Townahend's memoirs place the
1Meso Comm, Chamberlain, 21 Dec 16, no. 17007.
2Meso Comm, Bastow, 30 Jan 17, no. 2lL83.
3Meso Comm, Gribbon, 2 Nov 16, nos. 10462-63.
l3L
estimate at 11,000.1) Major Bastow related that 'on November 20th or
21st we had a reliable Arab report that another division had just reached.
Baghdad. General Townshend sent me over to Sir John Nixon that night
to ask him about it, and his reply was, "Tell Charles I don't believe
a word of it ,.. 2 Yet once the battle began, a day later, Townshend
learned that Nixon' s staff did have knowledge of pending Turkish rein-
forcements. Townshend finally received official notification of the
60,000 estimate on 2.5 November, but by then the battle was over.3
Even without knowledge of Turkish reinforcements, a mere counting
up of numbers would have shown that the risk was almost too great to
take. Townshend recalled that 'it was my plain and simple duty to carry
out the orders of my superior to the best of my ability, although his
orders were against my better judgement. . . . All of my study indi-
cated disaster to me.' The Commission presented Nixon and Duff with
the relative strengths and asked for their views • The Commission's
arithmetic ran thus s of 23,000 British and Indian troops in Mesopota-
mia, some 17,000 of them were with Townshend and ili. ,000 of those were
fighting troops, leaving some 6,000 to hold the communications across
500 miles of river, plus garrisons at Nasiriyah, Kurna, Amara, Ahwaz
and Basra, Duff had an easy answers 'I think we were entitled to rely
on Sir John Nixon's assurance that we had enough', 5 the same answer he
'Townshend, p. 160.
2Meso Comm, Bastow, 30 Jan 17, statement.
3Ibid., nos. 2l11.23_27.
Townshend, p. 161.
5Meso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15332.
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had used all along of depending on the 'man on the spot.' Nixon's
answer was no less well-worns 'My orders came to me from Irxuia that
is all I can say.' 1 The Commission quite rightly could not understand
how Nixon was so optimistic in his assurances • His answer re:tleots a
blind faith, since it had no basis in the realities of the situation
of supply and troop strength. He told the Commission that he could
get to Baghdad because the Turkish formations at Ctesiphon--the 35th
and 38th Divisions--were those he had already defeated at Shaiba, Amara,
Nasiriyah and Kut •2 To have checked on the figures would have destroyed
such reasoning. Barrow summed up '. . . they were all fully con-
vinced. that they could beat them arid push into Baghdad. I think that
none of them had any real doubt on that point. '3
Their confidence was entirely misplaced. Only Townshend claims
to have had doubts, arid after 3 October he kept them to himself. On
that date Nixon directed him to start naking plans for an advance, but
on 10 October llardinge ordered the 6th Division to stand at Aziziyah
until reinforcements arrived. This suited Townshend, but Kemball went
to visit him on the 19th and hinted that he might go into action on
short notice, because 'we might find, the situation, so close to the
Turkish force, intolerable and have to attck them' since Nur-ed-Din
had placed a cover force - at El Kutiriiyah, some 12 miles up-river from
Aziziyah. Kemball suggested that if Townsherid had to engage this force
of some k,000 Turks and Arabs, then he could use that as an excuse to
1Meso Comm, Nixon, 1k Nov 16, no. 11531.
no. Uk98.
3Meso Comm, Barrow, 22 Aug 16, no. 71k.
11•Note in TownshencI's diary, 19 Oct 15, Meso Comm. App. LXIII.
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press on to Baghdad immediately. Townshend would have none of it. He
wrote in his diary that if he did this, then he would get all the blame
for disobeying the Viceroy's orders. He might fight the covering force
if it became necessary (which it did. on the night of 27-28 October) but
he would not advance without more men, no matter what suggestions he
might receive from Nixon's staff. 'I must get orders to advance, since
I am not in command of Force 'D' in Mesopotamia and Sir John Nixon is.
I think it is his duty to give such an order and not make me advance
on my own and so take all responsibility before 	 Government for so
doing.
Townshend believed that if he could. not return to Kut as he had
recommended, then he did not want to advance without the strongest pos...
sible force. He had no idea that the two divisions in France were
coming, or that Nixon had assured London that the 6th Division could
enter Baghdad with its current strength. All he knew was that Nixon
expected 'liberal reinforcement', as stated in a telegram on 26 October.2
On 30 October Kemball again flew to Aziziyah to discuss Townshend's
plan of attack, saying that he had 'not been told what troops or what
strength are coming from gypt or India or anywhere' , which implies
that he knew some were coming, but not how many. Townshend was growing
increasingly worried that he might have to move without being at full
strength. First he begged Nixon to bring every possible soldier from
Basra to fill the ranks. Next, he wrote aprivate letter to Hardinge
1Note in Townahend's diary, 19 Oct 15, Meso Comm, App. LXIII.
2Moberly, vol. 2, p. Z8.
3Meso Comm, Bastow, 30 Jan 17, no. 21361.
p. 11,4.
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outlining the Mesopotanilan campaign thus far. He stated that Nixon
had directed none of the campaigns personally, but had. deferred to
Townshend at Amara and Kut, and was doig so again at Ctesiphon.
Therefore, Townshend argued, he was more likely to know the 6th Divi-
sion's abilities better than would Nixon. The troops were losing spi-
nt and he did not want to force them to attack Turkish trenches in
their present state. Further, some Moslems hesitated to fight at Ctes-
irIon , since it was the site of the grave of Suliman Pak, one of Mo-
hammed's most devoted servants. 'I am asking Sir John ixoE to give
some reinforcements into the country--the troops are not confident and
have had enough. This is absolutely true, of course, but it would be
altered if they would hear that reinforcements were in the country.'1
Major-General Maitland Cowper, the Deputy Adjutant and quarter-
master-General for Force 'D', told the Commission that the despatch
of the two divisions was purposely kept secret • He stated that the
news was first announced in bivouac just before the battle. 'I remem-
ber Sir John turning to General Keniball and saying, "George, go across
to Townshend and tell him about the reinforcements • Make it public
now, it will hearten them up." 2
 Cowper claimed the reason for the
secrecy was to keep the Turks from finding out about the reinforcements.
Nixon thought that if the Turks learned of the arrival of two entire
divisions, they would withdraw and not fight for Baghdad, and Nixon
wanted to annihilate them. While it is doubtful that the Turks would
have withdrawn if they had known of the British troops' arrival, the
1Letter, Townshend to Hardinge, 2 Nov 15, HDG/9k/l/159.
2Meso Conim, Cowper, 18 Jan 17, no. 19281.
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reasoning behind Nixon's action is questionable. The situation was a
repeat of that at Kut which object was more important, the defeat of
the enemy or the securing of the objective? Since the capture of Bagh-.
dad would have secured for the British a good defensive position, and
the Turks could send a possible 60,000 men to attack the city, would
the addition of Nur-ed-Din's force, had it withdrawn, have made that
much difference,- rticu1arly with the garrison defending Baghdad num-
bering at least two divisions? It was assumed that a British force in
Baghdad could defeat in detail any force coming down either river, so
if Nixon could get into Baghdad without a fight then his defensive po-.
sition there would be vastly superior to his offensive position at Ctes-
iphon. Therefore, Nixon's strategy was grossly defective. More than
any other target in Mesopotamia, Baghdad was a political objective,
and neither political nor military ends were served by fighting at
Ctesion. Cowper's statement, and Kemball's suggestions to Townshend
in mid-October, show Nixon's attitude in quite a different light from
his assertion to the Commission that 'I was not a fire eater ready to
go forward at any moment. My point of view was entirely that I should
carry out whatever policy was ordered. 1
Townshend went into battle against his better judgement. His
forces were understrength, and he had inadequate intelligence about
his reinforcements and. those of the enemy. Kemball claimed that when
he visitied Aziziyah on 5 November Townshend. was confident and ready
to advance. Townshend. said in his memoirs that he knew nothing of the
'intense optimism' that was supposed to be prevalent at 'his headquarters.
'Meso Coinm, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, no. 10827.
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He claimed that all he could do had been done, so he had to put on a
confident facade for the sake of the troops, 1 who, as he told Hardinge,
'are tired and their tails are riot , but slightly down.' 2 Neverthe-
less, the troops had the utmost confidence in Townshend, according to
Bastow, and they would go into battle just because he was leading them,
but the 6th Division staff knew Townshend.'s real attitude. Bastow
stated. that many of the staff realised the entire operation was 'to
try a big game of bluff and get them out. We backed Townshend's luck,
and our own luck; that was all. . . . We had. the utmost confidence in
General Townshend; the troops would do what they could not be asked to
do by anybody else.'3
The 6th Division would be asked to do a lot • The British force
that went into action on 22 November numbered 10,212 infantry and 1,080
cavalry, and they faced an extremely difficult task. Nur-ed-Din corn-
manded the 35th, 38th, 1 5th and 51st Divisions, numbering some 18,000
men, plus a few thousand Arabs The Thrkish psition contained fif-
teen redoubts covered by wire and linked by trenches, all commanding a
perfectly flat area of approach. The posit ion was reminiscent of Kut,
with the majority of the defenders on the left bank of theTigris, and
Townshend. decided to attack them in a repeat version of his Kut opera-
tion. He divided the troops into three columns, with a mixed force
added to the far right to harass the Turkish rear and carry out the
pursuit. The 6th Division went into battle without a reserve • Townshenj3.
Townshend, pp. 16o-6]..
2Letter, Townshend to Hardinge, 2 Nov 15, HDG/9L1/1/159.
3Meso CoTnm, Bastow, 30 Jan 17, nos, 211i46-48.




hoped to hold the Turks at the river, then draw their reserves to the
far left flank by an attack there. When they were committed, he would
launch his decisive attack with Delamain's column at the Vital Point,
two mounds anchoring the left of the first line of Turkish trenches.
The columns took up position late on 21 November after an uneventful
four-day march from Aziziyah.
At dawn on the 22nd the attack started and, although early success
was achieved, it was clear that the quality of the defending troops
was higher than heretofore. The 45th Division was mainly Anatolian,
and the troops had a high morale and good discipline. Nevertheless,
the British managed to break their hold on the Turkish front lines and
force them back to their second line by late afternoon. As night fell,
the fighting lstopped and the British attempted to secure their gains.
The Turkish fire had been deadly, and casualties were far higher than
had been expected. Although the entire front line of trenches had
been taken, the Turks had not broken and run as they had in the past,
so Townshend knew that his rapidly weakening force could do no more now
than hold on to what they had captured. On the 23rd, the Turks counter-
attacked, haif-heartedly in the afternoon but more agressively through
the night. The fighting continued on the 24th with the Turks attempt-
ing to recapture High Wall, an extended mound 20-25 feet high In the
centre of the first line. When they failed and witMrew to the second
line, Nur-ed-Din began to consider retreating. The night of 24-25
November saw a series of misconceptions so great that either side, with
the merest hint of the true situation, could have taken immediate vic-
tory. As the Turkish .51st Division withdrew after a counterattack on
lLI2
High Wall, Arab scouts thought they were British troops advancing, and
reported them as such to Nur-ed-Din. His own force was weakening and
he thought that the British must have received reinforcements and were
attacking. He ordered a withdrawal towards Baghdad. They left in the
night, but the next morning, when no British troops appeared, Nur-ed-
Din ordered his men back into the trenches.
As this was taking place, the British were trying to draw them-
selves together and decide hether they should stay. In the midst of a
dust storm, which blew throughout the 2L1.th, they failed to see the
Turkish trenches were empty. Thus, when the Turks returned on the morn-
ing of the 25th, the British believed them to be fresh Turkish troops.
Townshend knew he could not face another day of Turkish attacks and
survive, so he ordered the withdrawal to Lajj of the few troops he had
remaining. They began to leave the evening of the 25th.1 As they left,
the British believed the battle won, even though Baghdad was not reached
and they were abandoning the field • The Staf diary stated 'it now
remains to thoroughly reorganise, push forward fresh troops and again
resume the offensive when all preparations are complete.' 2 Townshend.
assumed the Turks to be too weak to follow, and, his orders called for
a withdrawal only as far as Lajj, 'where I am entrenching and going to
make myself comfortable.'3
The battle had cost the British dearly. Of the 10,000 infantry,
some i,200 had become casualties. Most of the men had been lost on the
1 Barker, Neglected War, pp. 1214_311.$ Evans, pp. 14.8-5].; Wilson, pp.
811
_88; uetta Staff College, pp. 59-63.
2Force 'D' General Staff diary, 23 Nov 15, W0/95/11.965.
3Townshend, p. 187.
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first day in capturing the front trenches. The three columns in the
attack, each a brigade, numbered only from 700 to ].,000 after the battle.
Of 317 British officers, 130 were casualties. Of 235 Indian officers,
only 111 remained. The 2 11.th, 101i.th aM 110th Indian regiments had lost
more than half their strengths. 1 The wounded had been evacuated to
Lajj, where two hospital ships waited, ready to accept 500 men each.
The total estimated number of casualties prior to the battle was 1,200
at most • The medical staff were totally unprepared to deal with three
to four times the estimated number of casualties, and the wounded were
subjected to conditions that made them wish they had remained on the
battlefield • It is really rather difficult to blame the medical staff
for being so poorly organised. Their casualty estimate was based on the
most difficult battle to date, the one at Kut, and the Ctesiphon posi-
tion and the plan to assault it were so similar to Kut that an equal
number of casualties seemed logical. Nixon told the Commission that
after 1it the seriously wounded numbered only 800, the other 300 being
only slightly wounded. 2 In all, it was not entirely the fault of the
medical service that the wounded underwent such suffering. The basic
trouble was that they, too, believed that the Turks would be defeated.
Then the wounded would only have to be moved twenty miles to hospital
in Baghdad, rather than 1100 miles, as it turned out to be. Again this
can be blamed on the lack of transport.
As difficult as it had been to move the necessary supplies for-
ward to Aziziyah, it was much more difficult to remove the supplies,
1Wilson, p. 86.
2Neso Coiniu, Nixon, 111. Nov 16, nos. 11799-803.
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troops and wounded Lack down-river. The medical transport was quickly
filled, and the wounded were carried off the field in standard trans-
port carts, without springs or padding. Once they arrived at the river,
the wounded were then placed on any available ship, one small steamer
packing some 600 men aboard . The ships that left Lajj on 25 November
did not reach Basra until 4 December, being held up by poor navigation
and Arab harassment. During this time the ships' stores ran out of
food and purified water. The men on deck suffered exposure from the
sun by day, and wind and rain at night. The ships carrying them down-
river had carried animals up-river and had not been cleaned before
taking on the casualties • The transport problems were worsening con-
sistently sl.nce the advance past Kurna, and finally culminated in the
horror that the wounded had. to undexo here. In spite of all this, the
Indian Government received a telegram, with Nixon's name attached,
that stated: 'General condition of the wounded very satisfactory. Med-
ical arrangements, under circumstances of considerable difficulty,
worked splendidly. 2 This telegram was transmitted to London and read
in the House of Commons. When the truth came to be known, it sparked
the public outrage that led to the establishment of the Mesopotamia
Commission.3
As the wounded tried to make their way down-river, Townshend was
having troubles also, and soon he was forced to follow them. Directly
after the Ctesiphon battle two officers arrived from Constantinople to
'Evans, p. 50.
2Barker, Neglected War, p. 137.
3Evans, p. 51.
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take charge of the Nesopotamian theatre. One was Khalil Pasha, an en-
ergetic young general, and the olher was no less than Co]nar von der
Goltz, who had been in Turkey since 1880, when he had been sent by the
German Genera]. Staff to reorganise the Turkish Army. These two directed
the pursuit and eventual siege of the 6th Division, though von der Go].tz
did not live to see their surrender. Under their command, the Turkish
forces followed hard on Townshend's troops and he had to abandon Lajj
and march for Aziziyah, which he reached on 28 November. Townehend
stood there for two days to cover the withdrawal of wounded and stores
but decided that Kut would better serve his purpose in the face of what
he believed to be large Turkish reinforcements • He still thought in
terms of the offensive, as did Nixon and the Indian Government, and he
viewed both Aziziyah and Kut merely as bases for the next advance.
Townshend telegraphed to Kembail that lie thought the Turks would not
follow him past Zeur, 'so far away from their beloved entrenchments at
Ctesiphon. The further we get him from Baghdad the more chance in the
next battle of our knocking him out altogether.'1
The withdrawal from Lajj to Kut was a perfect military operation.
The Turks shadowed Townshend at a distance of some ten miles, but by
30 November had passed Aziziyah and were closing on him. On the night
of 30 November-i December the Turkish advanced guard ran into the Brit-
ish rear. The next morning the Turks attacked'the British, camped at
Unun al Tabul, but were forced to retreat by well-placed artillery fire
and a concentrated counterattack which almost encircled the Turks • This
1Townshend, p. 189.
forced thejr retreat with some 700 casualties, while the 6th Division
gained a bit more time, but it weakened the British force by a further
500 men.1 Me].iss' 30th Brigade, having been sent to Kut to clear the
way for the rest of the division, returned to act as a rear guard and
the British marched to Kut, which they reached on 3 December. Town-
shend praised his men's endurance in a telegram to Corps Headquarters,
stating that his men had operated 'without the loss of a gun or a single
prisoner even. Never have I seen a retirement like that of 1st Decem-
ber even on manoeuvres better done as regards suppleness and steadiness
in manoeuvres under heavy shell fire.' 2
 Tounshend entered Kut on the
3rd by the 8th he was surrounded • Whether he should have stayed there,
and why he did so, are questions fraught with controversy. Townshencl has
received most of the blame for losing the 6th Division at Kut, but as
has been shown thus far, the fact that he had to leave Kut two months
earlier and embark on an operation sure to bring about his defeat was
none of his doing. Nixon's blindness and the resulting ignorance in
Simla and London forced Townshend's return to Kut. Nixon and the In-
dian authorities must bear the responsibility for the division's loss.
1Quetta Staff Coflege, p. 63.
el. no. 88, Townshend to Kemball, 3 Dec 15, Force 'D' General
Staff diary, App. 2, W0/9.5/4965.
GHAFPER 5
THE SIEflE OF KilT
DECEMBER 1915-APRIL 1916
The authorities in London and India believed the early reports
claiming victory at Ctesiphon, and they did not, therefore, appreciate
until too late the gravity of the events on the Tigris. Chamberlain
telegraphed a message to Nixon, via India and Hardinge, expressing his
sympathy 'with you and General Townahend in your disappointment which
I am confident will only be of a temporary naur' In an apprecia-
tion of the situation on 29 November 1915, Barrow wrote as if the 6th
Division was merely regrouping down-river from Ctesiphon. Apparently
unaware of the Turks closely following Townshend' s withdrawal, Barrow
spoke of Kut as 'an exiraordinartly strong position . . . that cannot
readily be turned. . . . therefore the desirability of preparing a
fortified position at Kut-el-Amara suggests itself 2 as if such a
strongpoint might act as a convenient resting place while Nixon pre-
pared to move on to Baghdad later.
Xt would be some days yet before the authorities learned the re-
alities of Townshend's plight. Although the retreat down the Tigris
was a textbook example of how such movements should be conducted, it
was a retreat nonetheless, and an exhausting one. Beginning from Lajj
on 27 November, the 6th Division reached Aziziyah the next day, where
'Tel., no number, Nixon to Townahend, 29 Nov 15, National Army
Museum, ref. no. 6012_2311..
2Memo by Barrow, 29 Nov 15, CAB/Ll.2/5/26.
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they halted for two days to allow the men to rest and the wounded to be
evacuated by the slow-moving steamers, which were hampered by the low
level of the river and extensive Arab harassment • The Division left
Aziziyah on 30 November for Umm al Tabul, then they marched without
stopping until 2 December, when they halted within sight of ICut and ate
a hot meal. The troops had marched forty-four miles in thirty-six
hours.1 They entered Kut on 3 December. Townshend's appearance as he
entered Kut was described by a gunner of the 5th Hampshire Battery:
'It reminded me of the painting of Napoleon retiring from Moscow I
think it was. Change those uniforms to British ones and you have a
perfect picture of Townshend. and his staff retiring to Kut as one could
ever get.'2
On the way from Lajj Townshend had been considering the question
of staying in Kut or continuing down-river. He wrote later that he
had decided to stay there for two reasons: first, to hold up the Turk-
ish advance by covering the river, which they needed for their supply
line; and. second, to give Nixon time to concentrate sufficient forces
for a counteroffensive. 3 His only alternative was to retire further
down the Tigris to Es Sinn, the scene of his victory in late September.
He decided against such a move, and has been criticised by historians
and military analysts ever since • His reasons for not going on were
that the Es Slim defences, while extensive, faced in the wrong direc-
tion; they'- covered a front of six miles on the left bank of the river
in. Miflar, Kut, (London, 1969),pp. Li5_55.
2Unpubllshed article on Kut, Maj..LGen. H.H.Rich, Imperial War Mu-
seum, (iwM), box 7Z1./1l.9/l.
3Townshend, p. 209.
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and three miles on the right, so it was impossible for his force to hold
securely a position constructed for three corps; there were no supplies
there; and, finally, his men were too tired to march any further.1
This last reason has been much criticised. Townshend later wrote,
'Never have I seen anything like the exhaustion of the troops after we
reached Kut.' 2
 Ronald Miller comments that this statement is not true.
'To the delight of his detractors, and unfortunately for Townshend, in
his autobtography . . . he gave the exhausted and sorry state of his
troops and their consequent inability to retreat further . . . as one
of the main reasons. .. . This was strongly denied by General De].a-
main' ,3 who was of the opinion that the troops could have continued on
the march the next day. However, recent interviews with the survivors
cast doubt on Millar's claim. In 1972, General H. H. Rich sent a ques-
tionnaire to the remaining survivors of the siege and asked them,' among
other things, to comment on their condition on 3 December and after.
Although a few stated that a day's rest and a meal would have been suf-
ficient to enable them to carry on, many disagreed. 'I think that when
we reached Kut we were exhausted, not merely tired. We needed at least
a week's rest. By then the Turks would be round us. Many of the sol-
diers, and all of the followers, could have failed to reach Sarmaiyat'
stated one of the responses. It is quite possible that the withdrawal
from Ctesiphon, two-thirds of which was carried out in two and a half




kQuestionnaire by Capt. Warreii Sandes,Rich papers, IWM, 7k/k9/l.
5Quetta Staff College, p. 65.
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Russell Braddon, probably Townshend' a most serious detractor, ques-
tions this decision on yet another ground. If the division was too
tired to march away from Kut, 'then how will they almost immediately
nnage to dig about six miles of trenches and fight off the Turks?'1
In a 1922 Staff College analysis of the decision, Major (later General)
H. L. Ismay, in a well-received paper, noted. that remaining in Kut 'en-
tailed extensive digging, further fighting, and that loss of moral (sic)
which is Inevitable in a besieged force.' 2 All of these criticisms
follow the assumption, however, that not only was Kut not worth keep-
ing, but also that there was a more suitable place further down the Tig-
ris to which they could withdraw • Where could Townshend go that was
as well-supplied as Kut? No other defensive line contained sufficient
stores. Had he abandoned. Kut, all those supplies would have fallen
into Turkish hands, for they certainly could. not have been carried away
as all the transport was being used for the wounded.
If Townahend had continued down-river, where could he have gone?
As he explained, the trenches at Es SInn, seven miles further on, were
facing in the wrong direction. Townshend wrote 'we could not have re-
named at Essinn on account of the food. question—we would have starved
In a week. '3 Braddon, Indeed, answers his own criticism In his dia-
tribe against Townshends 'And if he were not to stand at Es Slim, how
much farther must he march his exhausted men? To Gharbi? That was 70
river miles. To Amarah? that was 3.50 mIles.11 It is doubtful that,
Braddon, The Siege, (London, 1969), pp ]i5-16.
2lndoor Exercise 'D', Quetta Staff College, 28 Oct 22, Maj. H.L.




even if his men had marched after a day's rest, they could have sue-
cessfully reached the nearest post at All Gharbi, and the defences
there were little better than at Kut • True, they were marching toward
reinforcements, but the brigade coming up-river was as poorly supplied
as was the 6th DivIsion, and they would have to face an immediate Turk-
ish attack with little ammunition or food supplies and. virtually no
medical facilities. Norman Dixon mentions, for some odd reason, the
'wiser and possible course of tetreating to Basra', 1 although he fails
to state how Townshend was to move his command Ls.00 miles without trans-
port or supply.
Thus, there seems to be sufficient justification for Townshend's
decision to remain at Kut, although he knew that a siege was imminent.
Townshend was an avid military historian, and he wrote later
I knew well the fate which in history is generally reserved
for the force which deliberately shuts itself up in an en-
trenched camp or fortified place. . . . If the relieving
army is unable to reach the besieged force, military history
offers hardly any eamples of the self-deliverance of an
army once invested.
Townsher4 placed his faith in Nixon and the reinforcements he'9cnew were
coming into the country. After a].]., except for the check at Ctesiphon,
the Turks had never been able to withstand British arms, so he felt
confident that early relief was probable, if not a foregone conclusion.
In addition, Townshend had successfully withstood a siege at Chitra].
on the Northwest Frontier in 1895, so he knew something of siege tac-
tics. Because of this experience it has_lately been suggested that




Townshend 'had a pathological inclination toward sieges.' Barker,
in his biography of Townshend, rightly denies this claim. 'Townshend
was too well versed in military strategy to be swayed by emotional con-
siderations and. what he seenis to have regarded as the most important
factor was his superior' s promise that reinforcements would reach him
in a month.' 2 In spite of all the argument concerning his decision to
stay, it will soon be shown that, in any case, the ultimate decision
was not Townshend' s.
Before reaching Kut, he had requested permission to withdraw past
the town if necessary. Nixon's rejection of this idea did not arrive
until If December, by which time Townehend had. decided to remain to rest
his troops • The delay in reoeiaing the telegram was due entirely to the
6th Division staff, five members of which handled the telegram before
giving it to Townshend.. The Divisional cypher officer wrote that Town-
shend. remarkeds 'Such staff work I have never encountered hope never
to do so again (sic). Now it is too late to retire down the Tigris.'3
In the first of six proclamations to his troops to be made during the
siege, he told them 'I intend to defend. Kut El Amara & not retire any
further. • . . The honour of our Mother Country & the Empire demands -
that we all work heart and soul in the defence of this place. We must
dig deep and dig in quickly. 
,h1 
On 3 December Townshend informed Nixon
I mean to defend KTJT like I did CHITRAL' 5 Nixon replied immediately
1Millar, p. 61s..
2A.J.Barker, Townshend of Kut, (London, 1967), p. 246.
3Questionnaire,Lt. W.Snell, Rich papers, DiM, 74/49/1.
lSpecial Order, proclamation to troops of 6th Division, 4. Dec 15,
National Army Museum, ref. no. 6012-234..
5rel. no. 8&, Townshend to Nixon, 3 Dec 15, WO/95/4965.
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that he fully agreed. There followed a series of telegrams between the
two, Townshend. offering his reasons for remaining arid. Nixon promising
early relief. The message from Nixon on 
.5 December, however, began to
change Townshend' s outlook. Nixon stated that he approved Townshend' s
actions. 'Every effort is being made to relieve you as soon as possible
and it is hoped to do so within two months.' 1 Townsherid replied "with-
in two months" Is serious. I hope we can be relieved by a month. My
rations for British troops are only one month, and fifty-five days In-
dian troops,' 2 The next day, 6 December, Townshend reconsidered his
position.
I have carefufl.y considered your statement of relief within
two months and am convinced that would mean loss of this
Division, for the whole Turkish force of six divisions would
develop long before then. It would be best, I think, that I
shoild preserve force by retiring to Ali Gharbt and form cov-
ering force for the concentration at Amara. To be relieved
within a month would only mean a very anxious and trying
time, but two months, I am certain, means loss of the Divi-
sion. My retirement from here should be arranged. as soon
as possible. I should save most of ammunition, utilising
mahelas and bring away heavy guns • You know shape and size
of Kut peninsula I occupy. A large force can enfilade pen-
insulafrom all points of the compass and render it an in-
ferno.
This telegram shows that Townshend had no 'pathological inclina-
tion' to be surrounded. Kut was not completely encircled. until the
8th, aM the 6th Division still could have left by way of the left bank
of the Tigris, or crossed over the remaining bridge to the right bank1
away from the advancing Turks • He knew that this meant abandoning a
vast quantity of supplies and a strategic post In favour of the dubious
1Noberly, vol. 2, p. 135;
3Tel. no. 16X, Townshend to Kemball, 6 Dec 15, Meso Oomm, App.
LXIII.
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protection of the defences at All Gharbi, yet he considered taking
his chances in open combat rather than the virtual certainty of ulti-
mate surrender by staying in Kut. In a further telegram, he offered
to remain if the relief force could hold Sheikh Saad, a relatively
close position.1 Nixon answered on the evening of the 6th. 'Retire-
ment from Kut would open the Shatt-al-Hal to Turks and have a very bad
effect and does not at present seem to be demanded as a military neces-
sity. . . . Taking all these points into consideration Army Commander
does not approve your proposal to fall back on Ali-al-Gharbi. • 2 Thus,
the onus of responsibility for remaining in Kut shifted from Townshend
to Nixon. It was the correct decision, but it cannot be held against
Townshend as a reason for the loss of the 6th DivIsion. TownsheM
]Ater wrote s 'Under the circumstances—an absolute promise of relief-
it was sotmd strategy, as otherwise the whole of Mesopotamia would have
been lost. I had overwhelming numbers on me (sic); and had. I delivered
a battle in the open, I must have been defeated.' 3
 He replied to Nixon
that the promise on 7 Decembr of the 28th Brigade, newly-arrived from
Egypt, at Sheikh Saad within a week 'altogether alters mnatters.' The
Turks, however, reached Sheikh Saad first, and. the British advantage
was lost.
The first thing that Townshend. had. to do on 4 .
 December, after the
decision not to march his men any further, was to turn Kut into a se-
cure defensive position. Although the press release from Basra stated
'Moberly, vol. 2, p. 137.
2Tel, no. 1008-117-0, Nixon to Townshend, 6 Dec 15, W0/106/53.
3Townshend., p. 219.
lTel .no .





that the 6th Division was withdrawing into the fortified lines at Kut,
in reality the defences were practically nonexistent. Never thinking
the Turks could win at Ctesiphon, Kut had only been prepared to
defend against Arab raiders, and one barbed wire fence between four
blockhouses constituted the preparations. Townshend' s men had to dig
trenches across the 2 ,700-yard wide neck of land that faced the Turks.
Here Townshend' s defensive strategy again comes under criticism. For
about a week after their arrival, the British were able to maintain a
bridge across the Tigris. It was not, however, fortified to any great
extent owing to the work being done on the trenches • A Pubjabi detach-
ment held the far end, and the last of those leaving Kut (most of the
cavalry and transport animals) departed across it on 6 December. On
the 9th, BOOfl after the bridge had been rebuilt in a more defensible
location, Townshend ordered its destruction. His critics claim that
this ftxrced him into a passive defence and destroyed any chance he might
have had either to break out or to cooperate with the relief force. He
himself lamented the fact that he could no longer carry on an active
defence. Knowing that the Turks would leave only a small coveting force
around Kut while the main body concentrated against the relieving army,
an active force in the rear would have been invaluable. Bridges, how-
ever, can be crossed in both directions, and, since there 'had been no
time or organisation to establish a bridgehead on the right bank' 1 Town-
shend could not risk an attack from two 	 . Further, the Turks also
had orders to destroy the bridge, so Townshend considered it best to
disable it in such a way that its remains stayed in British possession.
1Quetta Staff College, p. 231.
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Thus, the bridge supports on the right baik had to be destroyed by vol-
unteers under heavy fire in order that the flow of the Tigris would
push the bridge into the bank on the British side.'
Once the defences began to take shape, TownshenI had to consider
his supplies of ammunition and food. On 1f December, the 6th Division
had 822 rounds per rifle, there being 7,250 infantry in action, plus
18,6714. shells of various calibre for thirty-five guns. 2 Vast quanti-
ties remained at the end of the siege owing to the assive nature of the
action there during the last four months. The amount of food in Kut
is a question that wi]]. probably never be answered. According to Major-
General T. L. Davison, Inspector-General of Communications, Kut held
adequate supplies to maintain the division for two months • According
to Colonel P. Hehir, Assistant Director for Medical Services, there
was 70 days supply of flour and rice for British and Indian troops and
followers (which numbered approximately 31500If) at full rations, plus
* a month's supply of curry stuffs, fresh meat (not counting meat on the
hoof) and potatoes. 5 That a minimum of six weeks' worth of food at
full rations was available was known in Basra, India and London early
in December. It is Townshezxl's administration of the food supply that
draws the greatest criticism, and to an extent it is justified.
On 4 December Townshend ordered a survey of all the supplies avail-
able in the town for possible confiscation, and authorised the buying
'Barker, Neglected War, pp. 155-56.
2Townshend, p. 358.
3Meso Comm, Maj.-Gen. T.L.Davison, 28 Nov 16, statement.
1 Braddon, pp. l2321l.
5Meso Conun, Col. P.Hehir, Account of the Medical Arrangements, etc.,
during the siege of Kut-al-Amarah, App. III.
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of grain from the ithabitants. 1
 There were 8,893 soldiers, some 3,500
followers and some 5,000 townspeople to be fed. Townshend. expelled
about 700 locals who could not prove that they were residents, but
decided not to clear the town for humanitarian reasons • He did not
wish to expose the population to the harsh weather and even harsher
treatment of the marauding Arabs, so he reluctantly allowed them to
remain, and they had. to be fed. It is not clear just when the town's
supplies of food came fully into British hands, but the Supply and
Transport Corps were given control of the food supply. Lieutenant H.
S. D. McNeal, who was one of the wounded exchanged after the siege,
told the Mesopotamia Commission that 'all Arab grain was, of course,
confiscated at the commencement', but the Supply and Transport person-
nel 'were so uncertain of the limit of the food supply that it was found,
both at the fort and at Woolpress cross the riveB that atta [ourse
flo was being used in sacks for defensive purposes ,2 This iflus-
trates that the strict control of food was not instituted at the start
of the siege. Cox noted that Townshend undertook to 1nd out about the
local supplies when he made the decision to maintain the hative popula-
tion. Townshend. called for 'Colonel Annesl?y, the Chief Supply Offi-
cer, to take it up at once. Colonel Annesley was there at the time and
we immediately started to investigate the question of local supplies. '3
Further, and just as critical, the restriction of the daily ration did
not begin until late January. It is in these two areas, commandeering
available rations and the liberal rations scale, that Townsherid.'s critics
1Townshend, pp. 2]Z$-l5.
2Report on the siege at Kut-al-Ainarah, Lt. H.S.D.McNaal, CRW/M/15/l.
3Graves, p. 196.
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are most justified, but he cannot be blamed for not searching immedi-
ately for available supplies.
Like most other events in this campaign, the handling of the food
supply was subject to a mixture of overconfidence and mistaken assump-
tions • Townshend believed that the relief force would break through
to Kut on its first attempt, and. he thus saw little reason to subject
the population to a house-to-house search, a move he conaidered would
stir local feeling against the garrison. 1
 He therefore ordered that
nothing more than an estinate of the town' s resources be gathered and
the buying of grain from the bazaars practiced rather than confisca-
tion. Not until the relief force was twice repefled, something no one
dreamed could happen, did the situation appear critical enough to war-
rant full siege practices. The town was again searched and the rations
cut • As Lieutenant-Colonel Winsloe, another exchanged prisoner, stated:
Had General Townshend been in possession of information as
to the amount of Arab grain stored in the town, he undoubt-
edly would have reported it.
At the same time it must be remembered that during, at
any rate, the first month of the investment up to the check
at Sheikh Saad, there was complete confidence among all the
troops in the Garrison, that General ir Fento Aylmer' s
relieving force would easily be able to push their way
through. Probably on this account, the responsible auth-
orities did. not go so carefully into the2question of sup-
plies as they otherwise would have done.
The decision to stay on full rations seems slightly more logical, for
the month of December at least, for the men needed all their strengths
to dig the entrenchments arid carry on the fighting. When von der Goltz
ordered the starvation of the garrison rather than assault late in
1Wilson, pp. 92-93.
2Meso Comm, Lt.Col.Winsloe, R.E., 25 Jan 17, statement.
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December, the British had largely completed their defences and should
have gone on reduced rations then. Thi5 would have extended Townshend's
Limit of reaistance. The question of the relationship between his es-
timates arid the actions of the relief force will be explored later.
As conditions on the Tigris worsened, the authorities in London
attempted, too late, to ascertain the real situation. Not until the
6th did Hardinge inform Chamberlain that Townshend' s force was about to
be surrounded, and this was coupled with a request for immediate rein-
forcement 'as the distances in Mesopotamia are so great that two months
Is a very short period In which to relieve Kut.' 1
 Chamberlain replied
on 9 December requesting Nixon's and Townshend' views 'regarding mea'-
sures to be adopted, feasibility of holding Kut pending reinforcement
or intention to retire to some other selected position.' 2
 He further
requested information on communications, available reinforcements, sup-
plies and munitions in the country, enemy strength, river arid weather
situation, and transport. Crewe, now Lord President of Council, whither
through ignorance of the facts o in an attempt not to d.ranatise the
situation, told Parliament on 7 December 'it cannot be questioned that
the course which has been taken--the determination not to attempt to
pursue such advantage as had been gained in the actual fight In the
neighbourhood of Ctesiphon, but to retire to a strong position lower
down the river--was the course, and one which ought to be generally ap-
proved. '3 In fact, the General Staff only conditionally approved.
I'el. no. H9615, Hardinge to Chamber.ain, 6 Dec 15, IO/L/MIL/5/7511j
12588.
2Tel, no. 31911., Chamberlain to Hardinge, 9 Dec 15, I0/L/MIL/5/7514./
31911..
3Meso Comm, Parliamentary questions Appendix.
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In a paper submitted to the War Committee on 9 Deceøer, they correctly
surmised the Turks' strategy but apparently did not have the latest in-
formation at hand, i.e., that Kut was already surrounded. The Staff
detailed the disadvantages of an extended retreat and agreed that 'if
local conditions and the state of his troops were such as to warrant
the belief that this place could be held until relieved',' then the
stand could be justified. However, they recommended to the War Commit-
tee 'that, provided it is possible to retire down the Tigris, he should
do	 By the time the Committee approved this suggestion on 15
December, Townshend had been cut off for a week.
Meanwhile, in India, Duff was beginning to grasp the realities of
the situation in Kut. He feared that the 6th Division's daily casualty
rate would soon decimate its strength and the relief force would come
too late to save it as a functioning force. 3 He wrote to Hardirige that
it was 'beginning to look as if we will have very great difficulty in
relieving Townshend, while the more I hear of his actual position at
Kut, the less I like it.
	 He still had. the highest hopes for the fu-
ture, although the overall strategic situation looked grim at the time.
In a memorandum on 1.6 December, Duff theorised. that von der Goltz
planned to mount a major offensive towards India, based In Persia • In
order to circumvent the threat, the forces in ?4es potainia had. to be
sufficient to threaten the Turkish rear, i.e., Baghdad. Therefore, he
agreed with Nixon's request of the 14th for two more divisions, which
1Paper by General Staff, 9 Dec 15, C&B/Z$.2/6/7.
2Draft tel., War Committee to Hardinge, 15 Dec 15, CAB/42/6/7.
3Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 13 Dec 15, HDG/90/l/363.
4Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 15 Dec 15, HDG/90/l/369.
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would bring Force 'D' to a strength of seven. 1 Hardinge did not share
Duff's fears. That von der Goltz would invade India without first de-
feating both Force 'D' and the Russians was 'a scheme which I can hardly
take seriously.' Neither did he agree with the idea of strengthening
Nixon's force to such a size. 'Nobody can, I think, dispute the fact
that this war wifl not be decided in Mesopotainia. . . . To divert troops
from the decisive point in Flanders is to play the game of Germany, and,
in my opinion, this policy has been too often pursued.' 2 This is an
abrupt change of attitude from his earlier pleas for troops for Meso-
potamia. Duff responded s 'I admit most fully that we cannot win this
war in Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles or Sa].onika, but I incline to think
we can lose it in almost any one of them.' 3 Hardinge was not 'in the
least depressed by our temporary setback in the neighbourhood of Bagh-
lad. . . . I simply ridicule the idea that [ownsheri would want relief,
for with 9,000 men he is supposed to be surrounded by 10,000 Turks and
can break through whenever he chooses
Hardinge was apparently the only official who had any confidence
in the 6th Division's easy recovery. He could not have realised that
10,000 Turks made up the advance force that covered the town, whereas
the total Turkish force numbered some six divisions, or 30,000 men.5
The Turks had been shelling Kut since 5 December, and on the 9th firing
intensified. On the 10th the Turks attacked, but lost heavily. Another
'Memo by Duff, 16 Dec 15, HIC/90/l/370.
2Letter, Hardinge to Duff, 17 Dec 15, H1X/90/2/331.
3Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 17 Dec 15, Hm/90/l/373.
Letter, Hardinge to Cox, 20 Dec 15, HDG/911./2/155.
5Quetta Staff College, p. 92.
163
day of increased shelling was followed by a second assault on the even-
ing of the 12th, which was again turned back with heavy loss. After
these repulses, the Turks settled into siege tactics and did not at-
tack again until Christmas eve • On that occasion, elemehts of their
forces broke into the British positions, and fighting was hand-to-hand
for a while, but the Turks withdrew Christmas morning after losing 2,000
casualties. The losses the 6th Division suffered in these attacks, plus
the casualties from artillery fire (a combined total of 1,625 by Christ-
mas) caused Townshend to again plead for quick relief. Since the re-
inforcements could only move up the Tigris In small numbers, Nixon cast
about for outside aid to help relieve the pressure on Kut • On 9 Decem-
' ber Nixon asked lake in India and the Secretary of State in London to
elicit Russian support. 1 Chamberlain complied, but reported on 11
December that the Russians did not have enough troops to move on Bagh-
dad and threaten the Turkish rear. 2 By early January Grand Duke Nicho-
las was reported to be In favour of cooperation with the British, but
he wanted a British force of 20,000 to leave Mesopotamia and join the
Russians In iestern Persia, from whence the combined force could drive
through to Baghdad. 3 The British preferred to employ their troops in
Kut's relief rather than send the bulk of their forces off to 1ght the
Turks elsewhere.
The lack of early Russian aid and the repeated urgings from Town-
shend put pressure on Nixon to concentrate the relief force as soon as
1Tel. no. IG172k, Nixon to Chamberlain, 9 Dec 15, IO/L/MIL/5/75/
126112.
2Tel. no. 3199, Chamberlain to Nixon,U Dec 15, IO/L/MIL/5/751/3l99.
3Tel. no. 128, General Hanbury-Williams to CIGS, 2 Jan 16, 10/LI
MIL/5/754/14003.
possible. Major-General Aylmer, Adjutant-Genera]. in India, arrived to
take command of the Tigris Corps on 10 December, a position he held un-
til early March 1916. His attempts to break through to Kut aroused con-
troversy over the actual time limit within which Townshend had to be
reached. As stated earlier, the town contained some two months' ra-
tions when the retreating 6th Division arrived. Aylmer told the Com-
missions 'It was understood when I took over command of the Tigris
Corps that there was only food in Kut up to the end of January.' 1 Al-
though Nixon told Townshend that two months was the outside limit of
relief, he told Major-General Sir George Younghusband, commanding the
28th Brigade on its way to Au Gharbi, "Townshemi asks to be relieved
within a month, but I do not think we can be ready under two months."
This was on December 6th or 7th, 1915.!2 Knowing that rations were
available until late January or early February, and that the poor
state of the transport precluded the possibility of an offensive of suf-
ficient strength to break through until that time, Nixon and Aylmer
still decided to attack with an unprepared force in early January. '
Nixon told the Commission that it 'was Townshend's reports as to his
food that forced the açlvance. '3 Yet after further questioning, he ad-
mitted 'I knew he had at least two months' supplies', and he stated
that he never believed that Townshend could only hold out until mid-
January. 'It was on my responsibility' that Aylmer's offensive began
on Li. January, Nixon told the Commission. When asked why he ordered
the advance so soon, he replied, 'they he TurljJ were pushing down
1Meso Comm, Aylmer, 9 Jan 17, statement.
2Meso Conun, Younghusband, 9 Nov 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, Nixon, 7 Nov 16, no. 10814.5.
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,1towards us.
That the relief force was unprepared and lost heavily was then
Nixon's responsibility, not Townshend's. True, Townshend's reports of
his food supply were inaccurate, or incomplete, and he regularly pleaded
for early rescue, but it was not Townshend who commanded the relief,
and it was Nixon's desire to strike before the Turks grew stronger.
That Nixon acted of his ow-n accord is shown in the accounts of his su-
periors. DUff told. the Commission that for the first attack in Janu-
ary, 'General Nixon did not ask for permissions he merely stated his
intention.' 2 Chamberlain had written to Hardinge earlier criticising
Nixon's comp1ete miscalculation' of the Baghdad offensive and mention-
lug that Kitchener had considered replacing him. 3 After Nixon asked
for two extra divisions to operate on the Karun, 1 Barrow wrote 'General
Nixon Is insatiable! I doubt if we could possibly support his sugges-
tion.' 5 Barrow recommended 'the immediate preparation of defensive
positions as far beck as Kurna and Shaiba' rather than giving Nixon
more men to mount other offensives. The War Committee seconded this,
although they allowed twelve garrison battalions to go to India to free
enough Indian Army troops to make up a fifth division for Mesopotamia.
'After relieving General Townshend, General Nixon's policy should be
6to act on the defensive.'
'Meso Comin, Nixon, 14 Nov 16, no. 11601.
2Meso Comm, Duff, 12 Dec 16, no. 15589.
3D. Goold, • Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Expedition and In-
quiry', Historical Journal, XIX, 4, 1976.
4Tel. no number, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2.5 Dec 15, I0/L/MIL/5/
791./12855.
5Memo by Barrow, 27 Dec 15, CAB/11.2/6/]Z1..










But first Kut had to be relieved, and to this end operations be-
gan on 11 January 1916, The relief force, a division strong, left All
Gharbi for Sheikh Saad, a march of two days. The attack started on
the morning of the 6th, after a dense fog dispelled, but the advance
met stiffer ..resistanoe than was expected. Aylmer intended Younghusband
on the left bank to.. hold the Turks to their trenches while Brigadier
Rice and the 35th Brigade attacked in force on the right. Heavy fire
from defences that were more extensive than expected held up the ad-
vance on the 6th, while the weather turned bad that night and a chill-
ing rain also worked against the British. Operations on the 7th and
8th were hampered by mud, but on the morning of the 9th the British
found that the Turkish trenches had been abandoned. The three-day
battle cost the British 3,800 of their 19,000 men, and the fact that
the troops, of the newly-arrived 7th Division, went Into battle with
virtually no medical equipment a personnel, slowed the operations and
caused immense suffei'ing. The Turks lost over ,OOO casualties, but
left their positions owing to lack of supplies rather than losses in
personnel. The bad weather had also slowed their inadequate transport
and the advance position had. to be abandoned for one closer to their
1base.
In the midst of the battle, on 8 January, Aylmer sent a message
to Townshend. asking if he would consider a sortie out of Kut. Town-
shend replied that he had considered doing so in order to harass the
Turks' expected retreat, but hesitated to venture out otherwise. He
'Quetta Staff College, pp. 127-31 j Millar, pp. 138_Ll.3; Moberly,
vol. 2, pp. 222-37.
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thought that he might be able to break out of Kut and save some two-
thirds of his force, but would have to abandon his wounded and his guns.
This correspondence was repeated to Nixon, who ordered them to stop
talkirg about a breakout. 'Army Commander directs you not to resort
to expedient of cutting ur way out except in desperate extremity. We
1have plenty of reinforcements here.' Thus Aylmer continued his ad-
vance up the river. By 12 January plans were prepared for a surprise
attack on Turkish positions behind the Wad.i, a tributary of the Tigris.
Aylmer moved three brigades and supporting troops across the Wadi dur-
ing the night of the l2th-l3th in order to outflank the Turkish posi-
tions facing the stream. When the attack started on the morning of the
13th, the British advanced easily until slowed by artillery fire whith
covered Turkish reinforcements hurrying to entrench themselves in a
dry stream bed • This they accomplished just in time to halt the Brit-
ish, while the troops in defences along the Wadi were able to stop the
attack across the river. The evening fell with both frontal and flank-
irg assaults halted, but the Turks withdrew during heavy rains that
night. The attempt to cut off the enemy forces failed, and the Turks
withdrew into strong positions on a narrow front between the Tigris and
Suwaikiyah Marsh. The Turks had. lost 2,000 men to the British 1,600,
but they had. been able to save themselves by an orderly retreat. Ayl-
mer had gained a little more ground at a high cost, but he was still a
long way from Kut.2
Aylmer was determined to press on toward the new Turkish positions
3Townshend, pp. 21I.0l.
2Quetta Staff College, pp. 1273L$. ; Millar, pp. 1ZI.8_50, Moberly,
vol. 2, pp. 2L1.3-55.
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at TJnun-al-Hanna, and again looked to Townshend for aid. Townshend re-
commended moving up the right bank as all the Turkish trenches were
concentrated on the left. 1 Aylmer, whose effective force now numbered
only about 9,000, hoped he could link up with a force from Kut on the
right bank while he held the Turks in their trenches at }Iarma. 'The
best plan seems to me for Townshend to cross hJ river during the night
with such available men as he has got in the mahelas and other river
transport available and march well round Es Sinn position on the right
bank.' 2
 Townshend replied that at most he could ferry Li 3 O0O troops
across the Tigris in one night with his stock of fifty native craft and
one steamer, but to bring across animals and a few field guns would
take another three to four days • He started getting the nahelas pre-
pared. 3
 Nixon again would have none of it. He said that the Turks
should be so weakened that, with reinforcements, Aylnier could move
quickly along the right bank and get to Kut, 'inflicting severe blow
on enemy' as he did so • Nixon' s instructions to Aylmer were negative
in the extreme3 'The course you now propose for Townshend in your tele-
gram under reply would be disastrous from every point of view--to Town-
shend's force to your force to the whole of forces in Mesopotamia and
to the Empire and. I cannot sanction
Townshend immediately replied that he preferred a breakout across
land to one across the river, but had been prepared to cross the Tigris
re1. no. 69/91/c, Townshend to Nixon, 16 Jan 16, W0/158/661i..
2Te].. no. ll/]32/G, Aylmer to Nixon, 17 Jan 16, WO/158/661h
3Tel. no. 69/97/C, Townshend to Nixon, 17 Jan 16, W0/158/66k.
Tel. no. 1008/309/0, Nixon to Aylmer and Townshend, 17 Jan 16,
wo/158/6611..
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if Aylmer had directed him to do so • He much preferred Aylmer moving
along the right bank alone and enfilading - the Turkish position at Han-
Townshend's telegram of 18 January stated that as he could not
break out with all his troops, he would remain and fight in Kut to the
last, then make the best terms for surrender should the relief column
not succeed	 Nixon reiterated his orders to Townshend. on the same day.
On arrival of Aylmer' s column our force should be in superior strength
to enemy and neither Kut nor guns nor stores must be abandoned.' 3
 This
order was supported by Hardinge, who stated that 'it is the desire and
policy of Government to hold Kut as a strategic point, and it is only
to be evacuated under the sternest military necessity. It is quite
clear to me that these views coincide with the opinions of the Home
Government.'
This order is among the last Nixon issued. On 6 January he told
Duff that the doctors considered him too ill to remain in Mesopotamia
and that they recommended his departure within ten days. 5
 Major-Gen-
eral N. Cowper, Quartermastererieral for Force 'D', to2xl the Coinmnis-
sion that Nixon collapsed soon after his return to Basra from Ctesi-
phon. 'I mean to say that in the last ten days in January before he
resigned, the Doctors were considering how soon we would have to bury
him, he was so
	 • 6 Duff decided the only possible replacement could
'Tel. no. 69/99/G, Townshend to Nixon, 18 Jan 16, WO/158/66k.
2Tel. no. 69/lOO/G, Townshend to Nixon, 18 Jan 16, WO/l58/6611..
3Tel. no. 1008/316/0, Nixon to Ay].mner and Townshend, 18 Jan 16,
wo/l58/6611..
4Letter, Hardinge to Duff, 20 Jan 16, HDG/103/2/153l.
5Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 6 Jan 16, HDG/91/1/lk.
6Neso Comin, Cowper, 18 Jan 17, no. 1963k.
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be Sir Percy Lake, the Chief of the Indian General Staff, although he
was not in the best of health either. 'He is in the closest touch with
all that has happened in Mesopotamia, with the present situation there,
with all that we have done and are doing in India to support arid help
the forces there, and he fully understands the Viceroy's views and
those of the Secretary df State." Hardinge's reply was hardly enthu-
siastic. 'It is not an appointment which inspires me with a great deal
of confidence. . . . he has always struck me as a man wanting in deci-.
sion and easily biased, while his age, 61 this year, is a serious draw-
back in a climate like that of Mesopotamia.' 2 He wrote to Chamberla.n,
'I was so strongly impressed by akej) delicate appearance, that I am
confident that he will not last many months . . . and I really think




 Had there been
another qualified successor, he probably would have been sent in lake's
stead, but there were none at hand. lake took over command. of Force
'D' on 19 January and his first directive from India was a message 'em-
phasising--what he already fully appreciates--the importance we attach
to the retention of
This was in reply to lake's first telegram to India, one he signed
but was drafted by the Staff in Mesopotamia. rhe telegram was an at-
tempt to draw attention to the serious supply situation along the Tig-
ris. It said that without more shipping and Line of Communication per-
sonnel any idea of relieving Kut would have to be forgotten. When Duff
1Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 6 Jan 16, HDG/91/l/]Jh
2Letter, Hardinge to Duff, 7 Jan 16, HDG/103/2/l58.
3Letter, Hardinge to Chamberlain, lLi Jan 16, Robertson papers,
Liddell Hart Archives, King's College, London, 1/13/2/2.
4Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 20 Jan 16, HDG/103/1/2090.
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found that the chief author of the telegram was Cowper, the (.M.G., he
was furious. 'Please warn General Cowper that if anything of this sort
occurs again or I receive any more querulous and. petulant demands for
shipping I shall remove him from the Force and will refuse him any fur-
ther employment of any kind. 1 More than shipping was necessary to
help the relief force, however. After Nixon forbade Townshend's coop-
eration with Aylmer, the Tigris Corps tried again to force a passage,
but their progress was slowed by rains and high winds.
On 21 January they tried to force the Turkish lines with a frontal
attack, but met with only limited success. Again the sea of mud ham-
pered the attack aix]. Aylmer was forced to tell Townshend that, after
receiving 2,700 casualties, 'flesh and blood cannot do more than what
troops have done against enemy and extraordinary adverse conditions.'2
He again urged Townehend to attempt a sortie, hoping Lake would approve
what Nixon would not. Townahend advised Lake that the 6th Division
had three choicess they could try a breakout and save some of the men;
they could hold on until the last of his food and ammunition; or they
could begin negotiations while he was still strong enough to bargain.
Townshend. recommended the first course. 3 After discussions with General
Charles Meliss, one of his brigadiers, TownsherxI realised that to at-
tempt a river crossing was too risky and that if it failed it would
fuither weaken his position at Kut and force the loss of what had been
achieved by a year' s victories 	 In addition, his outlook for survival
1Meso (iomm, Cowper, 18 Jan 17, no. 19381.




had just brightened stocks of hIdden food had come to light.
It has been shown that Townshend started investigating the local
supply situation from the first. He stated in his memoirs that on 21
January the garrison had two weeks full rations. 1 On the 24th he re-
ported that he could last for another 34 days. 'This question of the
[,OO horses and. mules I had not brought forward until then, as I should
not have been justified in killing the horses, and so rendering the
division inefficient for service in the field, until Aylmer told me
that he did not think he could relieve me.' 2 On 25 January he informed
Aylmer that he had just discovered sufficient supplies for eighty-four
more days. Towlishend explained in his memoirs that although he had
directed all foodstuffs to be commandeered, 'the Military Governor had
found it easy to buys 80 my orders had not been carried out in this
respect.' 3 Only after Aylmer"s last attempt failed did Townshend feel
it necessary to conduct a house-to-house search, which he had decided
against early in the siege as likely to be antagonistic to the town's
inhabitants	 No criticism of Townshend is more justified than this
oversight in seeking out hidden caches of food • That he failed to do
so indicated a blind faith in the relief force, hardly a realistic view.
Lake later wrote 'I cannot acquit Townshend of a serious error of judge-
ment in neglecting to acquaint either General Headquarters or the Offi-




4Meso Coinm, Lake, 11 Jan 17, no. 18565.
5Report on the Defence of Kut-al-Amara, lake to OSIncl, Jul 16,
wo/1o6/53, no. 5.
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Aylmer' s opening statement to the Mesopotamia Commission dealt harshly
with Townshend on this. 'I am bound. to bring this point prominently
to notice as it proved more disastrous to my operations than anything
else. I had been struggling against a factor in General Townshend's
defence which was totally false.' 1 Now that the state of supplies was
known, Aylmer halted operations for a while in order to strengthen his
force, and no further major action took place on the Tigris for about
six weeks.
Plans for the future, both of the garrison and the entire theatre,
were under discussion on the Tigris and. in.London. Aylmer and Townshend
formulated, another breakout plan in early February. Aylmer planned to
thrust ip the right bank with 12,000 inf'ántry, plus supporting cavalry
and artillery, with the objective of reaching the Shatt-al-Hai. Town-
shend promised as much support as possible from his outpost across the
river at Woolpress, but.he could not land troops east of the Hai be-.
cause of recently constructed Turkish outposts covering the right bank.
Aylmer said that he had received permission to evacuate the garris6n
if he reached the Hai and if the situation warranted such a move
Ayliner had. to await the 13th Division from Egypt, whose arrival was es-
timated to be 2 March at Basra and 15 March up the Tigris. The delay
In the force's arrival was a result of procrastination on the part of
the Director of Military Operations, Major-General Sir. F. B. Maurice
In London, who had not hastened the division' s departure from Egypt.
The division's departure from France was so late that they could not
'Neso Comni, Aylmer, 9 Jan 17, statement.
2Tel. no. 38)4.39, Duff to Robertson, 11 Feb 16, I0/L/MIL/5/75W
l490; Townshend, pp. 269-73.
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reach ?4esopotamia by 7 February, Townshend' s supposed surrender date,
so they remained in Egypt to refit. 'We did. not make an effort to hurry
because we thought it was quite hopeless', he told the Commission, but
the division sailed directly word was received of Townehend's extra
1food supply.
In London, major policy discussions concerning the role of Force
'D' were being carried out. Arthur Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty,
after talks with General W. R. Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, noted on 21 January that they were agreed that • In Mesopotamia
our object should be the security of the troops already engaged, rather
than an advance Into the Interior. 2 Barrow, In a memorandum three days
later, echoed the Idea that Force 'D' should assume the defensive, but
called for Kut's relief In order to maintain it as the most forward po-
sition. He thought Aylmer's force would reach Kut 'before many days',
but suggested that It wofild be wise to 'expedite as much as possible
the despatch of the promised troops from England and Egypt to India. '3
Diiff wrote to Robertson that Kut remained the key point of British
strategy, and that if it should be lost (the first official concession
to that possibility) then a point as far as possible up the TIgr±s
should be held, no lower than All Gharbi. 4
 Duff's appreciation of the
Tigris situation was equally doleful. He noted that Force 'D' numbered
61,455, but that did not necessarily mean that a strong force could be
Meso Conun, Maurice, 3 Oct 16, nos. 5088-89.
2Minute by Ba].four, 'The Present Military Position, and Opinions
In the War CommIttee', 21 Jan 16, Chamberlain papers, Uniy. of Birming-
ham, AC/13/3/16.
3Memo by Barrow, 2i Jan 16, I0/L/MIL/5/75l..
4Tel, no. 36369, Duff to Robertson, 27 Jan 16, CAB/42/7/15.
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gathered against the Turks • 'All I can say now is that owing to ship-
ping difficulties on the river I do not think we can do much more than
keep abreast of requirements at present. 1 Facing the British, the
General Staff estimated six divisions (50,000 men) for sure with a pos-
sibility of 16,000 to 20,000 more, and another division expected to
arrive soon. 2 The outlook for Force 'D' was not good.
The best description of the British plight on the Tigris is in
the Official History, quoted here at 1erith,
General Aylmer was carrying on operations with an improvised
staff, makeshift organisatlon and inadequate transport, med-
ical and other resources; in fact, under such conditions that
only an aprently imperative necessity had. justified his at-
tempting offensive operations. These, moreover, bad been
rendered more difficult by bad weather, which, besides ham-
- pering all movements and destroying communications, had given
the enemy more time to improve his defences and, by increasing
General Aylmer' s casualties, bad. reduced his slight numerical
superiority over the enemy. Further, for the trench warfare
in which they were engaged, General Aylmer's force was ill-
equipped and there was no way of remedying the deficiency.
India had not the means of doing so, and, as the output of
war material was still insufficient for .their own require-
ments elsewhere, the War Office were also unable to assist.
In consequence, General Ay].mer's troops had. no trench mor-
tars, no heavy howitzers and but few light 	 , no heavy
guns or Very lights and a limited number of machine guns.
The bridging train was mainly a local improvisation and
the country boats of which it was largely composed were un-
reliable and too heavy for transport overland • The force
was very short .of aircraft and there were no balloons for
observation of fire.
The main operations were taking place some two hundred
and fifty miles by river from Basra and their successful
conduct was much impeded by the shortage of river transport,
• additions to which were not arriving as quickly as had been
anticipated. Further, when they did arrive, besides re-
quiring considerable overhaul after their sea voyage, many
of them were without expert and reliable crews, a defici-
- ency it was impossible to make good. in Mesopotamia. .
Tel. no. 36369, Duff to Robertson, 27 Jan 16, CAB/42/7/l5.
2Appreciation by CIGS, 31 Jan 16, CAB/Ll2/7/l5.
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To send more Eeinforcement by land than was being done
was impracticable, and. the rains and heavy floods rendered
the track up the Tigris impassable for days at a time; for
the track was at this time still below flood level and. -
only the larger waterways along it had been roughly bridged
with any material available.
Other disadvantages of the river craft shortage were
that it rendered the provision at the front of adequate
supplies and stores of all kinds a most difficult matter;
it prevented the rapid transfer of troops from one bank
of the river to the other for operation purposes; and it
so limited the amount of land transport which could be sent
to General Aylmer's force as to tie him to the immediate
vicinity of the river.
Reinforcements and stores were arriving at Basra faster
than they could be sent upstream; acconm*dation ashore was
limited; there was a shortage of labour; and the staff of
the Principal Marine Transport Officer was too snail; with1
the result that the congestion at the port was very great.
It Is clear to see that the ineptitude of the administration of
this expedition, both in India and Mesopotamia, was phenomenal. Some- -
thing had. to be done to bring order out of chaos • Lake finally gave a
free hand to Sir George Buchanan, an engineer with many years experi-
ence at the port of Rangoon, as Director-General of Port Administration.
Nixon had refused to let him develop the port, but under Lake he was
able to transform Basra into an efficient operation, although his work
did not come soon enough to help the relief efforts. Even such action
as this, however, was not enough to remedy the entire situation, and
the War Committee decided to institute major changes. In early Febru-
ary, they 'decided in principle that in future the Commander-in-Chief
in India was to receive orders from the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff in exactly the same way as Commanders-in-Chief in other theatres
of war.' 2
 This would change the command structure at the top, with
3l4oberly, vol. 2, pp. 278-79.
2M. Hankey,	 Supreme Command,(London 1961), p. 500.
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control of the campaign in War Office hands, arxl with India acting as
the base of operations, without command prerogatives. This did. not
change the chain of command in Mesopotamia, although Robertson doubted
that lake's age and physical strength were suitable for his efficient
functioning as G .O.C. Force 'D' . Duff remarked that Lake had. passed
his physical examination before going to Mesopotamia, but this was his
first ever field command and it was not yet possible to gauge his fit-
ness. 2
 Chamberlain noted, 'I think everyone agreed that Lake 2.s not
equal to this job', 3
 but he remained in command until July 1916.
At first the change seemed more nominal than actual • The official
despatch to India stated that the C.I.G.S. was to be the director of
operations, but India would remain the main base 6f Force 'D' • The
War Office would make good all requirements of the force that India
could not supply, 'subject to general policy, at the time being, de-
cided upon by the War Committee.' All questions of policy for Indian
security, as well as that of Persia and the Gulf, rema:ined in India's
hands, as did the arrangements for 'our sick arid wounded and as to the
finance of the campaign.' It was, of course, the sick and wounded who
suffered most from the existing administration, owing to the niggardly
Indian financial policy. Nevertheless, the change was welcomed by all.
Chamberlain wrote 'This is a great improvement, because they are bet-
ter supported from home & because Duff will take hints arid suggestions
Te1. no. 13112, Robertson to Duff, 11 Feb 16, IO/L/MIL/5/75P1/14691.
2Tel. no. 38594, DUff' to Robertson, 12 Feb 16, IO/L/MIL/5/75L1./1471l.
3Letter, Chamberlain to Kitchener, 8 Feb 16, Robertson papers,
Liddell Hart Archives, 1/13/2/1.
4Secret despatch no. 11, Chamberlain to IndGovt, 18 Feb 16, WO/1o6/
52.
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from C.I.G.S. which he resented from the S. of S. whom he considered
to be merely Barrow under another name.' 1 He told the Commission that
he welcomed the change because the expedition had outgrown Indian abil-
ity to manage it, and he 'thought the War Office would be more gener-
ous to a force they themselves directed than to a force which was out-
side their immediate purview.' 2 Barrow stated that 'India could supply
nothing more; India was down to the bone.' 3 Hardinge's opinion was
that the decision was six months late in coming. 'We rejoice in the
control of military operations in Mesopotamia being in the hands of
the Imperial General Staff. . . . Mesopotamia is no longer regarded as
the Cinderella of the campaigns in progress. ' The difference in the
supply outlook was immediate, Duff noted. 'I am to have all I ask for,
and Egypt has been told that in future they are to comply with all my
demands. . . . for such results it is well worthwhile to surrender con-
trol. '5 Duff thought it all quite fitting, as he had, always claimed
that India had risked everything to help England and should now be
helped in return.
The fact that Mesopotaimta came officially under overall Allied
strategy and could expect to benefit because of it did nothing to alter
Townshend's situation in Kut. late in January mtions were reduced
and they began to slaughter transport animals for food • A Kut diarist
noted that horsemeat was first issued on 29 1anuary, five days after
1Letter, Chamberlain to Curzon, 19 Mar 16, IO/L/EuR.MSS./Fl12.163.
2Meso Comm, Chamberlain, 21 Dec 16, no. 17198.
3Meso Comin, Barrow, 22 Aug 16, no. 782.
kMeso Comin, Hardinge, 19 Dec 16, nos. 16673-75.
5Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 8 Feb 16, Iwc/9l/l/77.
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the meat and bread ration had been halved.' Within two weeks the large
starling population of Kut came under fire and was added to the menu.2
As horsemeat became a staple in the garrison's diet a problem arose con-.
cerning the Indian troops' eating habits. Many refused the meat on re-
ligious grounds, and before long scurvy was a growing problem, some
five cases a day being admitted to the hospital. The absence of fresh
vegetables did nothing to relieve the problem. Townshend informed lake
of the problem and asked for aid from India • On 13 February Townsh end
received word from headquarters that he could quote 'Imam Masjid, Delhi,
as saying there is no objection to Mussalmen eating horse in the stress
of war provided it is halaled willed by slitting the throa . ' This
was followed within two weeks by a formal pronouncement of another re-
3gtous leader who quoted chapter and. verse of the Hindu Shastra which
allowed Hindu soldiers to eat horse flesh. 4 Townshend observed that
only 720 of the roughly 6,000 Indian soldiers had taken the meat ia-
tion. The rest, owing to the urgings of the trans-frontier Pathan
troops who spoke of early relief, decided to hold out rather than eat
meat which they considered unclean.5
This was not the only trouble that British commanders were having
with some of the Moslem troops. Townshend later wrotes 'How much I
regretted that these trans-border men had been employed in Mesopotamia,
how much did I suffer on account of these--in my opinion--overrated
1Diary of Maj. J.W.Nelson, 24 & 29 Jan 16, Kent County Archives,
WKR/B2/A2.
2Millar, pp. 181i85.
'Tel. rio. 1350/2-A, lake to Townshend, 13 Feb 16, W0/158/655.
4Tel. no. 1350f10-A, lake to Townshend, 25 Feb 16, WO/l58/655.
rel.,no number, Townshend to lake, 26 Feb 16, W0/158/655.
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,ltroops.' Aylmer, on 21 February, wrote to lake pressing the desira-
bility of relieving the force of all trans-frontier Pathans at once.
Aylmer also refers to unpopularity of war amongst Mohammedan soldiers
generally.' 2
 In his opening statement to the Commission, Younghusband
elaborated on this unpopularitys '. . . amongst the Mohammedans there
was a distinct disinclination to fight against the Turks,especially
those from the trans-border tribes df the NorthWest Frontier of India.
• . . mutiny and desertion were not unknown.' 3
 The most flagrant ex-
ample of this was the case of the 15th lancers • On 23 February lake
reported that 'four hundred and twenty rank and file out of a total
strength of approximately five hundred • • . refused to march this morn-
ing from Basra. . . . Remainder of 15th who remained loyal is represented
by all Indian officers of regiment and about fifty rank and file.h1 On
the 2lIth a court-martial was convened and every nan was convicted,
They were sentenced to punishments ranging from three years hard labour
to life imprisonment. 5
 Luckily, as Maurice stated, these were 'only
isolated instances' 6
 and for the most part the Indian troops performed
splendidly. Nevertheless, the overwhelming fear in India of jehad
spreading through the ranks was supported by such incidents. This same
fear of possible Moslem reluctance to fight prompted Barrow to decline
France's offer of six native regiments from Tonking and Madagascar.
1Townshend, p. 273.
2Tel. no. 137/12-A, lake to OSInd, 21 Feb 16, wo/158/655.
3Meso Comm, Younghusband, 7 Nov 16, statement.
Tel. no. 1386/3-A, lake to OSIM, 23 Feb 16, wo/158/655.
5Te].. no. Li142, Duff to Robertson, 1 Mar 16, IO/L/MIL/5/755/16060.
6Meso Comiu, Maurice, 3 Oct 16, no. 5425.
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Chamberlain agreed to the attachment of a French general to Force 'D'
for observation, but refused the offer of troops 'in view of their com-
position', i.e., Moslem.1
The food problem was Townshend's main concern in February, but in
early March another attempt was made at relief, and he had to develop
another plan for a possible cooperative sortie. Aylmer advised him on
29 February that he planned to march six brigades across the desert at
night to carry out a dawn attack on the Dujailah flank on the right of
the Es Sinn defences. He told Townshend to prepare his artillery for
harassing Turkish reinforcements and his infantry for an attack on the
retreating Turks. Townshend replied that he would commit two brigades
as soon as he saw that the attack was successful • He thought it unwise
to send his troops across the river unless Ay].mer was in sight, as such
a move from the Kut peninsula was necessarily slow in developing. On
the morning of 8 March, the attack started and the effects of the pre-
liminary bombardment on the Es Sinn positions were visible from Kut.
The supporting troops in Kut prepared to board the steamer Sumana to
cross the river. Such was not to be, however. The night march had
achieved complete surprise and, at dawn, the main objective, the Dujal-
lah redoubt, was manned by only forty Turks • This was confirmed by a
- British officer who actually entered the defences disguised as an Arab.
No more than 200 supporting troops were in the area. With the objective
delivered to them practically for free, the British would not take it.
Instead, they waited for artillery to be brought up and positioned,
while one brigade would not advance because its commander had orders
1Letter no. 3278, Barrow to WO, 29 Jan 16, FO/371/2769/l8839; letter
no. 3271 , Barrow to Robertson, 211 Jan 16, FO/371/2769/l4618; letter, no
number, Bertie to FO, 10 Jan 16, FO/371/2769/5308.
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that laid down a strict timetable for the assault. It did not develop
until l600 that afternoon, by which time the Turks had reinforced the
position and were able to hold it, dealing heavy punishment to the at-
tacking troops.1
By the time night fell and the assault had. been repulsed, the
chances of success were minimal. The Kut garrison didnothing since
Aylnter's troops failed to break through, and the attacking forces had
to withdraw to the base camp at Wadi. this action has been criticised
more than any other in the series of attempts to relieve Kut. Contem-
porary accounts are perhaps the most scathing. A soldier of the Kut
garrison wrote that they found out about the failure to attack the re-
doubt from their Turkish captors. 'This is not the wa the I.E.F.D.
used to attack. It is very bitter to know we could have been relieved
if only they had come on, and not sat down for 12 hours. 2 Townshend.
later wrote to Lord Beresford. 'I had no more doubt or illusions after
this display of half-hearted fighting and I felt we were doomed though
of course I did not say so and. pretended the opposite.' 3 In India,
Duff's view of the battle centred on the generals, '. .... there must
have been incompetence in the command. I cannot understand why Lake
should have sat still at Basrah instead of being present personally to
direct the most important phase of the operations. . . . it is not the
troops who have failed us, but the generals in command of them.' Duff
told Hardinge that he might have to take some drastic measures. A few
1Quetta Staff College, pp. 180_8 1i. ; Mil].ar, pp. 189-200; Moberly,
vol. 2, pp. 312119.
2Nelson diary, Kent 6ounty Archives, WKR/B2/A2.
3Pvt. letter, Townshend. to Beresford, ownshend papers, Lid.dell
Hart Archives, King's College, London.
1Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 10 Mar 16, HiX/9l/l/166.
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days after the Dujailah battle, he removed Aylmer.
When questioned about Ay].mer's dismissal from command, Maurice
told the Commission that 'It was not on the ground of any specific
strategical or tactical blunder or blunders.' Rather, the authorities
felt Ay].mer's conduct 'of the operations . . . had not been fortunate',
and it was felt that a change at the top, especially to a younger man,
would alter the outlook of the troops. 1 Maurice then gave his personal
opinion that the appointment of a new commander was not sufficient to
save Kut. He considered 'that the operations of March the 8th decided
the fate of Kut and afterwards the floods made relief almost an impos-!
sibility.' 2 Ay].mer was relieved of command. on 12 March, to be replaced
by Gorririge, the 12th Division commander. In a last letter to Townsherid
Ay].mer regretted not being able to effect Kut's relief, but that it was
a more difficult operation than most people realised, especially those
who '	 in an armchair at the War Office. '3 Townshend. sympathised with
him. 'I doubt if the authorities at home grasped the difficulties he
had to contend with in the war of floods, rain, want of transport, and
last, but not least, want of experience and training in a large proper-
'LI.tion of his troops.
It would be another month before the relief force tried another
offensive • TowTlshend meanwhile issued his third communique to the gar-
risun. In it he told of Aylmer's failure to capture Dujailah and. the
subsequent withdrawal to Wad.i. He again was forced to cut the rations,
'Meso Conun, Maurice, 3 Oct 16, nos. 5137-38.
2Ibid.., no. 5189.
3Barker, Townshend, p. 192.
Townshend, p. 299.
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and 1,100 horses, including officers' chargers, were to be killed. 'I
am determined to hold out, and I know you are with me in this, heart
ani soul.' 1
 Lake was not so hopeful. He wrote to Robertson describing
the transport problem and its role in the slow progress up the Tigris.
Lake mentioned the fact that reinforcements were in Basra when Aylmer
attacked on 21 January but could not be moved up-river. Again during
the Dujailah battle, the scene at Basra was repeated, this time with
12,000 men and twenty-six guns. He hoped that the arrival of shipping
from India could be expedited, but stated 'I cannot however hope before
the flood season n mid-Marc approaches to use all the troops at my
disposal for the relief of Kut.'2
Events at Kut cast a somewhat different light on the Tigris situ-
ation, one that the authorities in India and London did not care to con-
sider. On 10 March Townshend received a letter from Khalil Pasha, corn-
manding the Turks in Mesopotamia. Khalil spoke of Aylmer's latest at-
tempt and suggested that no other effort would come so close to success.
'For your rt, you have heroically fi11d your military duty. From
henceforth I see no likelihood that you will be relieved. . . . You are
free to continue your resistance at Kut, or to surrender to my forces,
which are growing larger. Receive, General, the assurance of our high-
est consideration. '3 Townshend. of course replied in the negative, but
-he told Lake that negotiations might not be a bad idea. He still had
six-weeks' food and a fairly healthy force with which to bargain, and.
history was full of examples of besieged garrisons negotiating successful
1Comrnuniqu to troops, 10 Mar 16, Lt.-Col. J.W.Callaway papers,
IWM, box no. P42.
2Tel. no. 1456-C, Lake to CGSInd,l3 Mar 16,WO/l06/906.
3Townshend, p. 294.
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withdrawals with honour. Since his reason for holding Kut, to cover
a concentration of force strong enough to hold securely the remaining
British possessions, had been fulfilled, then to abandon the town would
only lose them a town, while his force would be saved, lake ordered
him to do nothing, but promised to pass on the proposal to the War Of-
fice. lake thought that if the Turks should broadcast his request to
negotiate then 'evil effects as regards loss of prestige would result
which would scarcely be less than the effects which the enforced sur-
render of Kut would involve.'1
Duff agreed with Lake. He thought Khalil's readiness to negotiate
was a response to increasing pressure from the Russians, who had. just
captured Erzeroum and were advancing on Karind in Persia, some 130 miles
from Baghdad. 2 Robertson's response was identical to Duff's. He
noted that in Turkey anti-German feeling was increasing owing to Rus-
sian successes, which forced the Turks to divert large numbers of men
to the Caucasus, thus causing the force south of Baghdad to be corres-
pondingly weakened by the shift of men and supplies. Robertson assumed
Khalil's overtures to confirm the serious situation in the Caucasus.
I regard them as an unsuspected perfect indication that success is as-
sured. in the event of determined action on your part. '3 As to Town-
shend's references to past sieges, Robertson wrote privately to Duff
'I have never read more ridiculous nonsense than his recent telegram
with regard to opening negotiations. He evidently has got that little
'Tel. no. 1008-520-0, Lake to OSInd, 14 . Mar 16, W0/106/906.
2Tel. no. 43397, Duff to Robertson, 114. Mar 16, W0/106/906; Barker,
Neglected War, pp. 142-43.
3T e1. no ' 14396 , Robertson to Duff, 15 Mar 16, W0/l06/906.
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knowledge of Military History which is alncighty dangerous' , even though
it was correct. Kitchener added the final comment to the scheme $ I
sincerely hope that you Lake and all the Generals (sic) under you real-
ise that it would forever be a disgrace to our country if Townshend.' s
force surrenders and, moreover, that our prestige in the F.st would un-
doubtedly be gravely prejudiced by such a disaster.' 2
 lake assured
him that everyone was 'striving to attain their object En will do ev-
erything that is humanly possible.'3
Gorringe's task was unenviable. Within a week of his taking corn-
mand the Tigris began to flood owing to the melting of the mountain
snow at the river's source. This hampered his operations in a variety
of ways. Not only did the low ground around the river become, inundated,
but the river itself widened and its current grew faster, making the
relief force's bridging operations even more difficult. Further, the
flood effectively stopped any cooperation that Townehend might have
been able to offer. Nevertheless, Gorringe was determined to break
'through, and his first attempt to do so came on 5 April. The newly-.
arrived 13th Division led the attack on the trenches at Hanria, and
within a matter of hours five lines were taken with few casualties.
By that evening, the positions at Fallahiya, some two miles further
up-river, were occupied after slight resistance. The news of the suc-
cesses cheered the garrison immensely, but the relief force remained
fifteen miles away and the Turks held strong positions at Sarmalyat
'Letter, Robertson to Duff, 15 Mar 16, Robertson papers, 1/32/11.
2Tel. no. 111.587, Kitchener to lake, 20 Mar 16, IO/L/MIL/5/755/1611.28.
3Tel. no. 27-711-.M,S,, Lake to Duff, 26 Mar 16, W0/l06/906.
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Hurrying to meet Townshend's deadline of 15 April, Gorringe ordered a
frontal attack on Sarmaiyat on 6 April; the .7th Division was repulsed,
but dug in close to the Turkish lines. Operations on the right bank
had also been successful, the Abu Roman position taken and consolidated
on the 5th. High winds and flooding marsh stopped the advance for two
days, but the 13th Division, advancing through the 7s trenches, at-
tacked again on 9 April. The Turks were able to hold their ground and
destroy the 'bunds' holding back the rising flood waters. The result-
ant swampy ground along their front forced a British halt
Inside Kut, Townshend was again forced to cut rations. On 10 April
he issued another message to his troops, informing them of Gorringe's
progress as he knew it (wireless communication with the relief force
had been intermittent). He had to stretch the garrison's food supply
at all costs, so he notified them of the ration reduction. 'I am corn-
pefled, therefore, to appeal to you all to make a determined effort to
eke out our scanty means so I can hold out for certain till our corn-
rades arrive, and I know I shall not appeal to you in vain.' 2 He fur-
ther implored the Indian troops to eat horse meat, and they finally be-
gan doing so, though probably owing more to hunger than to his appeals.
On the 11th, Townshend. threatened disciplinary action against all those
who did not eat meat • On that day, 5,000 Indians had received a meat
ration; more than 9,300 soldiers and followers were eating it within
a few days. 3 He reported to lake that he had sufficient grain to last
¼uetta Staff CoUege, pp. 198-20 11. ; Moberly, vol. 2., pp. 373-8k.
2Coinmuniqu to troops, 10 Apr 16, Lt.-Col. J.W.Callaway papers,
IWN, box no. Pk2.
3Millar, pp. 225-26.
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him until 2k April, and horsemeat until the 29th, this being made pos-
sible only by cutting the ration yet again. Lake thought that Rut
might be provisioned by air, and for a while the idea was pursued.
Townehend stated that he needed 5,000 pounds of food. a day, and on 15
April the air drop started • Conditions were perfect on that day, but
only 3,350 pounds were delivered • Never again were weather conditions
as favourable, and the average delivery was roughly a fourth of what
was needed per day in Rut, and storms and enemy aircraft made the idea
only part lafly viable .
Gorringe made his final attempt to break through. A series of
trenches near Bait Isa on the right bank fell on the 17th, but the Brit-
ish had to fight for their lives against a partially successful counter-
attack that night. This forced a halt to operations on the right bank,
arid the final assault took place against the Sannaiyat trenches on 22
April. Early success was reversed by Turkish counterattack and no
• ground was gained. 2
 This effectively sealed Rut's fate. The April op-
- erations cost the relief force 10,000 casualties, some twenty-five per
cent, of the command. The total relief effort, since January, had
caused 23,000 casualties, sixty per cent. of the total effectives, not
counting those sLck. Turkish casualties numbered some 1O,OOO. 3 After
the last attack failed, Townshend told Lake that all was lost. 'The
news you send is very bad and we must face facts. . • . he will not be
able to relieve me except by a miracle and. in war miracles do not happen.'
'Townshend, pp. 327-32.
2Quetta Staff College, pp. 205-09; Moberly, vol 2, pp. 373-8k.
3Quetta Staff College, p . 209.
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He therefore considered that lake should contact Khalil and begin nego-
tiations. Townshend was sure Khalil would grant the 6th Division pa-
role because it had. acquitted itself o well. The effects of the fall
of Kut would be far-reaching, he said. 'The effect of the force falling
by having to surrender will be far greater than the fall of Yorktown
throughout the British Empire and I believe Ehe Britis Government it-
self will fall. '
	 In spite of these dire predictions, he recominend.ed
negotiations and lake agreed with him. lake thought, however, that he
might still have one more chance.
Lake thought that a ship should try to run the river to Kut with
a month's supplies. The swift current would necessarily slow the ship
and make it an easy target, but he considered that 'Any chance however
slight I am unwilling to neglect.' 2 The paddle-steamer Julnar was se' -
lected as the relief vessel and she was manned by an all-volunteer crew.
She sailed on the night of 211. April, bit the mission was doomed. The
Arabs around the British base informed the Turks of the attempt, and
they thereupon strung a cable across the river to foul her paddles.
The ship was captured within sight of Kut and. all the crew were taken
prisoner. This ended the attempts to relieve Kut and negotiations were
authorised.
On 25 April Kitchener granted lake permission to begin talks with
the Turks. He reminded lake that Khalil's men were surely desperate
for supplies also,ancLthus Townshend. should not be forced to accept un-
fair terms . lake informed Townshend of Kitchener' s message and directed
1Tel. no. 1008-67140, Lake to OSInd, 23 Apr 16, WO/l06/906.
2Tel. no. 157]A, Lake to OSInd, 21. Apr 16, WO/106/906.
3Tel. no. 15736 , Kitchener to Lake, 25 Apr 16, IO/L/MIL/5/755/169].6.
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him to make contact with Kha].il. Townshend declined • He 'remained tin-
convinced that he was the right person to conduct the surr1er nego-
tiations and thought that lake was in a far better position as he would
be playing from strength. 	 Lake replied that Townshend, with his
prestige,would be more likely to obtain better terms • Townshend later
wrote that he knew his bargaining position was worthless. 'I had to
negotiate with Thalil Pacha, knowing that I had. not a biscuit up my
sleeve to argue with, and knowing that Khalil Pacha knew I was in ex-
treinis for food. . . . But I had. to get food at once or all my men would
lie down and. die.' 2 Townshend met Khali]. on 27 April, but nothing was
agreed as Townshend refused to abandon Kut prior to negotiations. He
still hoped to get his division paroled, as many besieged garrisons
had done in the past, but it was in vain. He told Khalil that to take
the responsibility of some 10,000 prisoners, having to guard, transport,
feed them and pay their salaries was too much for the Turks • Khalil
replied that he was ready to do all those things. He assured Townshend
that the men of the 6th Division 'would certainly meet with the same
reception as prisoners in Turkey as troops of Osman Pasha, the hero of
Plevna, had met as prisoners in Russia. '3
Townshend., and others, still tried to salvage something from the
talks. Kitchener had, in late March, ordered Captain T. E. lawrence
to work indirectly to help the Kut garrison. He had. authorised. law-
rence and the British authorities engaged in the negotiations, to offer
the Turks up to a million pounds sterling as bounty for the release of
'Millar, p. 252.
2Townshend, p. 335.	 -
3Millar, p. 254.
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1the division. lawrence and Aubrey Herbert, of the Arab Bureau in Cairo,
joined Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Beach of Townshend.'s Intelligence staff,
in discussion with Khalil. They attempted to negotiate an exchange of
British wounded for Turkish prisoners, to which Khalil agreed, provided
he was not given any Arabs. 'One in ten of his Turkish troops had.
proved to be a coward, but only one Arab in a hundred was brave. 2 The
£1,000,000 offer was made, and Khalil, who reportedly agreed with the
parole idea, said he would have to speak to Enver Pasha about it. The
reply was negative. 'Tell him to keep his money. I have lost ten
thousand men.' 3 Townshend, on hearing this, suggested the offer be
raised to £2,000,000, but this was not seriously considered. On 28
April lake reported that thelast British offer was 'release of the Kut
garrison on parole not to fight during continuance of the war in
consideration of the release of an equal number of Turkish prisoners,
plus, the surrender of all arms and guns in Kut, plus £].,0OO,OOO.'
Duff was not optimistic of the chances of success. He wrote to Robert-
son 'I confess I do not expect that we shall get anything better than
unconditional surrender.'5
As a last attempt to gain some terms, Townshend wrote to Khalil.
I am certainly deserving of a better fate than this at your hands • In
speaking of the defence I have made you yourself have said that I have
carried out my duties In a heroic manner; and now I ask nothing more
'Tel. no. 14895, Robertson to lake, 29 Mar 1, WO/106/906.
2Millar, p. 275; T.E.Iawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (New York,
1935), p. 59.
3Millar, p. 259.
4Tel no. I.G.-2668, lake to CGSIrid, 28 Apr 16, WO/106/906.
5Letter, Duff to Robertson, 28 Apr 16, Robertson papers, 1/32/23.
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than is reasonable arid right to expect from a noble adversary and sol-
dier of your repute.' 1 This statement most clearly shows Townshend's
basic attitude toward war and its conduct, and it is his major short-
coming; it wou'd bring about the greatest public criticism of his war-i
time performance. Hailed as the 'Hero of Kut' for his defence, his re-
turn to Britain was marred by the fact that he finished the war in lux-
ury2 while his troops suffered terribly. The above message to Khalil
shows that Townshend. expected the Turks to treat their prisoners hon-
ourably. His failing was that he was a man steeped in military history
and his attitñdes were formed by that study. Townshend was in the end
too idealistic, too much a nan of the nineteenth rather than the twen-
tieth century. In the Ottoman Empire, ideas of parole or gracious
treatment of prisoners were unknown, but Townshend was still fighting,
in Mesopotamia, a nineteenth century war of manoeuvre and. cavalry
thrusts • The realities of the Western Front brought the soldiers of
that theatre face to face with the conditions of total war, but Town-
shenci's experienóe did not allow him to comprehend such things. If
the situation had been reversed, he might well have paroled a besieged
Turkish garrison, but this would have been unthinkable to the Indian
or British authorities. Thus, when Kha].il told him he would be an hon-
oured guest and. his troops would be 'interned in places in a good cli-
mate near the sea' 3 Townshend took him at his word, because he believed
Khalil an honourable man who would strictly adhere to the rules of war.
Fel. no. 69_L.7O_G, Townshend to lake, 29 Apr 16, WO/l06/906.




Whether Khalil purposely deceived him or had no control over the treat-
ment of his men is open to question. Townshend. believed that the ill-
treatment of his men was the doing of the Germans, although this is
doubtful • Barker observed in his study of the campaign that 'All that
can be said in defence of the Turkish authorities with regard to this
sorry tale is that they often treated their own men with inhuman cm-
elty.'1
On 28 and 29 April, Townshend began to perform what he considered
to be the essentials before the garrison surrendered. He issued a mes-
sage to his troops on each of the last two days. On the 28th he spoke
of the negotiations and his attempts to gain parole for the division.
The next day, however, he was forced to inform he garrison of the sur-
render. He published the letter he had sent to KhaIil requesting gen-
erous treatment for his troops • He told them further 'I have received
notification from the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, to say I can start
for Constantinople; having arrived there, I have petitioned to be al-'
lowed to go to London on parole and see the Secretary of State for War,
and get you exchanged at once.' 2 His last message to Force 'D' read:
'My guns have been destroyed and. am destroying most of the munitions.
Officers have been sent to Khalil to say I am prepared to surrender.
I am not able to hold out any more and must have some food here.'3
Townshend burned the Union Jack and. left for Baghdad. As his launch
travelled up-river, the men of the 6th Division lined the banks and.
Barker, Neglected War, p. 2117.
2Cornmuniqu to the troops, 29 Apr 16, Lt.-Col. J.W.Cal].away papers,
DiN, box no. Pil2.
3Tel. no. I.G.-2679, Lake to (XSInd, 29 Apr 16, WO/106/906.
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cheered.
That Townshend' s internment was comfortable is not open to ques-
tion, but it was captivity nevertheless • The only terms short of un-
conditional surrender that he had been offered was a personal parole,
but he would not accept it. His message to Lake on 28 April shows he
was not certain that he would go to Constantinople. In the last days
of the siege he too had suffered the effects of the weather and short
rations, but he told Lake 'My duty seems clear, to go into captivity
with my force, though I know the hot weather will kill me. 1 He real-
iced that once the Turks had him, they planned to use him and the gar-
rison for propaganda purposes. The Turks were 'determined to show the
British force captured to the world' 2
 and the Committee of Union and
Progress newspaper 'Tanin' stated that 'This time they did not succeed
in scuttling. This time the English who, when they cannot achieve sue-
cess, consider it the greatest honour to run away, have been unable to
do so as they did at Gallipoli. '3 Thus, Townshend was paraded around
Constantinople before he was confined to house arrest on Prinkipo Is-
land. in the Sea of Narinora. That he did not suffer with his troops
cannot be blamed totally on him. As pointed out earlier, he did not
believe his men would be ill-treated. Besides, as Sherson wrote in his
biography of Townshend, 'Is it supposed that Khalil Pasha or Enver said.
to himi "Which would you like to do--go with your troops, or go to
Stamboul?". . . of course Enver brought him to Constantinople to parade
him in captivity before the Turkish populace. It was too great a triumph
1Barker, Townshend, p. 203.
2Townshend, p. 336.
3Arabian Report No. XXIa, L Jul 16, P0/371/2779/152060.
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for Enver to miss.' 1
 Towmshend, of course, was convinced that he could
only negotiate a prisoner exchange with the authorities in Constanti-
nople, so he went voluntarily, but, as Sherson says, did he really have
any choice? For him, the trip to Constantinople, the consideration he
received, the knowledge that his brigad.iers were well-treated, all
worked together to maintain his illusion that the honourable Turks
would abide by Townshend's ideals of the rules of war.
At the time of the fall of Kut, the 6th Division strength was
13,3692 and they had suffered 1,746 deaths during the five month siege.3
The surrender did not bring about the general uprising among the Arabs
that had been feared for so long. As usual, they were hostile or
friendly according to thir proximity to the battle line • The British
authorities were, to a man, surprised that the fall of Kut occasioned
no Arab or Moslem response. Barrow told the Commission that the sur-
render had 'much less effect than we anticipated. We thought that af-
ter the retirement from Ctesiphon the whole country would be up.'4
Gorringe explained that the reason this did not happen was the nature
of the defence. The British had. surrendered because of hunger, not be-
cause of enemy attack. 'The Arabs, as I have said, say "Oh, yes, you
took Kut but you did not take it by fighting." In other words, they
say to the Turks, "The English turned you out of your positions but
you cannot turn the English out of
	 rs."5
1E. Sherson, Townshencl of Chitral and Kut, (London, 1928), p. 328.
2Barker, Neglected War, p. 2116,
3Millar, p. 263.
4Meso Coinm, Barrow, 22 Aug 16, no. 1012.
5Meso Comm, Gorririge, 12 Sep 16, nos. 2814-15.
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The attitude of Persia and Afghanistan, from whom the Indian Gov-
eminent also feared invasion via the Northwest Frontier, remained un-
changed also • Barrow noted that the advance on Baghdad and the subse-
quent siege occupied Turkish attentions at a time when they could easily
have made ITajor gains in Persia. 1 Arthur Hirtzel, the India Office
Political Secretary, stated that the Amir of Afghanistan had remained
staunchly opposed to German intrigues: '. . . the Amir has managed to
hold his own in a way which astonished everybody.' 2 The Ainir report-
edly told German envoys that he would join their cause 'when they arrived
in Kabul with 250,000 men, and not before. Hirtzel, however, defended
the idea of prestige as a major policy in the Middle Est in the face
of the Commission's description of it as 'rather an Indian disease.'
Hirtzel maintained that if the British did. not maintain the offensive
and soundly defeat the Turks in Mesopotamia, they would experience
trouble with the area after the war. He told the Commission that 'a
withdrawal of the Turks for diplomatic reasons because they are beaten
somewhere else and. not beaten by us n Mesopotami will have no effect
on the Arabs after the war but they will snap their fingers at
At all levels the siege of Kut has been viewed as a disaster.
First, there are various accusations against Townshend: that he should
not have stopped there at all, for not accurately estimating the food
supply, for not cooperating with the relief force. As has been shown,
most of these questionable decisions were not in his hands at all, but
1Meso Comin, Barrow, 22 Aug 16, no. 675.
2Meso Comin, H&rtzel, 7 Sep 16, no. 2036.
3Ibid., floss 2l1l.75l.
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the food distribution certainly bears criticism. Barker observed that
if Townshend's staff had made a proper assessment of the
food resources in the first place, the decisive time avail-
able for a major relief operation could have been better
calculated, the troops properly fed and physically strong
and fib for a complementary action to support the break-in.
If all things are considered, would an accurate estimate in December
have made that much difference? Lidd.ell Hart said of the relief oper-
ations 'The conditions were bad, the communications worse, the general-
ship faulty.' 2 The battles Aylmer fought in January, the key time con-
cerning the early relief of Kut, were all victories, yet none were ex-
ploited because of the defensive skill of the Turks and the marshy soil
conditions through which the British had to advance. Once an accurate
estimate was in hand, after 211 January, the next attack, after six weeks'
preparation, was a failure, as were the others that followed. It there-
fore seems that Nixon' s original reason for attacking, that the Turks
were gathering in strength,was a .more vital reason for the failure of
the relief, as shown by the later battles and the resultant casualty
figures. Further, as has already been noted, Maurice assumed (with
good reason) that Kut was lost after Dujailah because the flood defeated
them after that battle in early March. The Duja&lah redoubt, key to
the entire attack, was free for the taking, but the British hesitated
and the battle was lost. Prior to the floods the defeats were the re-
sults of missed opportunities not because of a lack of numbers or
preparation. A survivor of the Kut garrison summed it up in his re-
sponse to General Rich's questionnairet
'Barker, Neglected War, p. 283.
2Sir B.H.Liddefl Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918, (London, 1930 ), -
p. 209.
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But even if the Relief Force had. been given time to build
up numbers, supplies and strong points (with the besieged
cut down in ratons), does the weather, the quality of the
Turkish troops, their movements downstream, the failure of
the high command to defeat the Turks in strategy and tac-
tics, the failure of the junior generals (as at Dujailah)
to utilise opportunities offered, suggest that the final
surrender was not Implicit in these circumstances, how-1
ever long scanty supplies were made to hold out in Kut?
After Kut was taken by the Turks, they later lost it owitg to poor
strategic decisions. Rather than press on to regain lost territory on
the Tigris, and possibly threaten Persia, they withdrew substantial
numbers of men to recoup their losses in the north. This set the stage
for Sir Stanley Naude's successful 	 offensive of 1917 which led to
the capture of Kut and the occupation of Baghdad. As Khalil Pasha wrote,
he was forced. by general Headquarters at Constantinople to split the
Turkish 6th Army, part of it to defend Kut and part to advance on 1-lam-
adan, some 250 miles northeast of Baghdad and deep In Persia. Khalil
'did not want to fll into this pitiable situation', 2 but he had no
choice. 'The Turks at Kut, instead of continuing their efi'ort against
British positions lower down the Tigris as the Germans advised theni to
do, determined to retrieve their losses in the north and diverted im-
portant forces to Persia.' 3 Thus the first flush of victory after Kut
made the Turks overconfident and enabled the British to gain a victory
within a year of their great disaster.
The major change in Nesopotalrila after the capitulation was the
official decision to begin a defensive strategy, 'and no importance is
'Questioiaiie,Lt. G.L.Heawood, Rich papers, IWN, box 74/11.9/1.
2 'After the Fall of Kut', Khalil Pasha, undated, Townshend papers,
Liddell Hart Archives.
Chambers, The War Behind the War, (New York, 1939). p. 309.
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attached to occupation of Baghdad or to possession of Kut.' However1
a position as far up the Tigris as possible was desirable in order to
support the Russians, and Lake was told. that 'in the event of any weak-
ening of the enemy on his front he orrizgJ should take advantage of it
provided that this can be done without suffering heavy losses whether
caused by unhealthy conditions or inflicted by the enemy." The Brit-
ish made smafl gains around the Sannaiyat position, consolidating their
hold, but did not press their advantage when the Turks withc!rew the
troops occupying the Es Sirm position on the right side of the Tigris.
It was not until November 1916, when Naude persuaded: Robertson to re-
sume the offensive on the Tigris, that this Turkish withdrawal was ex-
ploited and the British started their reconquest of Kut and the offen-
sive toward Baghdad. By that time, however, Force 'D' 'had been totally
refitted and the failures of the first eighteen months in Nesopotamia
were rectified. Maude began his offensive only after instituting major
reforms in the medical and supply administration. Naude learned from
the mistakes of his predecessors, and his advance was a perfect example
of the proper care and attention to detail that must accompany any
desert campaign.
It was regrettable that only the harsh retreat from Ctesiphon arid
the ensuing muddle of the relief attempts could bring to light the
shortcomings of India's administration of the Mesopotamian campaign.
The War Office assumption of command brought about the necessary changes
that eventually salvaged the Tigris disaster, but it was too late in
coming to save the 6th Division. Public disgust at the squalid state
1Tel. no. 15955-MO, Robertson to Duff, 30 Apr 16, wo/106/906.
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of the troops forced an enquiry to settle the blame for the mistakes.
Townshend was not criticised at the time; most of the newpaper ücounts
questioned the administration that had forced his defeat. 1 Although he
was treated poorly after the war, this resulted from the difference
between his captivity and that of his troops. Townshend conducted some
of the finest military operations of the war, and it is shameful that
these have been overlooked. As Barker observes,
Much of the criticism of Townshend stems from his self-
advertisinent, an art in which he was in advance of his
time. By his detractors he has been represented as an
impudent charlatan, forever blowing his own trumpet, con-
triia1ly wire-pulling and jockeying for position and, as
most of these debunkers were Townshend' s contemporaries,
their opinions cannot be dismissed out of hand • However
it is reasonable to point out that other famous men--be-
fore, during, and since Townshend--have employed similar
techniques and nobody has thought any the less of them
for that. Once again one is forced to the conclusion
that the real resentment was stirred u as a consequence
of his behaviour as a prisoner of war.
Whatever the man may have been like personally, that hardly affected
his ability to command, and generals throughout the ages have been re- -
garded as experts In their field no matter what their personalities
may have been. As Lid.dell Hart wrote, Townshend and the 6th Division
'wrote a glorious page in military history.'3
1Evening News, 28 Mar 16; Th Times (London), 1 Apr 16, 1 May 16,
et. a]..
2Barker, Townshend, p. 21$.?.
3Liddell Hart, p. 209.-
cHAFER 6
THE MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSION
As early as mid-October 1915 reports were reaching England through
private channels that the organisat ion and administration of the Indian
Expeditionary Force In Mesopotamia was not all It might be, in spite of
the unbroken string of successes they had thus far attained. Chamber-
lain wrote to Hardlnge that he had received reports concerning made-
quate medical facilities for the troops on the Tigris, and he wanted
to know just what the medical arrangements were.
I know that the difficulties must be great, and that it I
Impossible to foresee every emergency, but I trust that you
will impress upon all concerned that In this matter of
health they cannot take too many precautions and that we
shall not questio expenditure required to safeguard the
lives of our men.
This letter reached Hardinge early In November, but apparently there
was no reaction to It. By the time the retreat from Cteslphon occirred,
however, reports became frequent that the wounded were undergoing se-
vere hardship. On 28 December Hardirige remarked to Duff about the
'constant complaints as to the Insufficiency of supplies, stores and
comforts for the Mesopotamlan force.' 2 He asked Duff to investigate.
Thus began a series of investigations and reports that finally
culminated in the Mesopotamia Commission Report of May 1917. The -
'Meso Comm, Duff, iLl. Dec 16, no. 16371.
2Letter, Hard.inge to Duff, HDG/90/2/370.
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inadequacy of river transport and, the:tefore, the resulting lack of
supplies, medical care and comforts for the troops was the primary
cause of the intense suffering that the Indian Army troops had to en-
dure throughout the campaign. Until the reverse at Ctesiphon, Force
'D' was successful only because the troops were splendid and their en-
emy lacked determination. That the troops remained first-rate in their
fighting ability is not doubted; however, the change in leadership
quality of the Turk&h army, owing to the relief of pressure from the
Dardanefles, was sufficient to cause the failure of the overstrained
British supply line. The poor supply situation and inadequate treat-
ment for the wounded were widely enough reported in Britain to lead to
the demand for a public enquiry. There were letters Ffrom officers
serving there in which such expressions as "Full rations, for a won-
der", "We hadn' t enough water and had to drink stuff that I saw horses
refuse."' 1 In Parliament there were calls for governmental attention
to the problems in Mesopotamia. Lord H. Cavendish-Bentinck (Notting-
ham South ,c) stated 'Nothing surprises me more than the way in which
the people of this country have treated these lapses from efficiency
and these lapses from humanity on the part of the Government.' 2
 The
establishment of a commission to investigate the situation did not ap-
peal to the war leaders , but Parliamentary pressure, without regard to
party lines, forced its establishment once the papers relating to the
campaign were made public. Before the Ooinmission's creation, however,
1The Times (London), 18 Jul 16, p. 9.
2Hansard, vol. LXXX, p. 2191, 15 Mar 16.
3Debate on the release of Mesopotamia papers, CID, CAB/LI2/l6/'l.
4Hansard, vol. LXXXII, p. 2972, 1 Jun 16.
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Indian Government investigations were carried out, and they formed the
basis of the proceedings conducted by the Mesopotamia Conunission.
The first of these investigations originated in late December
1915 at the instigation of Hardinge's 28 December letter to Duff, who
replied on the 30th. He stated that, in order to get a sufficiently
unbiased report, he was not going to assign a regular officer to the
case. Instead, Duff employed Lord Chelmsford, past Governor of Queens-
land and New South Wales, and the next Viceroy, and Surgeon-General
J. G. MacNeese, Director of Medical Services in India. Duff apparently
had no fear of any adverse criticism. If he had, he would hardly have
told Hardinge 'I will leave no stone unturned to get at the actual facts.'
Duff's later actions cast doubt on his real desire to accept the facts.
He confidently told Hardinge that the complaints of the force were,ac-
cording to his experience, probably 'very often exaggerated by officers
making general statements which are really based on some particular in-
cident,' 1
 Duff was soon confirmed in his confidence. Lord Chelmsford,
called front India to London to prepare for his accession to the Vice-
royalty, never acted on Duff's appointment. Surgeon-General MacNeese's
investigation took him only to Bombay and Basra, where he saw the medi-
cal arrangements at their best. Thus, Duff received information that
was far from complete, and this must have affected his decision to
commission a second enquiry.
By February 1916, letters to India told of even more suffering
along the Tigris, this time by the wounded of the relief force. Al-
though 'everything was found all right at Basrah and from there to
'Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 30 Dec 1.5, HDG/90/l/422.
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India, wherever, in fact, we control matters directly', 1 Duff thought
that an independent enquiry should look into the troubles at the front
'before this is forced on us' and Hardinge agreed. Duff appointed Sir
William Vincent, member of the Indian Governinnt Council, and Major-
General A. H. Bingley, who had served in Bgypt since the start of the
war and was newly-arrived in India. Hardinge informed Chamberlain of
this action on 25 February in response to the Secretary of State's fur-
ther reports of bad conditions. Hardinge assured him that 'medical
arrangements in Mesopotainia have constantly occupied the attention of
the Cominaxxler-in-Chjef and myself, but Nixon never reported that all
was not well.' 2
 Once again, the 'nan on the spot' became ultimately
responsible. The new man on the spot, lake, welcomed 'the arrival of
an impartial commission which could record. facts.' 3 Lake wanted the
pair to investigate Townshend's claim that he had protested against the
Baghdad advance; also, they should look into the early advance to re-
lieve Kut, insufficiency of river transport and the resulting shortages.
The directions of the Vincent-ingley probe were expanded on 31
March to include such topics as those suggested by lake, should they
be relevant to the medical conditions • The original instructions di-
rected them to enquire into the action of the relief force, but this
was enlarged to include the entire campaign, although still in a medi-
cal context • Most importantly, they were directed not only to inves-
tigate the arrangements, but were 'instructed to ascertain and assign
1Letter, Duff to Hardinge, 22 Feb 16, HDG/91/1/110.
2Pvt. tel., Hardinge to Chamberlain, 25 Dec 15, IO/L/MIL/5/755/16039.
3Pvt. tel., Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 Mar 16, HDG/lOO/2/100.
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responsibility for any defects found. and to state whether individuals
or the system were to blame." In order to assist them, and to mollify
the growing public criticism of the conditions in Mesopotamia, Mr. E. A.
Ridsdale of the Red. Cross was assigned to the Commission from London.
Chamberlain thought 'it politic as well as right' to attaci Ridsd.le so
that the Red Cross aid could easily be rendered to Force 'D' ,2 Hardinge,
assuming London wanted to add an unbiased reporter, had no objection
to Red Cross participation, 'although Vincent could be trusted to give
a fearless and, independent decision.' 3 This statement shows Hardinge
was as ignorant as Duff of the true conditions in Mesopotamia. If they
had been aware of them, neither would have been as cooperative in en-
couragirg the investigation.
After eight days of taking evidence in Bombay, Vincent and Bingley
left for Basra on 10 March. They were joined by Ridsdale shortly there-
after,and. spent some two and a half months gathering information and
writing their report. They also received written statements from a
number of officers who had been invalided back home to England, dealing
with their experiences with the medical and transport problems along
the Tigris, in Basra, and on to India. When the Vincent-Bingley Report
was submitted to Duff in mid-July, it was exactly what he had asked for,
but not what he had expected. The report was, indeed, as fearless as
Hardinge had predicted. As they had been directed by their 31 March
1Meso Comm, Vincent-Birigley Report, CAB/19/26, App. 1.
tel., Chamberlain to Hardinge, izi. Mar 16, HDG/l00/l/123.
3Tel., no number, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 28 Mar 16, I0/L/MIL/
5/768.
Te1. no. M128L1.2/6, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 17 Mar 16, lO/L/MIL/
3/2508.
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orders, they assigned responsibility for the failures, and their find-
ings were not a good reflection on anyone except the overworked medical
personnel in the field. Everyone else was blamed, all the way to the
top. They listed as the causes of the hardships the lack of river
transport, the shortage of medical personnel, the lack of river hos-
pital ships, the omission of overland evacuation transport, and the in-
complete or totally absent medical establishment accompanying the 3rd
and 7th Divisions in their relief efforts. It was the shortage of
transport that was chiefly responsible. The facilities and stores at
the port of Basra were found to be complete for almost the entire campaign,
but above Basra the situation was completely different. They summed
up as follows:
As to the responsibility for this state of affalrs,we think
it was in great measure due to defects inherent in the
medical organisation in the Army in India. We also con-
sider that rigid economy which before the war was exer-
cised in respect of military expenditure in India, and
the spirit which this policy had engendered as to the
comparative merits of economy and efficiency, have con-
tributed materially to the breakdown.. .
The evidence also indicates that on various occa-
sions the medical arrangements might have been improved
by better organisation and co-ordination between the dif-
ferent services, and. for this defect the local officers
are responsible. We cannot, however, absolve the mili-
tary and medical authorities in India from responsibility
for many of these deficiencies.
We realise the serious character of such findings,
but in view of the fact that we are definitely required
to assign the responsibility for the breakdown it is
viously our duty to do so to the best of our ability.
Duff was not at all happy with the report. Vincent, Bingley and
Ridsdale looked deeply into the medical situation in Nesopotamia, they
detailed its shortcomings, and they gave their opinions on where the
iMeso Comm, Vincent-Bingley Report, CAB/l9/26, App. 1.
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responsibility lay. Duff did. not think so; '. . . the Comrnisssion -
have now departed from their terms of reference and embarked upon crit-
icisms of the preparations for the campaign which were outside their
purview.' 1 The fact was that the preparations (or lack of them) for
the campaign were the direct cause of the medical breakdown. hey
therefore were completely within their frame of reference. Duff fur-
ther complained that they had. reported on the actions of the Government
of India without interviewing any of the members of the Government.
Apparently, what they saw in Mesopotamia spoke volumes on the actions
of the Government • Duff informed Hardinge that the report could not
be published as it was of a 'nature calculated to encourage enemy and
to give him information of military value.' 2 Of the 180 paragraphs of
the report, he deemed 77 of them to be 'objectionabl' In reality,
they were objectionable not so much for their military value as for
their exposure of the gross mismanagement of the campaign. He grouped
these 77 paragraphs under four major headings; (1) those dealing with
operations not yet made public; (2) those showing lack of organisation;
(3) those complaining of lack of morale; and (11.) those condemning cer-
tain officers by name • He thought the first might be militarily im-
portant, the last three could be used by the enemy as propaganda to
disrupt the morale of the troops. In his listing of various subheadings
of objectionable material, it is easy to see how they could lower
morale, if they had not already done so. These included indefinite
Government policy, clues to British wastage, shortage of transport,
'Memo by Duff, 18 Jul 16, CAB/19/26, App. 2.
2Tel. no. M3O55, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 18 Jul 16, IO/L/MIL/
3/2508.
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sanitary difficulties, administrative defects, inadequacy of medical
arrangements, lack of Staff capability, lack of capability of certain
officers, disorganisation of rearward services, criticism of higher ad-
ministration and various other failures. 1
 As can be seen from this
list, it is not surprising that Duff did not want the report published.
Not only might it aid the enemy, it would also show how poorly India
had managed things. He did, nevertheless, send it to Chamberlain and
Robertson along with his recommendations for its editing or suppression.
In none of these messages did he deny any of the allegations.
Even before the Vincent-Bingley Report was submitted, however, there
were moves in London to open a full investigation. 'he revelation of
the medical breakdown was followed closely by the growing desperation
of the Kut siege. Robertson saw the relief of the 6th Division as the
best way to calm the outcry for an enquiry. 'If Townshend is success-
fully extricated I dare say we shall hear no more of the necessity for
a Commission. It is hoped that we shall not in any case. These Corn-
missions seldom do any good and always do some harm.' 2
 However, Kut
fell, and. the letters to Members of Parliament still spoke of terrible
conditions • In Nay, Asquith responded to requests for information
about the campaign. On the 11th he announced the release of papers
concerning Townshend's objections to the advance. Pressure remained
high for the release of more documents, especially those concerning the
medical situation. Sir H. Dalziel (Kircaldy Burghs,L) stated on 1 June
'that we are not putting forward an unreasonable demand in asking that
rel. no. M3O554., Hardinge to Chamberlain, 18 Jul 16, IO/L/MIL/
3/2508.
2Letter, Robertson to Chamberlain, 6 Mar 16, Robertson papers,
1/35/1k.
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we should have an opportunity of discussing a matter of so much miii-
tary and public interest.' 1 Bonar Law responded that 'the Government
have come to the conclusion that it is better, on the whole, that the
Papers should be published, and that the House of Commons should be
given information.' 2
 He added, however, that the release was condi-
tiona]. nothing could be produced that was too confidential or gave
information to the enemy.
The release of the papers was agreed in theory, but the Govern-
ment still did not make them available. y mid-June Members of Parlia-
ment were pressing for them. Lord Middleton, on 21 June, requested
that the papers concerning the entire campaign, especially the Baghdad
offensive, be made available. He asked for their release because 'some
of those responsible for the provision of troops have not yet risen to
the full measure of their responsibility, nd it wa} highly desirable
that there should be a full enquiry upon this question at the earliest
possible moment.'3
In late June, the Cabinet debated the release of the Nesopotamia
papers • The Admimlty and Foreign Offices were not opposed to their
publication, but the War Office strongly protested. Robertson marked
those papers he thought 'most objectionable to publish at this time',
but stated that even those remaining could be used by 'an astute enemy,
reading between the lines.' The Imperial General Staff recommended
that they be withheld	 The Cabinet had to consider at the same time
'Hansard, vol. LXXXII, 1 Jun 16, p. 2973.
2lbid., p. 2977.
3Debate on the release of the Mesopotamia.papers,CID, CAB/k2/l6/Z1..
4lbid.
211
the release of the papers concerning the Dardanelles campaign, to which
the General Staff equally objected. The Cabinet thought that the pub-
lication could have serious d.isad.vantages it might prejudice the suc-
cess of the Mesopotamian campaign; it would 'throw a flood of light'
upon Allied Middle East policy; it would reflect the actions of Allied
Intelligence; the enemy would learn what were considered to be his
weaknesses; the enemy would gain a good amount of tactical knowledge;
and it would reassure the Turks that the Dardanelles were safe from re-
newe attack.' Chamberlain in mid-July told the Cabinet that he did
not object to the partial release of the papers that Bonar law had men-
tioned to the House, but that he was afraid that without the entire
story inaccurate conclusions would be drawn. Asquith decided, with the
support of the Cabinet, to announce that the papers could not be re-
leased, that the conditions Bonar Law had mentioned in May had. to be
invoked owing to Army Council objections.2
This satisfied no one in Parliament. The Cabinet had to decide then
if the political advantage of releasing the papers wotild outweigh mili-
tary disadvantages. Asquith went to Parliament on 18 July with his ob- -
jections to publication, but suggested a debate on the 20th to resolve
the matter. 3
 He reiterated at the outset of the debate the military
disadvantages. He did not, however, wish to create dissension in Par-
liament. 'I should deprecate, on behalf of the Government, a Debate
which gave the impression to the world outside that we are in any way
'Debate on release of the Mesopotamia papers, CII), CAB/42/l6/L..
2War Committee meeting, 11 Jul 16, CAB/Ll2/16/5.
3Hansard, vol. LXXXIV, 18 Jul 16, pp. 850-55.
212
divided among ourselves.' 1 The Cabinet had settled on a compromise
between outright publication and total withholding of the papers. As-
quith announced that two separate enquiries, one for Mesopotamia and
one for Gallipoli, would be instituted. This was not a popular coinpro-
mise with many Government ministers. Sir &lward Grey and Sir Maurice
Hankey, Secretary to the War Committee, thought the Government would
have been wiser to resign. 2 Hankey later commented that all the Of-
fices connected with the Mesopotamia campaign 'would be diverted from
their paramount task of winning the war to raking over the ashes of
the dead past . . . and a].1 the risks to be run at a time when the na-
tion and the Empire were fighting for their very existence.' 3 Never-
theless, something had to be done. As Attorney-General Sir Frederick
Smith told Parliament at the outset of the debate on the Report, 'at
the then state of public opinion there was no other Immediately avail-
able form of enquiry which could have been used for the purpose of
quieting public opinion, and bringing, if possible, solace to those
who suffered, or confirmation of the wrongs under which they were la-
bouring.'4
The question Immediately arose concerning the composition of the
enquiring bodies. Asquith suggested a Commission of men from both
Houses of Parliament and from the public sectc,r. Sir H. Daiziel ob-
jecteds 'After all, this House is responsible to the country and need
not go to outside gentlemen, who represent no constituents at all.'5
Hansard, vol. LXXXIV, 20 Jul16, p. 1236,
2Goold, pp. 941l45.
3ffanicey, p. 521.	 -
4Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, pp. 2154-55.
5Hansard , vol. LXXXIV, 20 Jul 16, p. 1245.
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He suggested a committee from the House of Commons alone. Asquith was
accommodating. The Government submitted the Commission Bill on 2s .
 July,
basing it on a motion worded by Sir E. Carson (Dublin Univ., c). It
was found.ed on precedents set by the Special Commissions Acts of 1885
and 1888, aM the Metropolitan Police Commission of 1886.1
Parliament discussed mainly the Commission's composition. On 26
July the Government suggested the names of Lord George Hamilton as
Chairman, along with Lord Hugh Cecil, the Br1 of Donoughmore, Sir Arch-
ib.1d Williamson and John Hodge. 2 Dalziel objected to Hamilton as Chair-
man on the ground that he, being on a Government pension, would be biased
in favour of the Government. Asquith and other Members sufficiently
established Hamilton's credentials and impartiality to retain his nom-
ination. Others suggested the addition of both naval and military rep-
resentatives for ready expert advice. 3 Asqiith responded 'that the
naval and military experts should give their evidence as witnesses to
a body which has neither a naval or military element in its coinposi-
tion.	 This, however, was overridden by Parliament and representa-
tives of both services were included. The final debate on the exact
wording of the Bill took place on 1 August when it was given its third
reading. 5 Throughout the debate, there was little, if any, disagree-
ment on the idea of a Commission from anyone in any party.
On 1 August Parliament passed the 'Special Commissions (DardaneUes
1Hansard, vol. LXXXIV, 20 Jul 16, p. 1359.
2lbid, 26 Jul 16, p. 1706.
3Thid., p. 1707ff.
Ibid., p. 1725.
rext of the Bill In App. 1.
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and Mesopotamia) Act, 1916', formally creating the two Commissions.
Royal Assent was given on the 17th. The members of the Mesopotamia
Commission held. an informal meeting at the Local Government Board on
10 August. Here it was decided to hold the first hearing on the 21st.
On that day, the Commission sat at Committee Room 4 at the House of
Lords, with Lord George Hamilton, a former Secretary of State for In-
dia, as Chairman. The members were the Earl of Donoughmore, General
Sir Neville Lyttelton, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Lord Hugh Cecil,
Sir Archibald Williamson, John Hodge and Commander Josiah Wedgwood.1
The Commission was appointed
for the purpose of enquiring into the origin, inception, and
conduct of operations of war in Mesopatamia, including the
supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment
to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and.
woinded, and the responsibility of those departments of
Government whose duty it has been to dminister to the wants
of the forces in that theatre of war.
The major topics explored by the Commission will be discussed in the
same order as was called for in their appointment. They will be cov-
ered under the headings of (1) iiception and. conduct of the campaign,
(2) the state of the port facilities, (3) rIver transport, (4) the med-
ical situation, and (5) the Indian Gomrnment actions and responsibil-
ities.
'The Earl of Donoughmore had been Undersecretary of State for War,
1903-05, and Chairman of Committees, House of Lords, 1911; Gen. Lyttelton
had been CIGS from 1904-08 and 'IOC of forces in Ireland, 1908-12; Adm.
Bridge retired in 1904, but presided at the North Sea Enquiry Commission
in 1904; Lord Hugh Cecil, MP(U) Oxford University since 1910; Sir Archi-
bald Williamson, Mp(L) Elgin and Nairn since 1906; John Hedge was Acting
Chairman of the Iabou Party in Commons in 1915; Commander W&gwood, MP(L)
Newcastle-under-Lyine since 1906, had recently returned from serving in
action at the Dardanelles.
2Special Commissions Act, 17 Aug 16, CAB/19/9.
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Inception and Conduct of the Campaign
Prior to the First World War, Great Britain had extensive inter-
ests in the Persian Gulf area • She had. defence and lxrade agreements
with most of the local sheikhs and, as war neared, she grew increasingly
iiterested in the area because of the Baghdad Railway and the Anglo-
Persian Oil aompany. All of these trade interests were without support
in the form of any contingency plans for military action to protect
British interests. In May 1911, the General Staff delivered a paper
to the Committee for Imperial Defence in response to a request from the
Foreign Office. The General Staff considered that the limit of British
military intervention could be support; for the Sheikh of ICoweit by the
landing of a small force in that district should Turkey act provocatively.
They did, however, see serious drawbacks to such action. If any force
was to land in Turkish territory (and Koweit was nominally under Turk-
ish suzerainty) then it could have a two-fold effect. First, it could
provdke a Turkish military response in another area, such as the Egyp-
tianfrontier. Second, it could arouse Moslem sentiment against Britain
if the landing was not undertaken in certain conditionss the only proper
instance would be in response to an appeal from the Sheikh of Koweit to
intervene against Turkish military action. This might influence the
neighbouring tribes to bring their active cooperation against the Turks,
who were not popular masters. Should a force have to be committed, the
General Staff assumed that the Indian Army would perform the task, and
it would be a relatively easy one, as few Turkish troops were in the
area. A small British force could easily maintan itself with naval
support. This action should only be taken to bring political pressure
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to bear, not to provoke hostilities. 'Such operations would not meet
the contingency of a war with Turkey, and it is not proposed thatrin
the event of war the British line of advance should ascend the valley
of the Euphrates.'1
In response to this paper, General Sir O'Moore Creagh, Coxrnnander-
in-Chief in India from 1909 to 1914, commented that he considered the
Persian Gulf as a likely theatre of operations, but the Indian Army was
unable to intervene. 'I pointed out that the despatch of even a small
force owing to our numbers and considering the other duties of the
army, might be attended with great difficulty. I pointed out that our
deficiencies in medical and transport personnel were very serious.'2
General Sir Douglas Haig, Chief of the Indian General Staff at this
time, agreed with Creagh's prediction that the Turks might pose a seri-
ous threat in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Army was ill-prepared to
meet them. HarcU.nge refused to give credence to these warnings. 'In
his indignant reply o Hai Hardirie was confident that there was no
possibility of anything beyond verj minor operations being carried out
by India outside her frontiers against a major power.' 3 Hardinge re-
fused to look past the frontiers of India, and Duff, who became Commander-
in-Chief in March 1914, looked little further, and with reason. He
claimed that the Indian responsibility for military action extended no
further than the Persian Gulf; anything up-river of Basra was War Of-
fice responsibility 'and India was not allowed to collect intelligence
or formulate plans thereon. I received no plans of operations from
1Report of the Imperial General Staff, 1 May 11, CI]) paper ].04-D,
CAB/38/17/25.




Thus, when war broke out in August l91L., India was not prepared
to do anything other than defend. herself from local uprisings. India
did, however, despatch the cream of her troops to fight in France. This
has always been believed to have been in fulfilment of demands by the
War Office, but this has lately been questioned. Goold states that Har-
dinge 'showered Crewe with a stream of strongly worded telegrams arid
letters, in which he argued that India would. remain loyal, and would
contribute generously to the war effort if some of her troops were sent
to the Western Front.' 2 Duff's continent was 'I think you may say the
Indian Government willingly agreed to 'A' he force sent to Franj).'3
The War Office also directed India to send expeditions to British Fst
Africa and German East Africa. Thus, by early October, when the Persian
Gulf expedition was being planned, India had no desire to part with
any more troops. She did despatch Force 'D' on London's orders, but,
unlike Forces 'A', 'B' and 'C' the War Office did not control Force 'D',
although they ordered its formation.
The leading elements of Force 'D' were sent with sealed, written
orders. No discussion of the campaign, its conduct or objectives, was
undertaken between Duff and the General Officer Commanding. This is
the first hint that Indian interest in the campaign's conduct was not
to be close. Duff stated 'we were simply sending an organised division
and everything had long been laid down as to what it would require or
what was assumed it would require. Everything of that sort was cut
14eso Coinin, Maurice, 3 Oct 16, no. 52116.
2Goold, p. 9211.
3Meso Coinm, Duff, 5 Dec 16, no. lli.921.
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and dried." This describes India's attitude toward Force 'D'i every-
thing that was sent to it was strictly laid down by regulation; no in-
vestigation was done into the special conditions that would prevail in
Mesopotamia or what special Items had to be provided for the care of
the troops.
Once Force'D' was desiatched, India was loathe to part with any
more men. Hardinge and Duff were convinced that they had been robbed
of sufficient troops to defend India properly after their early gener-
osity. Thus came about the arguments between Hardinge and Crewe (then
Chamberlain) as to the supply of drafts and reinforcements from England
rather than India • This desperation to keep troops in India reached
its peak just prior to the Baghdad advance, when Duff advised Hardinge
that London 'will send us the required force if we hold out, but they
will give us nothing if the least sign of willingness to find reinforce-
ments is shown by us, and we shall have to do it all by ourselves.'2
The London authorities were naturally displeased with India's recalci-
trance. Kitchener told Duff that losing India was preferable to losing
England. England could survive without India, 'whereas If we were fi-
nally beaten on the Continent of Europe, the Empire, including India,
would be done for.' 3
 Duff responded to the Commission saying 'I should
have required that from another
	 . . . . If I had received that
from the India Office I would have given anything they liked. But I was
sent out there to defend India,not to lose it. ' Hardinge agreed with
'Meso Conun, Duff, 12 Dec 16, no. 15686.
2Neso Coinin, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15298.
3Meso Conim, Crewe, 1k Sep 16, no. 31311..
Zl•Meso Coinm, Duff, 5 Dec 16, nos. 111.980-81.
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Duff's position. He wrote to Crewe that '"India has done her duty to
the Empire" and he spoke of " our generosity to His Majesty's Government."'
The Commission thought this 'was not the attitude of an Englishman but
of an Indian Rajah.'1
Nevertheless, the Indian authorities did have some basis for Con-
cern. Hardinge testified that during 1915 there were seven native at-
tacks on the Northwest Frontier, five of them being 'most serious.'
'Our troops were at the moment absolutely weaker than they had ever
been before or will ever be again, I trust.' 2
 India Office Military
Secretary Barrow supported this in a June 1915 memorandum pointing out
that overseas expeditions had virtually denuded India of a defensive
force. India despatched overseas six and one-third divisions of the
nine it had mobilised by the end of 1915, leaving almost three divi-
sions plus thirty-three volunteer battalions to defend the country. Yet
the Commission learned that Indian authorities apparently did not press
for more troops as strongly as they might have done. Duff, when accused
of doing less for England than Turkey had done for Germany, answered
'I suppose that Turkey takes men by compulsion. I could easily get men
if you gave me the power to introduce compulsion but I never had it.'3
He admitted soon thereafter that he had never asked for it, except to
provide menial labour. The Government 'opened recruiting in India to
a very large extent' but were unable to provide anything more than a
volunteer machine-gun company. 4
 Barrow stated that the white male
'Meso Comm, Duff, 5 Dec 16, no. 14982.
2Meso Cornin, Hardinge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16533.
3Meso Comm, Duff, 5 Dec 16, no. 14679.
4Meso Coinm, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, no. 141.
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population of India (as of the 1911 census) was 113,974, not including
British troops. He further told the Commission that in February 1915,
Indian volunteer forces, urunobilised, numbered 42,.5L1.3 .1 He said that
the thirty-three battalions of volunteers, which could be used for local
defensive purposes, 'have never been mobilised because that would in-
terfere with their vocations in civil life very much. 2
Barrow's memorandum of 7 June 1915 stated that 'at the present mo-
ment the military security of India rests on our well established mili-
tary prestige and trust placed in a just and paternal administration.'
The rest of the memorandum,however, gives the impression that military
strength in India was quite sufficient, and that 'prestige and trust'
were well supported by arms • He observed that the number of British
troops was in excess of the estimated requirements, and they were in a
stronger proportion vis--vis the Indian troops, and that internal de-
fence would be weakened if the troops for frontier operations had to
be mobilised, a situation he thought would come about only in the case
of an Afghan invasion or a very large native urising. The worst part
of the situation was that India was having difficulty maintaining her
armies overseas. 3 When India sent troops to Fiance, she agreed to pay
the army's ordinary expenses while there, even though France was out-
side India's areas of interest (Fqgypt, PeTsia and the Gulf, Afghani-
stan, Central Asia arid Siam, .st Africa according to the Conunission
of the Administration of the Expenditure 01' India in 190o). The Home
1Neso Comm, Barrow, 21 Aug 16, no. 169.
2lbid., no. 135.
3Minute by Barrow, 7 Jun 15, I0/L/MIL/5/751.
B.R.Tom1inson,	 Political Economy of the 	 i91L_, (London,
1979), p. 108.
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Government normally paid the full expenses of the Indian Army when used
outside these areas of interest, and. any extraordinary expenses of the
Army when fighting elsewhere. India was obliged to pay only the normal
maintenance' expenses of her Army during wartime, arid only do so within
her areas of interest • India was therefore paying for all her armies
in the field, wheii Force 'A', at least, should have been totally kept
by the British Government . Britain did, however pay an increasing
amount of extraordinary expenses as the war progressed; her outlay al-
most doubled in the second year of the war when India's expenses only
went up some ten per cent.2
Still, as Barrow's minute shows, the military situation in India was
not as deficient as it was claimed to be, and could easily have been
stronger, considering the manpower available. Therefore, with a more
judicious use of the resources of Indian personnel, they could have
provided a sufficient force to meet the requirements of Force 'D', es-
pecially in the case of Townshend's advance on Baghdad. Hardinge told
the Commission that 'we had not received a single draft to any of those
British regiments, not one since the beginning of the war.' 3 This not
only forced Townshend. to operate with units that were seriously under-
strength, it also forced every fighting man in Mesopotamia to be at the
front continually, as there were no replacement units for periodic re-
lief. Never in France were troops forced to remain in the line for an
entire year. Thus, from the standpoint of personnel, India was negligent
romlinson, p. 108.
2Ibtd., p. 109.
3Meso Comm, Hardinge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16512.
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in doing all it could to provide sufficient troops for Force 'D'. More
men could have been sent to Mesopotamia, giving Townshend not only ade-
quate numbers to carry the day at Ctesiphon, but also to give Force 'D'
enough personnel for a rotation system for the troops.
The Port Facilities
Had India procured sufficient troops and made them available to
Mesopotamia, they would have been forced to undergo the same harships
as those already in the country. There can be little dispute that the
amount of supplies shipped from India was sufficient for the needs of
Force 'D' (at least until Gtesiphon), but it was impossible to distri-
bute them properly owing to the dearth of facilities at Basra and on
the Tigris. This makes the fate of the soldiers fighting in Mesopota-
mia particularly ironic. The supplies, comforts and medical stores
they desperately needed were, for the most part, in sufficient quanti-.
ties in the country, but they were all locked up in Basra • Before a
discussion of the river transport can be undertaken, it is important
to understand the state of affairs at Mesopotamia' s port of entry.
When Lieutenant-General Sir George MacMumi arrived on the Shatt-
al-Arab in early summer 1916 to assume the post of Inspector-General of
Communications, he wrote, 'As we entered the anchorage, a melancholy
sight appeared, twenty ocean steamers loaded with supplies and military
stores lay awaiting unloading and. had been so for a week, so devoid was
Basra øf wharfage, port labour or port craft 	 The official history
of the campaign states that Basra was the best available base, 'though
1MacMunn, pp. 207-08.
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it possessed many natural disadvantages' , not the least of which being
the extremely poor drainage of the town and. its environs • All ships
unloading at Basra had to move their cargo by lighter, because the only
available wharves were at Maqil, just up-river from Basra • Five wharves
had been built during 1915, but they were not extensively used owing to
the normally flooded conditions there, and because of their distance from
Basra. Captain W. B. Huddleston, the Principal Marine Transport Offi-
cer for Force 'D', testified that the average stay of a cargo steamer
at Basra was ten days owing to the lack of wharfage, lighters and. la-
bour.2 Sir Arnold Wilson 1, Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, later
wrote that some ships had. to wait in the river a month before they were
unloaded • The port was never improved as Nixon did not want to incur
the expense until it was absolutely necessary, and he considered the
functioning of the port, throughout 1915, as adequate for his needs.4
Not until the vast influx of troops in late 1915 and early 1916 did he
find, the port inadequate, but by then it was too late to Improve the
port in time to aid in Kut's relief.
Even when Nixon began to realise the difficulties that the condi-
tions in Basra were causing, he did. not act to remedy the situation.
Sir George Buchanan 'was sent by India to Basra in inid.-Deceinber 1915
with the title of Director-General of Port Administration and River
Conservancy. After years of managing the port of Rangoon, Buchanan was
1l4oberly, vol. 2, p. 189.
2Neso Comm, Huddleston, 31 Oct 16, nos. 9896 , 9900.
3Wilson, p. 113.
4Noberl3r, vol. 2, p. 189.
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recognised as being an expert in his profession. Nixon, however, re-
fused to employ him in this capacity, but rather directed him to sur-
vey the Euphrates River and Hainmar Lake for future civil works there.
Buchanan objected that he did not think India had despatched. him for
such menial duties, but Nixon would not relent. Nixon went as far as
to tell Buchanan 'lie did not understand
	
title of the appointment
as there was no port to administer.' The Commission pointed out to
Nixon 'that here is a condition of the port which you yourself describe
I think as unsatisfactory and that when the best assistance á.vailable
Is sent, instead of being availed of it is deliberately put aside.'1
Nixon explained to the Commission that he did not think it wise to
place a civilian in charge of a military operation as he would clash
with naval and marine personnel. He did not realise, he admitted when
the Commission pointed it out, that DirectorGenera]. was a military
title second only to Commander-in-Chief.
As poor as the port facilities of Basra were, they were sufficient
to amass, by late 1915, an adequate stock of the necessities for fight-
ing in Mesopotamia. As Duff told Hardinge in February 1916, everything
dealing with supplies and, medical stores was sufficient as far as Basra,
'wherever . . . we control matters directly.' This was perhaps an un-
conscious admission that beyond Basra their control was non-existent,
although their responsibility extended as far as the front lines. It
was, of course, the supply situation past Basra that became the chief
criticism of the campaign.
* * *
1Meso Coinm, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 12152.
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The River Transport
Sir George Buchanan's comment on first inspecting the base at Basra
was: 'I came to the conclusion that I had never before in my life seen
such a hopeless mess and muddle. 1 He must have made this comment prior
to any knowledge of the transport situation on the Tigris, ithere it was
far worse. He soon became aware of it, however, and his observation on
the supply problem was so simple and basic as to make one wonder why no
one else grasped it. He stated the problem as follows: '(a) the re-
quirements of the army at the front in tons per day, delivered where
required. . .; (b) the tonnage capaêity of the river fleet and number
of vessels available for all purposes; and if (a) exceeded (b) some-.
thing unpleasant was bound to happen.' 2 Unpleasant things did happen,
both strategically and on a more huinan level. David. Lloyd George later
wrote that it 'seems almost certain that, but for the shortage of river
transport, the Turkish Army would have been destroyed between Amara and
Ctesiion. '3 The same lack of river craft that kept Townshend from ex-
ploiting his victory at Kut in September 1915 forced him to wait six
weeks for ample supplies to be gathered before marching on, time which
was not'iiasted by the Turks in strengthening their Ctesij*ion position.
The equally slow concentration of forces severely handicapped the ef-
forts to relieve Kut. As MacMunn observed, 'It should be written in
letters of fire before every War Cabinet and before every General Staff.
He who wills the ends must will, the means. Z.
1Buchanan, p. 51.
p. 62.
3David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (London, 1933), vol. 2, p. 81Z1.
MacMunn, p. 219. - ______
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The amount of supplies that was actually being sent up-river is
open to debate, but all agree that it was too little. MacMum said
that in mid-1916 the British front lines were receiving 250 tons a day.1
Colonel F. C. Fulton, Director of Supply arid Transport until June 1916,
said that the basic ration supply for the troops on the Tigris amounted
to 3l5 tons, 'while I believe I am correct in stating that the total
average tonnage available for the conveyance of troops, S&T and ord-
nance supply, field park and te1egra1i stores, &c., worked out to very
little more than that required for feeding the force. 2 !blajor..General
Davison, Inspector-General from April 1915 to April 1916, told the Com-
mission that when the 6th and 12th Divisions were the only forces in
Mesopotamia, the carrying capacity of the river fleet was 600 tons and
that that barely met the army's needs. By the time the other divisions
arrived, 'We required 12,000 tons but we actually received up to March
10th 1,760 tons. Obviously it was impossible to move this great force
to the front rapidly and to keep it properly supplied. '3 It should be
noted that by tiiis time, eight extra steamers had arrived from India
and Egypt, but the needs of the front-line troops were still far from
being met.
Before exploring the attempts to increase the river fleet during
1915, it is important to point out that the only really viable method of
transport available was by river. The trip from Basra to Amara was
three and a half days by steamer, plus another day to Au Gharbi • The
same distances overland were covered by marches of ten and fourteen days
-	 1MacMuxin, p. 265.
2Meso Coinm, Fulton, 5 Dec 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, Davison, 28 Nov 16, statement.
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respectively, and there was no railroad or motor transport during that
time. There was no road as such, and the land along the river was sub-
ject to flooding and the tributaries of the Tigris were, at best, only
crudely bridged.1 Further, since it was virtually impossible to carry
out operations except near the river, owing to the lack of potable water
elsewhere, the Tigris served as the handiest line of communication, even
with its meandering course and difficult currents.
From the very beginning of the oarnign it was not unknown to the
commander of Force 'D' that dependence on the river was a difficult
task. Commander A. Hamilton of the Royal Indian Marine was with Bar-
rett from the start, and he had been with a arty that had surveyed the
Basra-to-Baghdad river route in 1905-07. He told Barrett,when Basra
fell in November 19111, just what type of ships were necessary to meet
the special conditions of the Tigris, and recommended that he order
twelve such craft. As was the case with Buchanan, expert knowledge was
ignored. When extra steamers were ordered, Hamilton testified that they
'were not really suitable, but we managed fir1y well with them.' He
further told the Commission that it 'would have been easy for me to have
ordered any number of vessels at the outset had anyone known what the
extent of the operations and the ultimate force would be. They were
evidently not wanted; moreover, the attitude was one of cautious econ-
omy.' (This was not the last time that lack of official policy and
frugal economy would be censured.) Hamilton summed up the entire river
transport trouble in one line * '. . . unless it had been foreseen on
the day Basra fell what the extent of the campaign was to be, no
1'1ober1y, vol. 2, p. 190.
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subsequent effort would have averted the trouble that has been experi-
enced, owing to the time required to produce such a river fleet.'1
Nixon testifièd that he never stopped asking for ships from the
first month he arrived in Mesopotamia, and that his requests followed
those of Barrett, which were despatched on L. January, 1, 17 and 26 Feb-
ruary 1915 . By late May, at the time of the advance on Amara, Nixon
informed India that the fleet at his disposal, seven dd1ers and four
tugs, were of too deep a draught to operate on the Tigris while it was
in its low stage.2
 This is an important point that never seemed to be
fully considered in India. At its lowest stage, the Tigris can only
be navigated by a craft drawing no more than three and a half feet. Bar-
rett and Nixon both de this clear, and even recommended the use of
ships then employed on the Irrawaddy in Burma • Such boats were avail-
able, but 'no one was man enough to commandeer them in any numbers.'3
Rather, the Indian Government pressed the India Office for help; they
said that they thought the rental fee asked for available boats in In-
dia was excessive, and they entered into negotiation with the various
Indian cGmpanies rather than commandeer them outright . The India Of-
fice replied that the Admiralty would provide twelve gunboats if they
could be erected at Abadan and fitted out for operations in Basra.5
Although the gunboats were necessary for military operations, they were
hardly sufficient to aid the transport line.
'Meso Comm, Hamilton, 26 Oct 16, statemint.
2Meso Comm. Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 12018.
3MacMunn, p. 233.
Tel. no. M14709, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 28 Apr 15, IO/L/MIL//
2508.
re1. no. M15664, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 6 May 15, I0/L/MIL/3/2508.
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when the India Office finally agreed to provide the ships, it
proved to be an arduous undertaking. After Nasiriyah fell and Nixon
began to look ahead toward Kut, he asked again, in late July, for more
ships. The India Office answered that such ships as he required were
not procurable and had to be built • Nixon asked that six paddle-steam-
ers, three stern-wheelers, eight tugs and forty-three barges be built
in England to specifications given by Lynch Brothers, who operated the
pre-war river service and had offices in London. 1
 As lake commented,
the 'India Office had the telegram on the 2nd or 3rd August, and as far
as anybody in India knew, they gave the necessary orders. 2 However,
that was far from being true, as the orders became submerged in red
tape. First, the Director-General of Stores at the India Office passed
the request to the Admiralty, who in turn considered the order excessive
and asked that Nixon be referred to in order to confirm the proposed
number. Nixon's reply arrived on 17 September. On that date the In-
dia Office began negotiations with Lynch Brothers, who agreed to con-
tract for only half the required number of ships. By the time the
plans were drawn up and tenders submitted for the orders, it was 3 No-
vember before al]. the ships were contracted for. 3 The Viceroy was im-
mediately contacted and informed that the ships, ordered as far back as
7 July, could not be delivered until rch 1916 at the ear1iest. 1 This
report came In the midst of preparations for the advance on Baghdad, a
time when the need. for shipping was critical, yet it made absolutely
1Tel. nonumber, Hardinge to Chamberlain, Ii. Aug 15, Io/L/MIL/3/2.508.
2Neso Conun, Lake, 11 Jan 17, no. 18658.
3Meso Comm, Collier, 19 Oct 16, statement.
Te1. no. M375].2, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 3 Nov 15, IO/L/NIL/3/
2528.
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no change in the arrangements for the advance.
The following is an account of the number of ships ordered and de-
livered to Mesopotamia in 1915. On its arrival in November 19111, Force
'D' had no river transport at all, but quickly commandeered the three
Lynch Brothers steamers that the Turks had not removed or sunk. On 4
January Barrett requested seven steamers and one or two lighters; these
were delivered between 22 April and 19 May. On 17 February, Barrett
ordered four launches aid four tugs, which arrived in mid-May. Nixon
ordered six launches and six tugs on 27 May, but the Indian Government
told him that they were not obtainable. On 8 July he ordered six more
launches; five of them arrived in October, one in December. He made
further orders on 19 and 28 July, 2 September, 9 aM 211. October, none
of which arrived before February 1916.1 Davison testified that by July
1915 Force 'D' was employing four Lynch steamers, nine paddle-boats,
aid seven tugs. He noted that thls'flotilla, supplemented by nahe].as,
was barely adequate for the needs of two divisions • It was just enough
to provide for the minor movement of troops arid the conveyance of stores,
but not for big strategic moves.' 2 General Cowper 2 stated that by the
end of 1915, they were equipped with thirteen paddle-boats, three stern-
wheelers, nine tugs and three screw boats, the last of which were use-
less against the Tigris current.3
Thus, a fleet barely able to handle the absolute minimum of
1Meso Comm, 'History of the Supply of Biver Craft to Indian Expe-
ditionary Force 'D' for General Transport Purposes from the Commencement
of Operations up to June 1916', p. 9, Appendix unnumbered.
2Meso Comm, Davison, 28 Nov 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, statement of available river craft, App. 39d.
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operations on the Tigris was swamped by the influx.of two divisions
from France and one from India in the three months after Ctesiphon. To
make matters worse, those ships that had worked non-stop for months were
on the verge of collapse. Just as reinforcements began to arrive, Nixon
told Hardinge that more than half of his existing craft would have to
undergo major overhaul immediately, 'failing which they will have to be
scrapped.' 1
 He therefore needed,in addition to the orders he had placed
in July through October, seventeen paddle-steamers, twenty-four stern-
wheelers, eleven tugs, two launches, sixty-four barges and six oil bar-
ges. By 13 February 1916, Force 'D' had received only three paddle-
boats, two stern-wheelers, one snail up-river tug, two motor lighters,
sixteen barges and one oil barge. Lake told Robertson that the neces-
sity of keeping the new division supplied with food and ammunition • of-
ten made it quite impossible to despatch other auxiliary essentials
such as aircraft barges, bridging material, medical personnel and
,2
material.
Given the fact that the number of transport ships was too few, the
question arises as to who was responsible for their provision. Barrow
testified that theblame did not lie with the India Office because prior
to 20 August 1915 'no question had been raised about the shortage of
transport. . . . we did not regard it as our business. '3 Barrow stated
that he believed Nixon had not sufficiently considered the provisioning
of his force. Nixon naturally denied this. He stated that it was
Tel. no. N1452ll, Hardinge to Chamberlain, 17 Dec 15, I0/L/MIL/3/
2508.
2Tel. no. 30881i., Lake to Robertson, 13 Feb 16, FO/37l/2771/3088i..
3Meso Conim, Barrow, 21 Aug i6, floss 561-62.
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impossible riot to be aware of the transport situation because it was so
faulty. He in turn blamed India. 'It was the omission to supply more
river transport—a circumstance beyond our control--that entailed such
avoidable sufferings on the troops.' 1
 The Commission suggested in re-
turn that Nixon did not give the authorities sufficient advance warn-
ing of his transport needs and. thus they were unavailable for the op-
erations toward Baghdad in November 1915, when they were most sorely
needed. Nixon responded that he had. no idea how long it would take
for India to meet his requests, but his orders for shipping were for
the transport of sick and wounded rather than for the Baghdad advance,
of which he knew nothing in July.2
This leads to an important question, and one which Nixon failed
to answer as straightforwardly as he might have done • The Commission
asked him why, when he knew that the transport conditions were totaUy
inadequate to deal with an active force going into battle, did he ad-
vance on Baghdad? This is a point which most incriminates Nixon for
the cariage during and after Ctesiphon, and throughout the entire summer
camjaign of 1915. Since Crewe and Chamberlain had both urged a cau-
tious policy in Mesopotamia, 'a safe game', why did Nixon recommend ad-
vances time and again (Amara, Nasiriyah, Kut, Baghdad) when they not
only contradicted official policy, such as it was, but they also were
so poorly equipped? The troops had to exist on a minimum of provision
in climatic conditions that compounded the troubles Ffrce 'D' was fac-
ing. If Nixon was really concerned with the welfare of his troops, if
'Meso Comm, Nixon, 111. Nov 16, statement.
2Meso Comm, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 12039.
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the shortage of supplies was always on his mind (as he testified it
wa, then common sense as well as military doctrine and official policy
dictated that he should not advance without a functioning and secure
line of supply. Nixon's answer wass 'We bad these troops up there
and we were going on fighting.' 1
 This makes it quite difficult to
agree with Nixon's statement that he 'was no fire-eater.'
If Nixon's sole duty was to give battle, then such matters as b-
gistics should have been handled by another agency, and Nixon blamed
his lack of supply ships on the Royal Indian Marine and the Indian Gov-
ernment. He claimed 'It was the duty of India to ask and find out what
was required for the force and not to impose the intolerable burden on
me of having to continually fight to obtain a necessary supply.' 2 Thus,
it was the duty of the byal Indian Marine to deliver the shipping to
Mesopotamia, and Nixon found that their 'methods of supplying them are
criminally dilatory.' Major-General Gorringe supported Nixon on this.
He claimed that the Indian Marine personnel lacked the experience to
cope with the difficult conditions on the Tigris; yet they did not take
advantage of the 'experienced staff of the Indian river steamship lines,
who had the necessary experience in peace i the filure of the respon-
sible authorities to mobillse these resources of river experienced of-
ficials was, in my opinion, a fatal omission.' 3
 To make matters worse,
the Indian Marine officials in Mesopotainia who sent to India for craft
of certain specifications, could not be sure that their superiors in
1Meso Coinm, Nixon, 1k Nov 16, no. 11565.
statement.
3Meso Comm, Gorringe, 12 Sep 16, statement.
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India would. meet their requests. Nixon testified that after repeated
warnings that only paddle-steamers were capable of sailing against the
swift current of the Tigris, the R.I.M. authorities in India still at-
tempted to get the Mesopotamian supply force to accept screw-driven
ships, which proved too weak to operate on the river.1
As well as the Royal Indian Marine, Nixon also accused the author-
ities higher in the Government of not supporting him. He claimed his
demands for transport 'were treated in a perfmctory marmer', and that
'it was the duty of India in the first place to foresee and, furnish, and
in the second place to meet the demands for them when made front the
field.' To support this claim, Nixon quoted from the Field Service
Regulations, part 2, section 5, paragraph 2, which lays the responsi-
bility for supplying the requisite forces on the Government, and section
22, paragraphs 2 and 3, which defines the responsibility of the direc-
tors of the administrative forces. Therefore, Nixon averred, the blame
was not his. 'Every effort made by me to obtain river craft was thwarted
by higher authority, and my demands were played with.'2
Sir Beauchamp Duff was 'fully cognisant of the shortage,' 3 and said
that from the outset he attempted to ascertain the needs of the force.
To prove this he cited communication with Barrett . take testified that
when he became G.O.C., Duff told him to estimate the needs according to
the number of ships necessary to meet the conditions of 'rations,
1Meso Coma, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 122113.
2Meso Coma, Nixon, hi. Nov 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, Duff, 111. Dec 16, no. 15968.
1Ibid., no. 15950.
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hospital, equipments, and all that sort of thing." lake believed that
no one ever asked for Nixon to give such an estimate, because he had no
increase in his force. Surgeon-General J. G • MacNeese related that the
transport situation 'was frequently discussed at the Commander-in-Chief's
conferences, and the impression left in my mind was that the GOC Force
'D' was responsible for making the best use he could of aU transport
available in Mesopotamla,' and that he could apply for anything he
might require. 2
 Duff testified that 'we were spending our time trying
to get all we could.'3
It Is difficult to state with certainty how hard the Indian author-
ities tried to obtain river craft • General Cowper testified that the
civil companies in India were unwilling to cooperate with the Govern-
ment : He claimed 'civilian India did not recognise that we were at war.
They would not give way in the slightest.' It seems that the
Government also did not recognise the imminent danger. If India had
been placed on a war footing, why did the authorities not commandeer
what was necessary to meet the emergency? Did they, like Barrow with
the volunteer battalions, not want to 'interfere with their vocations
In civil life very much'? The evidence given by representatives of
various Indian companies implies that the Indian authorities rarely
approached them for help. F. Carter, of Turner, Morrison & Company,
a mercantile firm in Calcutta and. Bombay, testified that his company,
as well as others in Calcutta, could easily have constructed ships to
Meso Coinm, lake, II Jan 17, no. 18 75.
2Meso Comm, MacNeese, 12 Oct 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, Duff, lii. Dec 16, no. 15698.
Meso Comm, Cowper, 18 Jan 17, no. 1911.27.
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meet the needs of Force 'D' had they been asked. 'A plan for a motor
boat suitable for the rivers was nade and an estimate drawn up by us
which was placed before Government, but we were told that it was not
required and that Government were providing all necessaries of this de-
scription.' 1
 H. P. King, of Associated Brass and Copper Manufacturers
of Great Britain, who was the company' s agent in the Far East, told the
Commission that a large number of suitable river steamers were avail-
able in Hong Kong, plying the river north to mainland China • He informed
the India Office of this by letter and in person, and was at first suf-
ficiently encouraged to offer his services free of charge to negotiate
for the craft. He began enquiries at his own expense and was prepared
to carry through with the preparations, but he heard no more from the
India Office. King stated that he did all of this upon hearing 'Mr.
Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons that the India Office
had scoured the world for suitable vessls.'2
Sir Robert Carlyle, of the India Council, and chief of the Depart-
aent of Revenue, told the Commission that he 'never heard whether any
steps were taken . . • to get boats from India and use them in Mesopo-
tamla on the rivers.' 3 However, Lord Inchcape, of the P&O hipping lines
and the British India Company, stated that their workshops in Calcutta
were employed by the Indian Government in altering river craft and fit-
ting out hospital and, transport ships, and building barges. In the year
ending 3]. July 1916, the P&O dock in Bombay reported that they had done
'a great deal of work' fitting out river craft, transports and hospital
Meso Coinm, Carter, 28 Nov 1 , statement.
2Meso Comm, King, 28 Nov 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, Carlyle, 28 Sep 16, floe k672.
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ships, Further, the two companies had had a total of seventy-six.
steazi vessels, barges and launches impressed by the Government (thirty
of which were lost in transit). However, of those ships, only nine
barges had been impressed prior to December 1915.1
This is the most salient point, most of the ships impressed or
fitted out were done so only after Ctesiphon. This is best shown by a
statement to the Commission by A. Simpson, senior partner of a company
owning four navigation arid railway companies in India • He stated that
one. of his firms, India General, was approached in January 1915 for
the impressment of two steamers, but they were informed a month later
that the ships were to be procured elsewhere. He listed the number of
vessels and when they were commandeered from his companies, in March
1915, four steamers; in August, two steamers and one barge; in Septem-
ber, one steamer; in October, four steamers; in November one steamer.
However in December 1915, after having impressed a total of thirteen
vessels in nine months ('spending our time trying to get all we could'
as Duff testified), the Indian Government commandeered twenty-four
steamers and six barges •2 This point is further shown by the arrival
in Basra on 1 March 1916 of ten steamers after a l OOO mile voyage from
the upper Nile, 3 although in February of the previous year Sir Henry
McMahon, Chief Commissioner in Egypt, had offered two stern-wheelers.
River boats able to navigate the upper Nile would have been suitable
for the Tigris, but India did not press for any.
1Meso Coinm, Inchoape, 3 Jan 17, statement.
2Meso Comm, Simpson, 30 Nov 16, statement.
3Letter, McMahon to FO, 9 Jun 16, FO/371%2771/110971.
4Letter, McMahon to FO, 19 Feb 15, FO/371/211.82/19921$..
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The Medical Situation
In his memoirs, David Lloyd George stated that 'if the neglect by
the military authorities was directly responsible for the failure and
defeat of the expedition, their neglect of the medical equipment turned
disaster into horror.' 1 It was bad enough that the 6th Division had
been defeated before Baghdad and then was lost at Kut, but the condi-
tions of the sick and wounded made the dbc1e worse still. The short-
comings of the medical facilities were brought about not only by the
lack of transport for shipping medical supplies to the front, but also
by the shortage of medical personnel and equipment. The reports of
the Vincent-Bingley and Mesopotamia Conunissione showed 'that the expe-
dition was systematically starved by the Indian military authorities
in regard to every vital medical provision.' 2
 As Chamberlain wrote,
'the. conditions have been awful, arid quite inexcusably awful.'3
Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Director of Medical Services
in India, Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie, attempted to introduce
a plan for reorganising the Indian Army medical system, to bring its
personnel to full strength and provide them with better wages. The
Army was not prepared for overseas expeditions when the war siarted,
and volunteers for such forces were not numerous. Babtie reported that
the medical service in general was understaffed 'but for services out-
side India these deficiencies were increased in respect to the reserve
of civil subassistant surgeons of whom over 350 who would have been
available for military service inside India could not be compelled to
Lloyd George, vol. 2, p. 816.
2lbid., p. 817.
3Letter, Chamberlain to Balfour, 25 Feb 16, Balfour papers, Brit-
ish Museum, Vol. MV, no. L$9736.
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serve oversea', not even with the inducement of double pay. 1 Other
understaffed sections included the Army Bearer Corps and labour for
the medical units and Supply and Transport Corps, who again were not in-
clined to enlist for foreign duty. Thus, as each expedition was sent
overseas, the next expedition was left with a less experienced staff.
Sir Have].ock Charles, Medical Adviser to the Secretary of State for In-
dia, testified that India was asked 'to send the best that she had. got
to France, and she sent the best to France; she sent the second best to
Fgypt, . . . third best to East Africa, . . . then whatever remained,
the dregs ,to Mesopotamia. 2 When the 6th Division left for Mesopotamia
in late 191k, the following were mobilised s five field ambulances, for
500 patients; one clearing hospital, 200 patients; one stationary hos-
pital, 200 patients; two general hospitals, 850 beds; one X-ray sec-
tion; one medical stores depot; and seventy-one medical officers.3
These arrangements sufficed as long as wounded were few and not
too many soldiers succumbed to the appalling climate. As distances in
Mesopotamia are great, it was impossible for the hospitals to move very
often or very far, so the wounded had to travel quite far to be treated,
which was not too great a hardship provided that transport was avail-
able and medical officers were able to tend the wounded along the way.
When the wounded from Ctesiphon were evacuated, the most forward. hos-
pital was Anara, and many were taken as far as Basra, almost 500 miles
away. As pith the transport situation, London was equally ignorant of
these medical arrangeints. In late October 1915, Chamberlain announced
Meso Comm, Babtie, 13 Oct 1 , statement.
2Meso Comm, Charles, 28 Sep 16, no. L&825.
3Letter, Babtie to Maxwell, GOC Egypt, 12 Oct 1k, H]X/88/l/327.
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in Parliament that while he did not know the exact details of the sit-
uation, 'there is a well-equipped general hospital at Basra and other
hospitals have been established at various points in the sphere of op-
erations. . . . The Government of India are well aware of the inipor-
tance we attach to making the best arrangements possible. 1 Chamber-
lain could easily believe such to be the case, because since the war
began the India Office had only once been asked for medical supplies
The Indian authorities were not quite so confident. Hardinge wrote in
late November 1915, 'I am afraid our hospitals in Mesopotainia leave
much to be desired. . . . The great difficulty is to evacuate the
wounded from the front to the base which is so far distant, and which
can only be done by river, while river transport is very smafl. '3 Har-
dinge looked to the occupation of Baghdad as the answer to all the prob-
lems, as did most of the medical personnel of Force 'D'.
Hardinge's statement proves that the Indian Government was aware
-
of the difficulties in Mesopotamia before the advance on Baghdad, yet
Duff testified that it was Nixon's failure and that of those serving
under his orders to bring to notice defects in organisation which could
not be fully appreciated' by either London or Simla . Nixon responded
with the requests that he had made continually for shipping. The yin-
cent-Bingley Report stated that the 'demands of the force in regard to
personnel, particularly hospital staff, was frequently put before the
1Meso Comm, Questions 8cc. in Parliament, 27 Oct 15, CAB/19/8, Ap
pendix unnuinbred.
2Report to the Meso Comm on Stores, Section 1, CRW/M/15/3.
3Letter, Hardinge to Sir Via. lawrence, 25 Nov 15, HDG/103/2/1.5l7.
Meso Coram, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 12218.
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authorities in India from an early period in 1915. ' Additional offi-
cers were despatched in June 1915, but they did not meet the number
required by the Deputy-Director of Medical Services in Mesopotamia,
Surgeon-C eneral C • H. Hathaway. The reason more personnel were not sent
was explained by Babties 'I was unable to do more than was absolutely
necessar5r 1n Mesopotamia until the North-West Frontier and the internal
security columns had been arranged for. 2 The additional officers ar-
rived only after Nixon • represented that there would be a breakdown if
conditions were not improved.'3
In spite of Nixon's warning, the medical staff was able to func-
tion fairly well until Ctesiphon. Prior to that time, 'we were dealing
with small numbers, going short distances in fine weather, placing ser-
bus cases on stretchers and landing those unfit for travel further
down the Tigris at Aiiara. ' To operate thus, the medical services had
fitted out eight native ziahelas as hospital craft, each able to hold
about seventy-five patients. More craft were requested from India In
June, August and December 1915. The battle at Ctesiphon changed every-
thing. Basing their casualty estimates on the battle at Kut-al-Ainara,
In the previous September, the medical service estimated no more than
1,000 casualties. To evacuate these, two steamers were detailed, with
mattresses, blankets, operating rooms, extra cooking facilities, latrines,
and extra medical stores and rations. At the end of the day's fighting,
It became clear that this was not enough. Five more steamers plus
1Meso Conun, Hathaway, 10 Oct 16, statement.
2Meso Coinm, Babtie, 13 Oct 16, statement.
3Meso Comm, Hathaway, 10 Oct 16, statement.
Ibid.
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baiges were added to the evacuation fleet, each with medical personnel,
blankets, medical comforts and dressings • plus four days' rations • When
every ship and barge was filled to capacity, 800 wounded renined af-
ter 3,000 were evacuated. No one had been prepared. for such enormous
numbers of casualties, and the wounded, who had to stay on board the
overcrowded ships for at least a week,could only be tended by personnel
prepared to cope with a quarter their number for half that time. Many
were unable to move nor ever had a change of dressing, so the wounded
were forced to lie for days in their own excrement, exposed to heat dur-
ing the day, cold at night, frequent rain and constant Arab sniping.
One reason these conditions were so long in coming to the notice
of anyone outside Mesopotamia was owing to a telegram India received
on 7 December. Over Nixon's name was this messagei 'Wounded satisfac-
torily disposed of. Many likely to recover in country comfortably
placed in hospitals at Anara and Basra. . . . Medical arrangements un-
der circumstances of considerable difficulty worked splendidly.' 1
 It
should be noted that Nixon had fallen ill in the midst of the Ctesiphon
battle and had been evacuated on one of the overloaded steamers • Nixon
testified that 'to the best of my recollection' he did not draft such
a telegram. It was sent from the Adjutant-General's branch and Nixon
assumed that it had been sent with his name but without his knowledge.
'Telegrams were sent in my name about ordinary business without my know-
ing,
 it and, it must be so where there are so nany of them.' 2
 Soon after
this testimony, however, Nixon explained 'we did not intend to create
Barker, Neglected War, p. 137.
2Meso Comm, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 11929.
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any false impression; we did not know that it would be read out in the
House of Commons or anything of that sort. 1 Nixon said that he had
been impressed with 'the resource arid energy and sleepless toil of the
medical officers and their unceasing efforts to alleviate the suffer-
ing of the wounded in the enormous difficulty of this evacuation, arid
the outstanding fact that the wouMed had been brought down at all. 2
As stated earlier in regard to transport, if Nixon had been as
concerned with the medical shortages, especially as they overlapped with
the shipping problem, he could have easily called a halt to operations
until the defects were remedied. Such a decision would hardly have
been criticised by the Secretary of State, since he had urged caution
all along. The Commission asked Nixon why he did not make greater ef-
forts to bring outside attention to the problem. When making his ap-
preciation of the Mesopotamian situation on 30 August, he had. made no
mention of any difficulties. 'That was purely a military appreciation,'
he answered. 3
 It did, however, give the Genera]. Staff the impression
that his transport was sufficient • The Commission suggested that the
poor medical situation had not been fully considered. 'But surely af-
ter sending repeatedly for supplies that did. not come along you ought
to have lost your temper and used strong language, and. let them know
that the limit of your forbearance had been reached.' Nixon, too used
to the strict economy of pm-war India, could only reply 'I would have
Meso Comm, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, no. 1193&.
no. 11937.
3Meso Coinm, Nixon 1k Nov 16, no. 11891.
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used extremely violent language--If I had. thought that I should have
got something by it.'1
That Nixon did not try hard enough to meet the needs of his force
is hinted at above, but he finally admitted that he was not fully aware
of the problems. When offered ambulance boats and medical stores from
the Red Cross, he never replied to the offers. On the one hand he ex-
plained that his staff handled most of the telegrams and screened those
that reached him, yet on the other hand he testified that his Staff
told him everything • Why then did he decline the Red Cross offers?
'The report then to me n August l9l was that what they had got was
sufficient , This was some six weeks after he warned India about a
potential breakdown of his medical service. Nixon told the Commission
that if the medical service was short of supplies 1
 it was the duty of
the senior medical officer, Hathaway, to order it directly from India
without consulting him. Nixon theretore assumed that since Hathaway
made no complaints to him, then his requisitions were being niet.3
Nixon never read any telegrams from the Red Cross, and he heard no com-
plaints from his Staff, so he claimed Ignorance of the needs of the
medical service. It would. seem that until he was face to face with
the medical deficiencies, during the evacuation from Ctesiphon, Nixon
had little actual idea just how poorly equipped the medical branch was.
Nixon was justified In his criticisms of India, however. The In-
dian authorities seemed bent on proving that they could run the cainaign




and. were equally determined not to hint that they. might not be doing
everything possible. In August 1915 they refused an offer from the
Lord-Lieutenant of Hampshire to raise the money for medical supplies
and pers nn , just as they refused a Red Cross offer of motor launches
in December 1915, after the Ctes1i*on retreat. 1 Sir Robert Carlyle
testified that Duff wanted to establish a committee to provide comforts
for the troops in Mesopotamia, a splendid idea consid4ring that in a
country whose summer temperature reaches 120° aM above, only two ice
machines operated dependably, and they were both in Basra. 2 This com-
mittee was not formed, however, owing to an objection by Hardinge.
Carlyle stated 'I bayer could understand what the real ground was. .
What was said by the Viceroy was that everything that was necessary
could be suppliat by the military people. . . . it was not, I think,
for the Viceroy to interfere in a matter like this with the Commander-
in-Chief. '3 There was a similar lack of responsibility among other
members of the Government. Surgeon-General MacNeese almost resigned
his post as Director of Medical Services in India when he could not
persuade the Quartermaster-General to provide hospital ships for the
Tigris Duff intervened to resolve the situation, but this is an ex-
ample of why Hathaway remained desperate for hospital transport in
Mesopotamia even after the disaster at Ctesiphon brought the weakness
to light. It is easy to see why Lord Curzon was moved to comment 'I
1Uoyd George, vol. 2, p. 822.
2Meso Cou, Hathaway, 10 Oct 16, nos. 5810-16.
3Meso Comm, Carlyle, 28 Sep 16, floss 4609-16.
4Meso Comm, MacNeese, 12 Oct 16, statement.
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regret to say that a more shocking exposure of official blundering and
incompetence has not in my opinion been made, at any rate since the
Crimean War.'1
Indian Government Actions and Responsibilities
Fom the time of Kitchener's occupation of the post of Commander-
in-Chief, the control of the military section of the Government had
been virtuaUy consolidated In one post. Kitchener, in the years 1906-
1910, joined together the positions of Commander-In-Chief and Military
Member to the Council, creating a situation that united civilian and
military functions. It was as if, in Britain, the posts of C.I.G.S.
and the Secretary of State for War had been held by the same man. Thus,
the person appointed to the position of Commander-in-Chief Immediately
had. his work load, and responsibility doubled. Matters were further
complicated by the chain of command. As the Mesopotamia Commission
stated,
you have a military organisaton under the control of Ehe
Hom Government here and you have another big military or-
ganisation under the control of the Indian Government and
then you have the India Office with a Military Departmet
that cannot superintend a campaign but can give orders.
To muddle the situation even further, the decisions concerning the cam-
aign in Mesopotamia that emanated from India came from Hardinge and
Duff only; they consulted with no one as to the conduct of the cam-
aign.
The Coinmiss,on learned from rious members of the Council in In-
dia that nothing concerning Mesopotamia ever came under discussion.
1'Goold, p. 91i4.
2Meso Comm, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15197.
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Such silence was evident from the outset. Aylnier, then Adjutant-Gen-
eral In India, testified E1 remember perfectly well, when the Mesopo-
tamia Expedition started, it was not mentioned at those meetings at all
it was kept a dead. secret." Duff stated that it did not need to be
discussed. 'You will remember it began in a very small way. It was
quite a minor operation, like sending a company across the larrack square,
when it first began.' 2
 But even as the expedition expanded, it remained
a secret from the Council. Sir William Clark, Department of Commerce,
Industry and Railways,testified 'I have no recollection of the Council
having been consulted at any stage of the Mesopotamian operations, nor
do I remember that in the earlier stages, at any rate, we received any
information of any importance on the subject.' 3 Ay].mer stated that when
the decision to advance on Baghdad was made, it was mentioned only in
passing, and no discussion was elicited. Aylmer commented
It was my impression at the time that His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief did not like my giving my opinion.
It was not a true statement when it was given out in Par- -
liament that all the military authorities in india had
concurred in the advisability of the advance.
Sir Robert Carlyle agreed, but pointed out that under Section 8 of
the India Councils Act, the Viceroy, as Governor-General, had the power
to issue 'rules and orders for the more convenient transaction of busi-
ness In the Council.' As an extension of this power, Section 19, Part
V, gave him the power to decide if and when a case came before Council.
1l1eso Comm, Aylmer, 9 Jan 17, no. 17907.
2Meso Comm, Duff, 5 Dec 16, no. 14936.
3Meso Coinm, Clark, 23 Nov 16, statement.
4Meso Comm, Aylmer, 9 Jan 17, statement.
2118
'It will thus be' seen that the Governor-General did not transgress the
letter of the law by excluding the Council from participation in Meso-
potamian affairs." Hardingb used this as justification when he testi-
fied. He claimed that since the expedition took place outside India,
there was no obligation to consult the C*incil. After agreeing that
he and Duff managed the campaign alone, he explained that he had not
the time to consult the Council, a debatable reply. 'Most of the ques-
tions required very urgent replies he claimed. Carlyle testified
that this consolidation of power in the hands of the Viceroy was 'part
of a trend among previous holders of that position. Having served on
the Councils of two Viceroys, Carlyle stated that under Lords Minto
and Hardinge, there was little discussion, a change of practice from
the time of Lord Curzon. 3 Carlyle said. that on Hardinge's Council
'there is comparatively little collective responsibility.' The Council
was more than a mere formality, he said, 'but I think it has a good
deal diminished.'11
Thus, the prime responsibility for the decisions affecting the
Mesopotainia camign belong to Hardinge and Duff alone. Hardinge '
decision to act on his own, while perhaps not a wise one, was at least
his decision. Duff, however, owing to the organisation instituted by
Kitchener, was forced. to take on the increased duties of his position.5
3'Meso Coinm, Carlyle, 28 Sep 16, statement.
2Meso Comm, Hardinge, 19 Dec 16, no. 16890.
3Meso Comm, Carlyle, 28 Sep 16, floss L69k.-95.
11 Ibld., no. 11563.
5P. Mason, A Matter of Honour, (London, 19711), pp . 392-401, contain
an account of Kitchener' s reorganisation and its implementation.
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The consolidation of work in one place nay have made for greater effi-
ciency in Kitchener's time, but Kitchener was suited to the position
and, he held, it in peacetime. When war came, and duties increased there-
by, the combined workload became too much for one nan. Chamberlain
wrote
My present opinion is . . . that the Indian system is wrong
because it concentrates in one nan the functions of the Sec-
retary of State for War, Chief of the General Staff & CInC.
of the forces & that an Archangel couldn't o the work--
even it he were better supplied with staff.
Barrow supported this attitude.
One man is doing what was the work of about five • At the
time I recollect there was a Commander-in-Chief, four Ar-
my Commanders or six, and there was the Military Member.
questions were dealt with by those six persons and their
respective epartments and Staff and they are all concen-
trated now.
Duff was not the man to handle all the responsibility. 'He was a desk
soldier who was temperamentally incapable of devolving his work; his
problems piled up on his shoulders and. were altogether too much for one
man, however	 . '3 The Military Member was responsible for 'provi-
sions of stores and supplies which affected the state of preparation of
the Army but are not primarily involved in the policy concerning its
employment. In this matter, the Commander-in-Chief is solely respon-
sible for advice to the Council.' 4
 Thus Duff was forced to take respon-
sibility for military policy, administration, command and efficiency.
Perhaps as an attempt to alleviate some of the pressures thrust
'Letter, Chamberlain to Curzon, 3]. Mar 16, IO/L/JR.MSS./F1l2.l63.
2Meao Comm, Barrow, 22 Aug 16, no. 1043.
3A. .Rnbold, Watershed j India, l9l ZI922, (London, 1979), p' 25.
Memo by Hamilton Gordon, in letter, Haig to Asquith, 111 Sep 16,
Bodleian Library, Oxford, Asquith MSS/II/30.
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upon him when he accepted the post of Commander-in-Chief in early 1914,
Duff whole-heartedly embraced the ilosophy of economy that had been
practised in India in the years prior to the war. A policy of retrench-
inent, after the reorganisations instituted by Kitchener, was directed
by the India Office, and a study of Indian Government finances (the
Nicholson Commission in 1913) agreed with this policy. The recommen-
dations of this study, sent to India on 20 March 1914, directed the
Indian military establishment not to spend any money on preparations
for possible overseas expeditions. Alternative mobilisat ion schemes
should be prepwred for any such measures, but no finances should be
allocated. Duff told the Commission that India was 'to contemplate
what we could do with regard to sending troops abroadi but we were to
spend no money. I think the point at present is rather one of expen-.
diture on equipment.' 1 As the Commission pointed out, 'just about the
time of this economy campaign the equipment of the Indian troops was
improving and becoming more expensive.' 2 The India Office sanctioned
this cut in expenditure at this key time of Indian improvement because
'the Government of India had never inteided or been expected by London
to prepare an army to meet a European power, particularly one operating
outside its own frontiers. '3 Mason writes in his work on the Indian
Army that because the Indian peasantry was so poor, it 'was the policy
of the Government to tax him as lightly as possible and....it followed
that to be careful with military resources was right for India; it was




from Britain that a more generous foresight should have come.'1
This was further explained by J. B. Brunyate, Military Finance
Secretary from 1907-12 and Government Financial Secretary since 1913.
'The formulation of new schemes was not encouraged, and the Financial
Department fully availed itself of that right of preliminary criticism
which sometimes tests the belief of the military authority in its own
projects. 2 This 'right of preliminary criticism' became the bane of
aU military men attempting to procure even the smallest items. Aylmer
testified of his tenure as Adjutant-Genera]. that the primary difficulty
in procuring anything for the military was 'the terrorism created by
the Finance Department.' He described the result of this terrorism'
thuss 'There is excess of criticism even in minute points. Trying to
get anything through at atmia is like a man trying to struggle through
quicksand or bog. He becomes exhausted by opposition on all sides and
sinks.' 3 This atmosphere of strict economy created an attitude in all
branches of the military that to ask for anything new was a waste of
time, and. the result was that all ranks did the best they could to sub-
sist on what little was issued to them. The Vincent-Bingley Report
summed up this attitudes (a) there is more merit in silence than in
requests; (b) economy is more important than efficiency; (c) nothing
new could be introduced, without an equal saving elsewhere; and (d) even
with the smallest request, one could expect it to be halved. The Re-
port commented that 'a system of this natur will possibly be good and
1lqason, pp. 11.l0ll.
2Meso Comm, Brunyate, 17 Oct 16, statement.
3Maso Comm, Aylrner, 9 Jan 17, statement.
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economical in peacetime but it is bound to break down in war. 1
When the war came, the system employed was so ingrained in Indian
personnel that it did not sufficiently adapt to wartime necessities.
Duff testified that even when Hardinge, on his visit to Mesopotamia in
March 1915, offered the medical authorities there all the supplies they
needed, they 'were slack in asking' for necessities 	 Just as the
troops were unused to making requests, so the Government departments
were unused to fulfilling them. Aylmer claimed that although he had
to submit ten times as many requisitions for the armies in action, the
governmental machinery made no allowances. 'In my opinion a clear con-
ception of what this war really meant did not exist in Siinla. Through-
out the autumn of 191k it was an axiom that the war must come to an
end before April 1915, and the Budget for 1915-1916 was to be a normal
one." Brunyate of the Finance Department confirmed this. He quoted
the military expenditure ass:.. 1913-1k, £21,266,000; 1911&_l5, £21,810,000;
1915-16, £23,216,000, a mere £1. 11. million increase in order to help keep
four expeditions in the field and maintain an interior defence. ,k
testified that he personally suppressed many of Aylmer' s proposals for
Army improvement, and he defended the Finance Department's critical
process. 'That has always been the system. There has been much less
referring back since the war has been going on, but it was the old cus-
torn. . . . It is very often the fault of the Branch concerned in putting
1Meso Cornm, Babtie, 13 Oct 16, no. 7469.
2MeSo Corth, Duff, 5 Dec 16, no. 111592.
'Meso Comrn, Aylmer, 9 Jan 17, statement; Mason claims that this was
at the direction of the Home Government, Mason, p. Llll(fn.).
Z1Meso Comm, Brunyate, 17 Oct 16, statement.
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forward their demands badly.'1
Thus, the unnecessary attention to detail within the Governmental
bureaucracy, the lack of sympathy within the system for the needs of
an army at war, and the prevalent attitude in the army that it was imu'
possible to get necessary supplies and equipment made a bad situation
worse in Mesopotamia. Soldiers brought up in such an atmosere must
have become inured to privation, and that may account for their out-
standing fighting ability in the most difficult circumstances • It may
also account for their use of a bare minimum of transport, since they
must have assumed that the Government had again turned a deaf ear to
their pleas, as had happened so often in the past. Although Brunyate
testified that 'there was no policy of refusing anything that there
was no reason to regard as a prime military necessity' ,2 testimony from
both Government officials and field officers showed that everyone out-
side the department believed otherwise.
Although the 'system' can be blamed for creating an atmosere In
which poorly equipped armies had to struggle against both the enemy In
front and the Government behind, it is those who refused to circumvent
the system In order to meet dire necessities who must accept responsi-
bility for the failures in Mesopotamia. In India, Hardinge and Duff,
who controlled the policy and the conduct of the campaign, were the
most culpable. One must agree with Goold's criticisms of Hardinge. He
saw the campaign in Mesopotamia as the one bright spot In the entire
war. It was th only really successful campaign in the first year of
'Meso Gontm, Duff, 5 Dec 16, nos. 14603-04.
2Meso Comm, Brunyate, 17 Oct 16, statement.
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the war, and the only one India controlled. Hardinge therefore was eas-
ily persuaded by Nixon, by w.y of Duff's orders and his own offensive
spirit, to expand the campaign. He was encouraged by the string of
successes and the lack of criticism of the campaign from London, other
than the occasional mi].d. question from Crewe or Chamberlain. Hardinge's
most costly mistake was the decision concerning the Baghdad advance. He
so believed Nixon's estimates that hø made no attempt to alter the plan
of attack, even when he had. knowledge of the poor medical and. transport
conditions and the impossibility of alleviattng them prior to the ad-
vance. Goold states that 'Hardinge was certainly guilty of subordinat-
ing military to political considerations, a danger which he himself
had warned against. . . . it must be emphasised that Lord Hardinge
emerges as a man whose excessive optimism distorted his perspective. 1
Hardinge could possibly have been excused on the grounds of mili-
tary naivet, but such could hardly have been said of Duff. He could
not have been less conscious than Haidinge of the poor state of the
auxiliary services in Mesopotainia, and he should have been more aware
of the probable consequences of the insufficiencies. His bel1e that
India had done more than her share in fighting the war kept him from
actively utilising India's resources of men, mat(riel and industry, and
Force 'D' was correspondingly deprived. This awareness should have made
him more receptive to the policy of caution urged by Crewe and Chamber-.
lain, yet he consistently supported expansion. He explained that no
definite policy ever came from the India Office, 'that there was no
final objective laid. down at all for this force.' 2
 While no final
3Goold, p. 937.
2Meso Coinm, Duff, 7 Dec 16, no. 15171.
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objective was stated, the general policy was; one of caution. Yet he
ordered Nixon to establish control over the Basra Vilayet and to pre-
pare plans for occupying Baghdad while he delayed the delivery of those
orders to the India Office. Duff met with Nixon for only ten minutes
prior to sending him to Mesopotaniia, and told him nothing of the Sec-
retary of State n e attitudes . Nixon, armed with Duff's orders to ex-
pand, pursued the policy avidly. Duff was therefore in a pivotal posi-
tion in that he ordered Nixon to advance, yet he could explain these
advances to Hardinge and Chamberlain as the decision of the 'man on the
spot.' That he could initiate and support an extended offensive in a
terrible climate with inadequate supply shows his Incompetence as Com-
mander-in-Chief. Perhaps the strain of too many duties overtaxed his
powers of judgement, but the responsibility was his nonetheless. Again,
the ultimate mistake was the decision to advance on Baghdad, and Duff
finally admitted to the Commission that he had recommended the move with
the knowledge that preparations were inadequate.
Given the fact that he was 'only following orders', Nixon might
to an extent be excused from any responsibility in the Mesopotamian
failures. As he told the Commission, 'The orders of the Cabinet and
the Secretary of State were Interpreted for me and sent to me through
India. If they had a discussion with the Secretary of State it did not
come to me.' 2 This is best shown in his surprise at being criticised
for his late submission of plans for the advance north from Kurna, which
he had sent to Duff much earlier; he had no idea that Duff's orders to
'Meso Comm, Nixon, 16 Nov 16, nos. 12090-92.
2Meso Coinm, Nixon, ill. Nov 16, no. 11639.
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him did not reach Chamberlain until early May 1915, six weeks after
Nixon received them. His fault was gross overconfidence. Hardirge de-
scribed Nixon's attitude toward Baghdad thusi 'It may be that by his
miscalculati3n of the enemy forces opposed to him or by his misplaced
contempt for their powers of resistance he made a serious mistake, but
it is clear that he took a sporting chance and found the odds against
him." Robertson, as C.I.G.S., took another view of this P!e said
that the advance on Baghdad was 'a risk for which there was no justi-
fication whatsoever. That such a transgression of elementary military
principles should have been committed proves how hopelessly defective
were the methods by which the war was then conducted.' 2 Although this
statement deals mainly with the Government's decision, it is an accu-
rate reflection of Nixon's part in the decision-making process.
War is no place for 'sporting chances', especially when one is ig-
norant of or indifferent to the odds • If Nixon's answer to Chamberlain
that he could 'open the road to Baghdad' with one weak division had been
a calculated response, then he could well have justified the risk. How-
ever, he consulted with no one, especially his field commander, and he
consistently ignored intelligence reports about enemy strength when it
did not suit his plans. By his own admission, he knew of the impossibly
strained transport situation, but his belief that the Turks could not
withstand British arms led him to overlook such details. 'I did not
think and I do not think now the risk was any more than it had been
1Meso Comm, Hardirige, 19 Dec 16, statement.
2Robertson, vol2, p. 51.
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the whole time', he testified. 1 It is a naive general that cannot con-
ceive of his own defeat, but Nixon was convinced that Baghdad was his
for the taking. Nixon was probably the most surprised man in Mesopo-
tamia at the retreat of the 6th Division from Ctesiphon.
Nixon remained convinced that he had done his best under the cir-.
cumstances, and that lray be true; but he could have improved those cir-
cumstances and he did not do so. None of the operations that he di-.'
rected were so pressing that thpy could not wait for the improvement
of his supply line and medical facilities. If he had refused to move,
claiming that those two factors In the expedition were the primary causes
for his inability to advance, he could have forced their improvement,
and thus increased his chance of success. As It was, he gained his
successes In spite of his force's shortcomings, and this must have bol-
stered his confidence 'ast the point of good judgement, and as a result
his troops had to suffer the more. As he wrote in September 1915, 'The
climate is bad, very bad, constantly & almost continually from 110° to
115° in the shade, 125° in a tent with the sides down & somewhere about
i6 (sic) in the actual sun's rays, but the men have stuck it out
splendidly & worked & marched & fought grandly all through. 2 While
his figures may be exaggerated to an extent, what he forced his troops
to do 'In the actual sun's rays' makes one wonder if he was as concerned
for his men as he claimed. Although Barrow testified that there was
no reason for Force 'D' to conduc* operations in such hot weather, Nixon
tried to justify himself i
'Meso Comm, Nixon, 14. Nov 16, no. 11565.
2Letter, Nixon to C.A.Kempthorne, 20 Sep 15, DiM, Box 29, no. 528.
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That the summer was the season that the iasks set US had
to be carried out was not of my choosing and I should be
extremely sorry to think it possible for any soldier to
conceive that our troops, whether white or coloured, should
desire to make hot weather a pretext for not attempting
to carry out the orders that they had received • Our Em-
pire was not built in that manner, and, far from agreeing
with Sir E. Barrow that the Force might without reproach
have rested on its laurels with part of its work not done,
I should have deemed myself liable to suinnary removal if
I had refrained from attempting to do what I wa told to
do while troops were available for the purpose.
This shows a remarkable lack of communication between the centres of
command and operations.
Hardinge, Duff and Nixon must take chief responsibility for the
disaster. They are the ones who directed the campaign to the defeats
at Ctesiphon and Kut • Chamberlain would not or could not stop the
course of events because he believed that the generals on the spot had
the best available information, and they certainly were supposed to
know how to act upon it • This, however, was a totally mistaken assump-
tion, and shows Chamberlain to have been derelict in his duty as a
policy-maker. Robertson goes so far as to blame him, and all the men
in the Home Government, as the most responsible. He wrote that 'the
chief cause of the trouble was a thoroughly bad system of High Command.
This could only be remedied by the action of the Cabinet, and therefore
the latter should be placed first and not last in order of responsibil-
ity for the consequences that ensued.' 2 Chamberlain should have exer-
cised his authority and fulfilled his role as policy-maker, rather than
allowing himself to be manipulated by the military.
1Neso Conun, Nixon, ili Nov 16, statement.
2Robertson, vol. 2, p. 65.
CHAFFER 7
THE COMMISSION'S REPORT
After nine months of accepting and considering testimony and writ-
ten depositions from 100 witnesses, the Commission finished their in-
vestigation and, on 17 May 1917, submitted their report to the War Cab-
inet, The final report was signed by all the members of the Commission
except Commander Josiah Wedgwood, NP, who submitted a separate report.
The Commission's findings are summarised as follows:
1 The Mesopotamia campaign was justified as necessary, but re-
quired careful control.
2. The division of responsibility between the Secretary of State
for India and the Indian Government was unworkable.
3. No overall strategy or definite goals were ever formulated.
1i. Supply should have been controlled by authorities at the ports
rather than from Indian Army Headquarters.
5, The Commander-in-Chief or his representatives should have made
periodic visits to Mesopotamia in order to be familiar with the needs
of the force.
6. All military operations prior to the Baghdad advance in No-
vember 1915 were justifiable as defensive necessities.
7. 'The advance to Baghdad under the conditions in October 1915,
was an offensive movement based on political and military miscalcula-





8. Those responsible for 'this untoward advance' were, in order
of priority, Nixon, Hardinge, Duff, Barrow and Chamberlain, plus the
War Committee of the Cabinet.
9. Responsibility must be attributed to the political powers in
London since they made decisions on the principle that they should de-
cide military policy.1
The Report further criticised provision of supply, transport, re-
inforcement and medical stores, the morale of the troops, facets of In-
dian Government administration, and Nixon, Hathaway, Mbtie and MacNeese.
The Commission also submitted recommendations, calling for the improve-
ment or reform of relations between the Secretary of State for India
and the Viceroy and their Councils, the over-centralisation of the In-
dian military, the confusing and over-long chain of command, the Royal
Indian Marine and the medical service.2
Josiah Wedgwood' s minority report was submitted with the Coinmis-
sion' s findings, and to an extent his criticisms are more pertinent.
Wedgwood found that the blame placed on the Governmental authorities
in England was misdirected, especially concerning the Baghdad advance.
Given the information they had at hand in October 1915, they would have
been more to blame if they had not sanctioned the move. • It will be a
bad day for our Empire when soldiers and statesmen decline all risk,
and withdraw confidence from the men on the spot. '3 He thought it
'Meso Comm Report, CAB/l9/26.
2Meso Comm Report, Recommendations, CAB/l9/26.
3Meso Comm, !edgwood's Report, CAB/19/26.
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futile to censure Nixon for failure, without censuring every other
senior Indian commander who had lost his job during the war. Wedgwood
stated that the training of senior Indian officers was not up to stan-
dard, and therein was the problem. 'An administration that was content
with this type of deficient training and selected generals to command
in Mesopotamia, that knew them for what they were and yet let the ex-
pedition be run as 'nobody's child' must be held responsible for what
happened in Mesopotamia.' He thus laid the blame on Hardinge and Duff,
as well as the Indian system. He criticised their assumption of major
control, their poor handling of the administration of the campaign,
and their attitude of placing Indian requirements above the needs of
England and the troops of Force 'D' . He reported his findings thus:
I find that, throughcit the tenure of office of Lord Har .
-dinge, the Government df India showed little desire to help
and some desire actually to obstruct the successful prose-
cution of the war.
I find that the responsibility of the Mesopotamian fail-
ure of 1915-1916 rests principally on the Government of India,
in that they gave ill-informed advice and did not throw them-
selves and the resources of India into the energetic conduct
of the war.
I find that the Government of India consisted in fact of
the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, and the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff.
I find that no blame should be attributed to anyone,
civil or military, in this country for the initiation, con-
sideration, or sanction of the advance to Baghdad in 1915.
I am equally convinced that the delay caused by the consid-
eration of the advance in this country did not retard or ad-
versely affect in any way the chances of that advance.
I find that the advance to Baghdad failed because the
transport was insufficient and the force ill-found.
I find that the troops maintained the best traditions
of the Service, that the generalship was fair, but thai Gen-
eral Townshend alone inspired his men with that confidence
and devotion without which victories such as the first battle
'Meso Comm, Wedgwood's Report, CAB/19/26.
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for Kut and Ctesiphon are impossible.1
Wedgwood recommended that the War Office administer the Indian Army,
that Indian officers undergo training of a higher quality, that censor-
ship in the field be loosened, that seniority as a reason for promotion
be removed and that the Government of India widen the scope of public
activity in its functions.2
On 12 July 1917 the House of Commons began the three-day debate
on the Report • The opening speaker was Attorney-General Sir Frederick
Smith. He began the proceedings by suggesting that a tribunal should
be formed according to the Military (Courts of Enquiry) Act of 1916 to
pass judement on those named in the Report as culpable. The main
difficulty lay in the inability of courts under existing statutes to
try both military men and civilians. Smith stated that a civilian
could testify at a military court of enquiry only if protected from
self-incrimination. Military witnesses were denied this, of course.
Therefore, Smith argued, if a court-martial found a soldier innocent
of the charges brought, but such actions did actually occur, then a
civilian must be responsible, but could not be punished without an en-
tirely new trial being started. 3
 Smith's opening comments outlined a
Governmental suggestion for a formal tribunal, yet the remainder of
his excessively long speech dealt with arguments against any such pro-.
ceedings, or indeed any action against those accused in the Report.
The Attorney-General pointed out that to try anyone on the basis
1ileso Comm, Wedgwood's Report, CAB/19/26.
2Thid
3Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, p. 2172.
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of the Report would be a miscarriage of justice. After all, the Special
Commissions Act had guaranteed immunity from prosecution for the total
surrender te the Commission of all requested documents • He said that
to force the production of such information 'was a right proposal in
the interests of justice' but, he continued, 'it is not, I say, right
for us to turn round and say, "On that you shall be judged." 1 Smith
further argued that other elementary rights accorded by law were over-
looked by the Commission, and this made any action against the accused
unfair. He claimed that the witnesses 'left the box in many cases with
no conception of the real and true case against them, and in one or
two cases with no conception of the statute under which they were con.-
demned, and in many cases, never having heard evidence of most weighty
witnesses. 2 Smith told the House that the basic rules of law, that
the accused should be present throughout the trial, should be able to
defend himself to those witnesses, and should be able to cross-examine
witnesses against him, were all denied to the those before the Conurtis-
sion. His arguments against any legal action were in marked contrast
to Asquith's statement to Parliament a year earlier, when the Special
Commissions Bill was passed. Asquith commented then that the Govern-
ment did 'not desire that the operation of the Clause giving indeinnit
should be such as to exclude from subsequent investigation, and it may
be punishment, anybody who is shown to be reap nslble for what has hap-
pened.' 3	-
'Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, p. 2160.
p. 2163.
3Hansard, vol. LXXXIV, 26 Jul 16, p. 1728.
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The Commission members in the House were quick to answer the At-
torney-Genemi's condemnation of their lack of legal procedure. Wedg-
wood interrupted Smith's speech to remind him that the Commission was
not a court of law and was .,not acting upon any given charges, so they
therefore were not obliged to follow the rules practied by a court.
Lord Hugh Cecil, in his speech to the Members, reminded them of the
special powers granted to the Commission by the Act which formed it,
powers which overrode rights against self-incrimination either through
verbal testimony o the forced production of documents • 'The only
powers that were added to these powers of enquiry were, in the view of
the Commission, given to them to get over any difficulty which might
arise Incidentally and which might be an obstacle to their arriving at
the truth.' 1 Sir Archibald Williamson spoke on the second day of the
debate. He told, the House that the Commission had. no charge before it1
indeed, it8 function was to investigate to see if there were charges to
be brought. As to the rights of the 'accused', there were no accused
since there were no charges • As to the right of cross-examination and
legal defence, the Commission had been given the power to grant any
-	 witness legal counsel if it seemed that any injustice might be done.
It was, however, virtually impossible to grant such counsel to every
witness. (None had legal assistance and there is no record that any
witnesses requested such.) 'It is inconceivable that all these wit-
nesses could come to nake their statements accompanied by lawyers, and
that the exact proceedings of a Court of law could have taken place In
1Iansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, pp. 2180-81.
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this Commission. I am perfectly certain that the House of Commons, when
appointing the Commission, never dreamt of appointing a Court of law. 1
Williamson further stated that the major witnesses--Nixon, Babtie,
Hathaway, and ?4acNeese-- 'had all the evidence which appeared to be rel-
evant supplied to them' before their appearance in the witness box.
Duff and Chamberlain, he continued, 'were both supplied with the whole
of the evidence as and when it came out. 2 Lord George Hamilton, the
Commission chairman, later wrote, 'Each man told his story, and each
man left the Commission with a certain knowledge of the points upon
which the Commission considered his statement weak or strong.' 3 Attor-
ney-General Smith's speech decrying the Commission's work was only the
fiTht attack upon it; others came from both the House and the Government.
Before any further discussion took place on the possibilities of
dealing with the Report, however, Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke. He ad-
dressed the Members for an hour, explaining the course of events which
led to the disaster at Ctesiphon and the failure to relieve Kut. He
said little that was not common knowledge, and ended by praising all
the officers and men in Mesopotamia and absolving them of any blame.
That he took upon himself, arid in doing so saw no other course than to
tender his resignation. Almost every Member to speak thereafter voiced
his dismay at the loss of Chamberlain's service to the Government, al-
though many, even in their expressions of regret; congratulated him on
his assumption of responsibility as Secretary of State and on his' tà.kig
1llansard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 2311.
2Ibid., p. 2312.
3The Times (London), 16 Jul 17, p. 9.
266
the correct course. They felt, as The Times wrote the next day, 'that
we regard his action as scrupulously proper and honourable to himself.'1
Immediately after Chamberlain's speech, the debate returned to
not only the idea of a tribunal but also to renewed attacks on the Com-
mission and its findings. Representatives of the Government seemed de-
teriulned to discredit the Report and forgo any fuither action. Smith's
opening speech had attacked the procedures followed by the Commission
members; Balfour's speech, an impassioned defence of Hardirzge, aimed
at the members themselves. Balfour, using the Report's condemnation
of the use of private telegrams to conduct official business between
London and India, accused the Commissioners of condemning Hardinge over
'matters of relative triviality.' He stated that 'the criminals there
are not Lord Hardinge or the Secretary of State for India. They are
the Commission. Does anyone doubt that statement?' 2
 Archibald William-
son responded in disbelief at such a reception of the Report. 'The
Commission, indeed, finds itself in the position of a criminal In the
dock rather than In the position of a body investigating and reporting
upon occurrences at the request of the	 .	 Ramsay Macdonald (Lei-
cester, lab.) defended the Commission soon thereafter, claiming that
with 'the exercise of even a prejudiced imagination I cannot imagine
he would be capable of producing a Report of such low value as some
rt. hon. and hon. Gentlemen have tried to make out.' Swift MacNeill
'The Times (London), 13 Jul 17, p. 7.
2Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, pp. 2260-61.
3Ibid., 13 Jul 17, p. 2310.
Ibid., p. 23110.
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(S. Donegal, N) observed, 'The position of a Commission is a most un-
grateful one unless they report in accordance with the wishes of the
Government. 1
MacNeill's statement is a pertinent one. Was the Government crit-
icising the Report because it, unlike the Dardanelles Commission Report,
reflected unfvourably on the Government? Was MacNeill correct in
stating that 'because they did not prophesy or report smooth things,
the same fate has befallen them as has overtaken everyone who has been
asked to report and. has reported not - according to the wishes of
the persons appointing them'?2 Williamson told the House 'I regret
that the Commission were unable to bring in a whitewashing eport.
It is unfortunate, and I very much regret, and I think we all regret,
that we were unable to come to such conclusions.' 3 It seemed to others
that the Government were attempting just such an action. Mr. Joseph
King (N. Somerset, Lab.) said, 'This House seems to have resolved it-
self, for the time being, into a great whitewashing company. From the
various parts of the House, with various reasons which have been al-
leged, with respect to various aspects of the Report or in regard to
the eminent men concerned, there have been splashes, or let me say
daubs of whitewash, put upon the Report and anything that might come
Ii.
out.'
This attitude dealt not only with the attacks upon the Commission
but also with the attempts at forming a tribunal to deal with those
1Hansard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 233Z.
2lbid.
'Ibid., pp. 2319-20.
Ibid., 12 Jul 17, p. 2252.
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accused. It seemed odd to many that such a tribunal was at all neces-
sary. When this idea was relayed to the House of Lords, it was not
greeted warmly. Lord Loreburn referred to the proposed tribunal 'first
as a wet blanket and afterwards as a whitewashing commission. Similarly,
Lord St. David criticised it on the ground that it had. a shelving look,
or at all events would have that appearance in the eyes of people out-
side." The question that these men brought forward was this: since
the Commission investigation, after eight months and 100 witnesses, in-
dicated guilt on the parts of some men involved, why did not Parliament
act to deal with them directly? Why begin a separate court action to
review the same material the Commission had delivered in order to jud€e
those accused? As the Manchester Guardian commented, 'We confess that
for the Government, after appointing a Commission, to appoint a Jucil-
cial Court of Enquiry strikes one as an evasion of Its executive respon-
sibility. . . . These charges are a matter for Executive or Parliamen.L.
tary action.' 2
 Admiral Lord Beresford wrote to The Times, 'Why did not
the Government use their right as the Executive, after this finding,
for punishing those found culpable? . . . all sorts of persons have
been punished by the Executive Government for acts the Government thought
were culpable--governors, magistrates, police officers, sailors, sol-
diers and civilians. '3
This reaction was given by several Members of Parliament. James
Hogge (Edinburgh, L) claimed that a tribunal would be a waste of £100,000
'Manchester GuardIan, 12 Jul 17, p. 5.
2Manchester GuardIan, 13 Jul 17, p. 11.
3The Times (London), 17 Jul 17, p. 7.
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to £250,000 of public money. 'It seems to me that the Government are
the body who ought to take the decision; the Government, having had the
Report of the Commission, ought to decide what they are going to do,
and do it.' 1 Asquith also thought that the House of Commons was the
only feasible body to handle the matter. 'To my mind it is obviously
absurd • and even more than absurd • that you should submit to two or
three judges or persons of judicial experience the question whether,
in the conduct of a great war, this or that statesman or body of states-
men, this or that soldier or sailor, formed or acted upon mistaken judge-.
ment of policy.' 2 John Dillon (E. County Mayo, N) saw the tribunal as
a way to remove the issue out of the way long enough for It to be for-
gotten. 'It was an attempt to humbug us into the belief that nothing
had taken place. '3 Sir John Jardine (Roxboroughshire, L) also believed
the House of Commons the only logical body to administer justice. 'If
we want to arraign these officers of State we can do it by discussion
and by bringing forward Resolutions, and getting at them one by one.
We are the great inquest of the nation.
David Lloyd George spoke to the House in favour of the tribunal,
which would consist of one judge and one Member of .rliament, in ac-
cordance with the Military Act of 1916. He defended a judicial tn-
buna]. thuss 'In any profession if you turn a man out of his profession,
it is adegradation, and no profession has ever done it without full
1Hansard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, pp. 2350-51.
2Ibid., p. 2359.
3Harisard, vol. XCVI, 18 Jul 17, p. k72.
1•Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, pp. ?239-kO.
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judicial investigation beforehand, in which the person implicated has
a full opportunity of obtaining a hearing and tendering his evidence. 1
Lloyd George commented that if the proposed tribunal was unacceptable,
then a special tribunal appointed from among the Members was fine with
the Government. Although both types of tribunal were suggested. by the
Government, neither was put to the House for a vote. Rumbold states
that
the Government were wandering down the laths of expediency
to satisfy a public cry for victims and they were propos-
ing to do so in a way which would have shuffled off their
responsibility for the fate of individuals onto the uncer-
tainties of a quasi-judicial tribunal with unclear terms
of referenc -operating in the cloudy penumbra between law
and policy.
The deiBte moved away from the tribunal question to one of the
guilt of those accused • In this more general discussion, Members voiced
their opinions on whether anything should be done at all. Attorney-
General Smith thought the Report was sufficient punishment for those
concerned. 'The fact that there were no charges has not prevented ver-
dicts of guilty". I am sure the hon. and. gallant aentleman edgwoo
will not dispute it that the Report is simply a cemetery of reputa-
tions' 3
 Sir John Jardine supported the idea of doing nothing, as he
found no crimes detailed in the Report. 'It is merely want of judge-
ment, want of foresight, some of them getting old, some of them losing
their requisite activity, and some of them losing their heads.
1Hansaxd, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 2370.
2Rumbo].d, p. 83. 	 -
3Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, p. 2162.
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There is nothing that can be called high crime and nothing that cai be
1
called misdemeanor.'
More Members thought the opposite, at least early In the debate.
Sir J. D. Bees (E. Nottingham, u) observed 'I really think It is very
difficult to hold. any other conclusion than that it is of no use having
great officers of State like the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, if,
when things go wrong, they are not to be held. responsible' ,2 echoing
Section 9 of the Report. Joseph ICing raised the point that there may
have been crimes, but considering the offices held by those accused
mere irresponsibility was damning enough. 'Have they proved capable,
have they done their best, have they used the ability and. ipagInation,
the industry and courage, which we expected of them? I believe on
those points these men stand convicted.' 3 Neither could their past
records be used to excuse them. Ronald McNeIll (St. Augustine, Kent,U)
countered the argument of those who spoke in favour of the accused, es-
pecially Hardinge, when asking if their records, 'however eminent and
distinguished, are to be brought forward as a sort of set-off by dis-
tinguished officers who In the hour of trim], and, national crisis, not-
withstanding their past services, have broken down with results very
disastrous to the country.Z1
This argument of overall service negating any resiwrnsibility for
the Mesopotamian disaster was used most frequently in defence of Hardige.





Immediately after his tenure as Viceroy ended in April 1916, Hardinge
returned to his position as Permanent Undersecretary of State for For-
eign Affairs. In early July, some ten days prior to the Report being
debated in the Commons, Hardinge spoke to the House of Lords. It was
his maiden speech, and it created quite a furors for two reasons.
First, being a permanent Civil Servant, Hardinge was not allowed to
exercise his privileges as a peer during his tenure of office. Thus,
in order for him to speak, the rule was waived in his favour by the
Prime Minister. Second, his speech was a defence of his actions re-
garding Mesopotamia while he was Viceroy. 'He disclaimed any desire
to shirk any responsibility which was his due, but it was not easy to
know what other peremptory action he could have taken without exposing
himself to the charge of excessive civilian interference in military
matters.' 1
 He also pointed out all of India's contributions as justi-
fication of his tenure of office. 'Excessive civilian interference'
is a weak excuse for not exercising his authority when it was most
needed • Many observers, both in Parliament and the press, were not
impressed wIth his arguments. Swift MacNeill referred to the speech
during the debate on the Report. 'No Peer--thank God, really, for it--
has ever made a maiden speech in defence of himself and in sacrifice
of his officials. His speech amounted to, "Please, sir, I did not do
it; it was the other boy." 2 The popular press also took Hardinge
strongly to task. The Morning Post wrotes 'We note that Lord Hardinge
in his defence--half a whine and half an attempt to shift the blame--
'The Times (London), Zi Jul 17, p. 7.




refers to other manifola labours with which his shoulders were loaded.
• If his subordinates were to blame, he is responsible for his sub-
ordinates, because he either chose them or could replace them."
Other newspapers and Members of Parliament were easier on him.
The Manchester Guardian, while commenting that Hardinge's speech, 'de-
spite its length and comprehensiveness, failed to add much to the dis-
closures of the Report', also stated, 'In everything he did Lord Har-
dinge acted as an honest and conscientious trustee of the interests of
ia' 2 The Daily Telegraph was also somewhat sympathetic toward him.
Hardinge's speech 'was an apologia, of course; bu± It was the apologia
of one who--rightly or wrongly--felt that he had. been misjudged. and did
not hesitate to lay his case before his fellow-countrymen.' 3
 E. S. Man-
tagu (Cambridgeshire, L),soon to be secretary of State for India, thought
Hardinge a victim of circumstances, saying 'now he is censured by this
document for what, for the fact that he relied too much upon those who
had been chosen to give him military advice. Among many things we have
never decided in this country are the relations between politicians and
soldiers.' 4 E. G. Heinmerde (N.W.Norfolk, L) supported this view, 'I
think It is absolutely correct to say that every single thing that Lord
Hardinge did he did on Information from people who he certainly had
every right to trust.
1Morning Post, 11 Jul 17, p. 6.
2Manchester Guardian, L. Jul 17, pp. k5.
3Daily Telegraph, L. Jul 17, p. 17.
4Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul. 17, p. 2202.
5Hansard, vol. XCVI, 18 Jul 17, p. 486.
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Balfour, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, defended Har-
dinge repeatedly on the grounds of his overall career. He came under
heavy criticism when he refused to accept Hardinge's resignation after
Chamberlain's had bei tendered. Three times Hardinge submitted his
resignation, and each time Balfour refused to accept it, 'the ground
being that Lord Hardinge is an excellent permanent head of the Foreign
Office. Therefore, even if he did not do his duty in India, in my opin-
ion that is no reason at all for telling him that he is not to do some-
thing else that has nothing to do with India. 1 Balfour blamed the
House of Commons' inaction on the proposed tribunal as being the great-
est detriment to Hardinge, who wanted an opportunity to present his case
to an impartial tribunal so he could clear himself. 2 Balfour seemed to
ignore the fact that Hardinge had already been given the opportunity to
present his case, and that had been the cause of him being named by the
Commission • Balfour remained adamant i 'So long as I am responsible
for a Department I am not going to permit what I conceive to be a gross
injustice being done to one of my subordinates.' 3 Criticism of Balfour' s
decision came from outside the House of Commons, also • Even those
papers which had sympathised with Hardinge disagreed with Balfour. The
,lj
Times called his reasons 'arguable, though in our opinion unsound.
They did think, however, that Hardinge's repeated attempts set him 'be .
-yonci reproach in a matter of formal propriety.	 Lord George Hamilton's
1Hansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, pp. 2259-60.
2Hansard, vol. XCVI, 18 Jul 17, pp. 505-06.
3lbid., p. 1197.
L1The Times (London), 1k Jul 17. P . 7.
rhe Times (London), 13 Jul 17, P . 7.
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letter to The Times gave his opinions on the two resignations. 'If
Parliament and the public will accept and adhere to this principle and
make it a tradition of the political life of this country, the labours
of the Mesopotamia Commission will not have been in vain.'1
Several Members of Parliament thought Hardinge' s treatment prefer-
ential and compared it unfavourably with that of others accused in the
Report, all of whom had been suspended from duty during the enquiry.
V. C. Anderson (Attercliffe, Sheffield,Iab) called for equal treatment
and for Balfour to accept the resignation, at least temporarily. 'We
are not asking that people shall be brought to trial nor are we asking
for punishments. We are asking that while these matters are cleared
up that those concerned shafl not retain their official positions. • 2
A • J • Sherwell (Huddersfield, L) also called for Hardinge' s suspension
until he was formally cleared, as any doubt of his abilities would
surely be detrimental to his work. 'The real danger to the success-
ful prosecution of the War is the danger of the loss of confidence of
the country In the thoroughness, effectiveness, and response to the
sense of responsibility on the part of those who are controlling the
direction of the War.'3
As the debate proceeded, the idea of a tribunal grew less iinprtant,
and the speeches began to move farther Into generalities and questions
of overall praise and blame. Although an occasional voice of reason
emerged asking for a quick decision so the business of government could
ZFhe Times,(London), 16 Jul 17, p. 9.
2Hansard, vol. XCVI, 18 Jul 17, p. 1183.
3Ibid., pp. 1192-93.
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proceed, such voices were lost in the crowd that grew increasingly hos-
tile, As Balfour was being criticised over Hardinge's service, the
Government as a whole were soon the target of many speeches. John Dii-
ion saw in Balfour's refusal an attempt by the Government to circumvent
?he principle of Ministerial responsibility, and the only means by
which we really in this House can hope to exercise any influence what-
ever over the Executive Government of this country.' 1 A more direct
attack on this same theme came from J. M. Hogge 'It seems to me that
a great number of these people are going to get off, and going to get
off very lightly. . . . the Government have harrowed the feelings of
all right-thinking people by the incompetence with which they have dealt
with this inconsequent muddle.' He expanded his argument, moving from
those accused in the Report to everyone involved in the campaign in
Mesopotamia. 'I would like to have seen the House of Commons take a
clear issue as to whether, having got rid of some of the muddlers who
took part in this Mesopotamia business, we should not now get rid of
the others. The Prime Minister is resporib1e, in the last resort,
for this muddle.' 2 Ramsay Macdonald took the Government to task for
its lack of attention to the campaign, and blamed that for the failure
of the Indian Army in Mesopotamia.
They knew the strength of the Indian Army. They knew its
organisation and its medical equipment, and if there is
anybody supremely responsible, responsible in the last re-
sort, for the way in which that Army took the field, for
the variation of the plans placed before it, for the un
conscious growth of its programme, for the indefinite ob-
ject that again and again appeared only to disappear before
1HansaH, vol. XCVI, 18 Jul 3.7, pp. L68_69,
2Hansard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, pp. 2351-52.
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its military commanders, the Home Governent is pre-emi-
nently responsible for the whole affair.
The press also saw the opportunity of attacking the Government.
The Times did so indirectly through its disapproval of that section of
the Report which exonerated the advising Councils of blame, when they
should have been more forceful in influencing events. 'They should
never have submitted so weakly to be shorn of their attributes, and
this contention relates more particularly to the Members of the Gov-
ernment of India, who tacitly abdicated their functions during the war.'2
Less soiisticated papers were more open In their criticism, theorising
that military experts were overruled by politicians, 'the real contri-
of the mischief.' 3
 The Morning Post accused the Government of
hampering the Indian Army by their appointments 'of Lord Hardinge and
Sir Beauchamp Duff because they were weak, and of Sir William Meyer,
because he suited their policy of starving the Army. 
,14 
Behind it all
was Asquith, their villain of the piece. They saw the disaster before
Baghdad as his fault, claiming he knew of the transport problem (which
was utter nonsense) and that he overrode the military by 'the cunning
manoeuvre of appointing an Inter-Departmental Committee. ' 'Therefore
the chief lesson of this Report Is that the blame goes lBck to the pol-
iticians. They had neglected our defences in peace; and in war, in
their panic pressed the experts to "do something" and get success at
1npard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 2311.1.
2The Times (London), 2 Jul 17, p. 9.
3The Daily Mail, 28 Jun 17, p. Li.
1Morning Post, 29 Jun 17, p. o.
5Morning Post, Li Jul 17, p. 6.
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all costs, without any due consideration of the military feasibility.'1
Such wild accusations in the press provoked a response from the
Members of Parliament during the debate. It was the one thing in which
there was general, If not total, agreement. Archibald Williamson de-
fended the Commission's work and warned the assembly that they must
take action on the Report if for no other reason than to make clear
the real findings. He stated 'the conclusions of the Report and the
conclusions of the newspapers are entirely and totally different.
The country are taking their impression of the Report from what they
read in the newspapers, and it is well that it should go out from this
House that it is not a correct version. 2 Other Members were more
blunt; Aubrey Herbert (S. Sbmerset, u) said he had 'rarely seen any-
thing meaner than the perversion of that Report by the "Daily Mail" for
its own purposes.' 3 Asquith agreed, saying 'the manner in which this
report has been travestied, perverted and exploited, is one of the most
scandalous chapters in the history of the degradation of the Press.
Such indignation was not universal, however. William Joynson-Hicks
(Brentford,U) thought that anything the press said was worth notice,
because the newspapers 'have merely given evidence of what the public
Is thinking. The reason why we here must take notice of the views of
the Press is because it is the only expression of public opinion at the
present moment while we are under a Coalition Government. '5
1Morning Post, 29 Jun 17, p. a.
2Hansard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 231k.
3lbid., p. 2320.
Ibid., pp. 2366-67.
5Hansard, vol. XCVI, 18 Jul 17, p. 1193.
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The House agreed on one thing other than a condemnation of the
presss a condemnation of the Indian administrative system. When the
Mesopotarnia Commission submitted their Report, they added a list of
recommendations, most of which dealt with improving the Indian adinin-
istratlon, Archibald Williamson told the House that although their
accusation in the Report of various individuals was serious, it meant
little in comparison with what he hoped the Commission's work would
bring about. 'That is what the Commissioners kept always before them,
that they might leave behind them not alone a record of misnanagement
and a record of blame, but might leave behind, them a record that they
found the condition of administration in India unsatisfactory.' 1
 Wedg-.
wood's observations supported this statements 'It is that spirit ii-
lustrated by the bureaucracy in India during this war which is, to my
mind, far and away the most serious question brought forward by the Re-
port.' 2 When Chamberlain spoke to the House, he expressed the opinion
that 'it would have been better if from the first the control exer-
cised on behalf of His Majesty's Government had been vested in the Gen-
eral Staff or the Army Council' 3rather than in the India Office. This
was hardly an observation of .hindsight, for he had written a memorandum
a year earlier concerning a reorganisation of the Indian system, al-
though he thought that the middle of the 'war was not the time to insti-
tute such a proposal
	 Montagu, previously an Undersecretary at the
India Office, criticised the Indian Government as 'too wooden, too iron,
'Hansard, vol. XCV, 13 Jul 17, p. 2320.
2lbid., p. 2378.
3Ibid., 12 Jul 17, p . 2212.
1Memo by Chamberlain, lLi Jul 16, in Cabinet minutes 11 Jul 16,
CAB/112/l6/5.
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too inelastic, too antediluvian, to be of any use for the modern pur-
poses we have in view." He was given the opportunity of acting upon
his words when he was appointed to replace Chamberlain a few days later.
Indeed, the new men at the top, Lord Chelmsford as Viceroy, Charles
Mcinro as Commander-in-Chief, and E. S. Montagu as Indian Secretary be-
gan work together to bring about reforms in the Government and Army in
the immediate post-war period. That turned out to be the only real ac-
tion taken after the submission of the Report. In the House of Commons
the anger and threats of 12 and 13 July had cooled when the subject was
returned to on the 18th, after a five-day period of seeing to other busi-
ness. In the intervening days other matters had occupied the minds f
the Members, so the concluding day of the debate saw the end of any
real attempt to deal with the Report as it should have been handled.
A few last-minute calls to remove Hardinge fell on deaf ears, and the
Report went to the Army Council who were to deal with the soldiers ac-
cused. Since Chamberlain had left and no one could move 1four to ac-
cept Hardinge's resignation, the civilians were no longer at issue.
The tenor of the speeches on the 18th were an echo of Lloyd George's
call to get the debate over with and get on with the war.2
The Army Council discussed the proposals for action throughout
July 1917. On the 6th, they had directed the War (binet to prepare
court-martial proceedings against Duff, Nixon, MacNeese, Babtie and
Hathaway.3 The next day they decided to give the accused the chance
Hansard, vol. XCV,12 Jul 17, pp. 220L$.-05.
13 Jul 17, p. 2375.
3Army Council Meeting 216, 6 Jul 17, W0/l63/22.
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to defend themselves in a public enquiry. If a court-martial seemed
in order, Section 161 of the Army (Courts of Enquiry) Act, 1916, would
have to be waived, as this stated that no one could be tried after three
years from the commission of an offence. 1 Only on 11 July did they re-
alise that the evidence obtained by the Mesopotaxnla Commission was in-
admissable, because Section L of the Special Commissions Act said that
statements by any witness 'shall not be evidence against that person
in any criminal proceeding (including a proceeding by Court-Martial)
at any time thereafter instituted against him.' 2
 By 19 July the idea
of a court-martial had been dropped. Following the precedent of the
South African War Stores Commission, the Army Council decided to elicit
written explanations from the accused, and legal counsel would be pro-
vided for them to draft their statements If They so desired. 3
 The ex-
planations submitted by those accused are not on file, but the Army
Council minutes recorded the reaction to the explanations. On 5 Sep-
tember 1917 Sir Wifliam Babtie's statement was accepted as satisfactory
and no action was taken against bim! Surgeon-General Hathaway's
statement was considered on 20 March 1918, and they decided that he
should be called upon to retire. Surgeon-General MacNeese was that
same day exonerated. 5 The Army Council, after considerg Nixon' s
written explanation on Li. September 1918, also excused him. 6
 Duff
1Army Council Meeting 217, 7 Jul 17, WO/163/22.
2Army Council Meeting 221, 11 Jul 17, WO/163/22.
3Army Council Meeting 221i., 19 Jul 17, WO/l63/22.
Army Council Meeting 230 , 5 Sep 17, WO/163/22.
5Army Council informal meeting, 20 Mar 18, W0/163/23.
6Army Council informal meeting, Li. Sep 18, WO/].63/23.
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apparently never replied.
When all is said and done, the after-effects of the Mesopotamia
Commission were negligible. Chamberlain resigned as Secretary of State
for India but was soon back in the Government as a Minister without port-
folio in the War Cabinet, in April 1918 • Duff, having left India for
the purpose of testifying to the Commission, never returned to his
post. He died in 1919. Hathaway was asked to retire, but none of the
other military men suffered official sanction. Hardinge was never out
of a job. Thus, only one of those accused for causing the failure and
suffering in Mesopotamia faced any type of official retribution for
their sins • Did the Commission then perform any real function? Briton
Busch states that the report led. to reforms instituted by Chelmsford,
Montagu and Monro, but, as Chamberlain said in his July 1916 memorandum
to the Cabinet, reorganisation of the Indian system was already being
studied;	 it was strictly a natter of beginning It 'as soon as oppor-
tunity occurs. 1 Was the Mesopotamia Commission nothing more than a
colossal waite of time? Considering some of the criticisms levelled
at it, one mIght think so. Many of the flaws noted, however, are un-
justified or Irrelevant.
Busch and Barker both point otit the failure to observe normal
rules of evidence. 2 This was dealt with by Wedgwood and Cecil when
this criticism was raised originally by Attorney-General Smith • The
Commission was an extraordinary body detailed to gain the facts concerning
1Memo by Chamberlain, l Ll. Jul 16, Cabinet minutes 11 Jul 16, CAB/
42/16/5.
2Barker, Neglected War, p. 462; Busch, p. 129.
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the campaigns they were not a court, and no judges or lawyers were mem-
bers, so they proceeded in the most direct manner available. They were
given special powers in order for them to do so. Other than those they
were never under any directions to act in any particular way as they
carried out their investigation.
Next, the Commission was criticised for not calling any witnesses
from the Indian Quartermaster-General's section, nor for visiting India.
Barker observess 'Such a blatant omission lends force to the criticism
that the members of the Commission sitting on soft seats in London
never grasped the significance of some of the Issues they were supposed
to be investigating." Would questioning the Quartermaster-General
have produced any significant difference In the findings? The Cornmis-
sioners may 1have gained a more complete understanding of the difficul-
ties under which they operated, but this begs the question. The ulti-
mate problem was not that the supply section could. not deliver an ade-
quate amount of shipping and materials of war, but that what they did
send had no effect on the decision-making process. The fault lay In
Nixon, who refused to take his logistics into account when planning
his campaign. The fighting in Mesopotamia was not so difficult because
the Quartermaster Corps was derelict in its duty, but because Nixon
would not use his supplies wisely or wait for sufficient supplies to
arrive. The supply line from India to the front could have been im-
proved and disaster averted had Nixon been wise enough to base his plans
	 -
on his force's abilities rather than on his own desires. Had the Corn-
missioners visited India, the outcome would surely have been identical:
'Barker, Neglected War, p. Z62.
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a better knowledge of the system, a system which cried out for improve-
ment, but not a major change in the results of the Report. Although
the system was faulty, it was not the ultimate problem, nor was its
reform the ultimate solution. Both problem and solution lay in command.
Barker also criticises the Commission's findings concerning the
supply of drafts to the front • The Report blamed India for not doing
enough to keep the number of men in the Army as high as possible. Bar-
ker comments that 'pre-war policy imposed by Whitehall was not consid-
ered--it was sufficient that the Indian Government bad not shown pre-
vision. 1 Rumbo]4 also points out the Report' s lack of blame accruing
to the War Office for not supplying any replacements. 2
 These comments
are true, of course; the Nicholson Commission cut the Indian Army bud-
get to the bone at the worst possible time. This only shows that the
Commission ignored Whitehall's responsibility on this point, not that
the criticism of India's recruiting policy was in error. Since India's
policies were determined almost exclusively by Hardirige and Duff, then
the same personnel problem arises in the comnand structure.
Barker's major criticism deals with the members of the Commission,
that its structure showed a 'strong political bias.' 3
 If he refers to
their political affiliations, then a look at the representation denies
such a bias i two Lords, two Liberals, one labour and one Unionist from
the Parliamentary ranks • If he refers to the fact that six of the eight
members were in the political sphere, that is only natural as the
1Barker, Neglected War, p. l6O.
2Rumbold, p. 80.
½arker, Neglected Waj p. Li61.
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investigation was begun by Parliament and the results were destined for
that body. The Members of the House of Commons themselves insisted upon
the addition of military and naval representatives; the Government pro-
posal had included neither. Barker goes on to cite the lack of exper-
tise on the Commission, yet this too is questionable. As Lord Hugh
Cecil said, 'It was certainly the view taken by the Commission that it
was a Commission to enquire into what may be called, broadly, a ques-
tion of administrative efficiency. . . . they nominated distinguished
administrators, like Lord George Hamilton, Members of Parliament, and
persons familiar with military and naval administration.Lord George
Hamilton had been Secretary of State for India; the rl of Dorioughmore
had been Undersecretary of State for War; General Neville Lyttelton had
been Chief of the Imperial General Staff; surely these men had had broad
experience in administration. Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge had presided
at the North Sea Enquiry Commission, so he had experience to draw on
to advise on procedure. None of them had intimate experience with the
Indian Army, it is true. Here, perhaps an Indian veteran may have been
a better selection than Lyttelton. Still, would that have radically
altered the findings? By examining so many witnesses from so many
areas and strata of Indian service, was not the Commission adequately
advised on any necessary points? After all, the Government's original
proposal, excluding military and naval personnel, used that same theory,
that expert knowledge would be available through the witnesses • In
order to have a Commission adequately representing all aspects of the
Iansard, vol. XCV, 12 Jul 17, pp. 2180-81.
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investigation so many members would have been necessary that the group
would have been unwieldy.
Assuming, then, that the Commission did the best job it could have
done, one must question whether it should have been formed at all, and
what were its after-effects? 'The Mesopotamia Commission was, perhaps,
inevitable, for Britain had a habit of official enquiries into military
disasters dating, in modern times, from the Crimean War.' 1 Taking this
view by Busch, the Commission was a matter of tradition, if not policy.
Other disasters such as Crimea and. the Boer War earned Commissions of
Enquiry, and rightly so. If gross negligence causes avoidable fiasco,
then such negligence should be investigated and put right, arid, those
culpable dealt with. By having the civilians and military foist off
the blame upon each other in these two instances, no punishment ensued.
Were they then worthwhile? Assuming they brought about reform to over-
come future negligence, yes, they were. The question remains, however:
was justice done? Or was justice even involved?
When Asqulth offered Parliament the Special Commissions Act, A. J. P.
Taylor theorises that it was no more than a 'red herring' to gain sup-
port for him in the House. 2
 True, his political fortunes were not run-
nirig high at the time, but it is doubtful that, even had he been in a
strong position, he could. have avoided taking action. Pressure through-
out the House was such that his attempts to avoid or postpone an inves-
tigation met with no success. Even at the best of times, the only fea-




interest in time of wars this did. mt appease the House when he did use
it, and it is open to question whether it would have been any more ef-
fective had. Asquith's position been more tenable politically.
Support for the Special Commissions Act spread across arty lines,
so general was the desire for investigation. Surely this was a desire
for information to determine exactly what brought about the breakdown
in Mesopotamia, with the purpose of making right those f.ilings. There
seemed to be no vindictiveness during the debates on the Special Commis-
sions Act, nor in the proceedings during the investigation. Not until
the Report was published and certain persons, as well as the overall
system, were named as responsible for the disaster did anyone call for
retribution along with reform. Hardinge, Duff, and Nixon received the
weightiest share of blame, as well they should. Indeed, it has been
one intent of this paper to show that they were even more guilty than
the Report indicated. Since these men were directly responsible for
the unnecessary suffering and. death in the campaign, should they have
been punished, or excused? One may argue that to punish them would
change nothing, that the agonies of the fighting in Mesopotamia would.
not now be relieved for those who had suffered through the opening
eighteen months of the campaign. This may be true, but if such an ar-
gument is to be used, why have any judicial system of' tradition at all?
Why have a legal or penal system if not to administer justice?
This leads to the major issue of the Commission's effect. If any
retribution was to be given, who was to order it? Certainly not the
Coinmission it had no judicial or executive power. Once its Report
was submitted, its function had. passed. Should it have been done by a
288
special tribunal? None could agree upon one to deal with soldiers and
civilians alike. The only feasible answer was to have action taken by
either the House of Commons or the Government. The actions of the Gov-.
ernment upon receiving the Report show how ill-prepared they were for
such a document. The Government directed Lord Curzon, Lord Privy ea,
to head a committee to consider disciplinary action against those named
by the Commission. The committee consisted of Curzon, Lord rby, Aus-
ten Chamberlain (although he was named in the Report, he had not yet
resigned), and George Nicholl Barnes, Minister without portfolio in
the War Cabinet. They decided to take no action against Hardinge, as-
suming he had acted upon bad military advice. Duff had suffered suffi-
ciently by losing his position as Comnander-in-Chief, with the result-
ant loss of prestige and money. He and Babtie 'should be called upon
to retire under the provisions of Article 527 of the "Royal Warrant for
the Pay, Appointment, Promotion arid Non-Effective Pay of the Army".
Lord Derby dissented from this proposal with regard to Surgeon-Geneial
Babtie.' Further, Hathaway should be called upon to resign his commis-
sion, Retirement, accordinge to the Royal Warrant, entitled the person
to retirement pay, whereas resignation of one's commission meant losing
the pension. MacNeese received a reprimand. Nixon, after being named
most responsible by the Report, did not receive official censure from
this committee. 1 Phese, however, were no more than recommendations to
the Army Council; they were not definite actions to be taken.
When the Army Council decided that they could take no action owing
to the indemnity clause, the Government again had the responsibility
1Notes from a meeting held 18 Jun 17 at the Privy Council, IO/aJR.
Mss./F112.163.	 /
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to act, and again they evaded it. They instead put forward the tn-
bunal suggestion, thereby asking the House of Commons to decide what
should be done. After three days of debate, they decided nothing, and
in the end accepted the Government's proposal to excuse the civilians
and let the Army Council deal with the soldiers, all but one of whom
were exonerated. Thus, by assing the issue around, no one had to take
the final decision. In the end, therefore, the Mesopotamia Commission
was a waste of time. Eight men spent several months working their hard-
est to produce an accurate record of events, doing so at Government re-
quest, and doing as good a job as could be expected, and absolutely
nothing came of it • As stated before, the Indian reforms were In the
offing anyway, and the medical service in Mesopotamia improved with the
information supplied by the Vincent-Bingley Report arid the organisation
of War Office control. The Commission performed neither of the two
functions it should haves it em-iasised the need for reform, but it
did not bring it about; and it named those guilty of negligence that
was virtually criminal, but it could not induce anyone to act against
them. If the Commission was appointed to find a scapegoat, the Govern-
snent showed that they did not want one • If it was formed to lead to
reform, it was too late to do so since the reforms were already being
planned.
The ultimate question remainss was justice done? Although the
Mesopotamia Commission was formed to investigate for reform, its Report
brought about the question of justice. The Government tried to avoid
taking action by attacking the Commission in the House of Commons, but
theirs was the ultimate responsibility. Perhaps the best description
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of the Government's position was put forward by the Manchester Guardians
But, after all, does the public servant have the right to
have the benefit of all legal rules of evidence, like the
burglar? We are not sure • The burglar, if he is convicted,
loses his civil rights; not so the politician or the public
servant who is censured for incompetence or bad judgement.
The one is innocent until he is convicted; the other has to
be above suspicion. In the one case the issue is one of
guilt in the eye of the law; in the other it is one of po-
]i.tical fitness or unfitness • The true analogy is not with
the criminal, but with the employe.,who often loses his po-
sition on evidence that would be insufficient to convict a
nan on a criminal charge. All that can be reasonably ex-
pected of an employer who has grounds for suspicion is that
he sho1d act without haste and without prejudice; he need
not observe all the legal rules of evidence • We confess
that for the Government, after appointing a Commission, to
appoint a Judicial Court of Enquiry strikes one as an eva-
sion of its Executive responsibility.
The Government, of course, did none of this, but perhaps they saw
the more subtle method of punishment that would not.. reflect on theui,so
long as they avoided direct action. Perhaps they decided to act on the
idea that the publication of the Report 'would--such as in the case of
the ex-Viceroy--in itself be a punishment to those whose conduct had
been thus exposed, and that It would be very damaging to their reputa-
tions and future careers. , 2 The Government may well have let the press
and the public perform their own punishments of the accused, while they
did not dirty their hands and could, as Lloyd George requested at the
height of the debate, get on with the war.
1Manchester Guardlan, , 13 Jul 7, p. L•




An Act tO constitute Special Commissions to inquire into the origin,
inception, and conduct of Operations of War in the Dardanelles and Cal-
lipoli, and into the origin, incption, and conduct of Operations of War
in Mesopotamia. 7th August l9l6j
Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the ad-
vice arid consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in
this present Parliament assembled, and. by the authority of the same, as
follows
l.--(i) The following persons, namely,
The Right Honourable the Earl of Cromer, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.,
C.I.E.,
The Right Honouxable Andrew Fisher,
The Honourable Sir Thomas Mackenzie, K.C.MIG.,
Sir Frederick Cawley, Baronet, Member of Parliament,
James Avon Clyde, Fquire, King's Counsel, Member of Parliament,
Captain Stephen Lucius Gwynn, Member of Parliament,
Walter Francis Roch, Esquire, Member of Parliament,
	 -
Admiral of the Fleet Sir William Henry May, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
Field-Marshall Lord Nicholson, G.C.B., and
The Right Honourable Sir William Pickforl, Knight, one of the Lords
Justices of Appeal,
are hereby appointed Commissioners for the purpose of inquiring into the
origin, inception, and conduct of operations of war in the Dardanelles
and Gallipoli, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, aininuni-
tion.and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick
and wounded and the responsibility of those departments of Government
whose duty It has been to minister to the wants of the forces employed
in that theatre of war.
(2) The following persons, namely,
The Right Honourable Lord Geoije Francis Hamilton,G.C.S.I.,
The Right Honourable the Earl of Donoughmore,
Lord Hugh Cecil, Member of Parliament,
Sir Archibald Williamson, Baronet, Member of Parliament,
John Hodge, Esquire, Member of Parliament,
Commander Josiah C. Wedgwood, Member of Parliament,
Admiral Sir C3rprlan Arthur George Bridge, G.C.B., and
General the Right Honourable Sir Neville Gerald Lyttelton, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
are hereby appointed Commissioners for the purpose of inquiring Into the
origin, Inception, and conduct of operations of war in Mesopotamia, in-
cluding the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment
to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded and the
responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it has
been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre
of war.
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2.--(1) The Cornmissinners appointed under this Act shall have all powers,
rights and privileges as are vested in the High Court or in any judge
thereof, on the occasion of any action, in respect of the following mat-
t ers -
(a) The enforcing: of attendance of witnesses and examining them on
oath, affirmation, or otherwise, and the issue of a commission or a re-
request to examine witnesses abroad; and
çb The compelling the production of documents; arid
(c) The punishing persons guilty of contempt;
and a summons signed by one or more of the Commissioners may be substi-
tuted for and shall be equivalent to any formal process cape.b].e of be-
ing issued in any action for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and
compelling the production of documents.
(2)A warrant of committal to prison issued for the purpose of enforcing
the powers conferred by this Section shall be signed by one or more of
the Commissioners, and shall specify the prison to which the offender
is to be committed., but shall not authorise the imprisonment of an of-
fender for a period exceeding three months.
(3) The Commissioners may authorise the representation before them of
any person appearing to them to be interested by counsel, or solicitor,
or otherwise, if they consider that any injustice would ensue if that
person were not so represented.
(1i) The Commissioners may act notwithstanding any vacancy in their num-
ber and three shall be a quorum, but the Commissioners may delegate to
two or more of their number their powers of holding sittings for the
purpose of making inquiries and taking evidence abroad, and any powers
in relation thereto.
3.--(l) The Commissioners shall, having regard to the interests of the
public arid to naval, military and diplomatic considerations, allow or
refuse to allow the public or any portion of the public to be present
during any proceedings of the Commissioners: Provided that a full and
complete record in shorthand shall be kept of all the evidence taken
whether in public or In private.
(2) If any person who is present at any proceedings of the Commissioners
at which the public or any portion thereof are not allowed to be pre-
sent discloses, without the authority of the Commissioners, or without
proper authority given on behalf of His Majesty, either directly or in-
directly, anything that has taken place at those proceedings, he shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and the Official Secrets Act, 1911, shall
apply as it applies to a misdemeanor under Section two of that Act.
li.__(1) A person examined as a witness by the Commissioners shall not
be excluded from producing any document or giving any information on
the ground that such document or Information Is secret or confidential,
or Is entitled to be withheld under Section 2 of the Official Secrets
Act, 1911, or from answering any question put to him, or from producing
any document, on the ground that the answer thereto or production there-
of may criminate or tend to criminate him, but any answer so given shall
not be evidence against that person in any criminal proceeding (includ-
ing a proceeding by court-martial) at any time thereafter instituted
against him, and any document so produced shall not be evidence against
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him in any such proceeding unless the production of that document could
be enforced in those proceedings or evidence of that document could be
otherwise obtained in any such proceedings.
(2) Nothing in this Section shall apply to the case of proceedings for
having given false evidence before the Commissioners, or of having pro-
cured, or attempted or conspired to procure, the giving of such evi-
dence.
5.--The Commissioners may hold. sittings outside the United Kingdom, and
for the purpose of' any such sittings in India, or of anything required
to be done in India by or on behalf of the Commissioners, this Act shall
have effect as if a High Court of Chief Court in British India were sub-
stituted for the High Court.
6.--Any Report of the Commissioners, and any Minority Report, shall be
laid as soon as may be before both Houses of Parliament, and the Corn-
niissioners may, if they think fit, make interim Reports; provided al-
ways that the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Mesopotamian
campaign shall proceed with all possible expedition to inquire *ith re-
gard to the provision for the sick and wounded, and shall report the
result of their inquiries on this matter as soon as they are completed.
7.--This Act may be cited as the Special Commissions (Dardanelles and
Mesopotamia) Act, 1916.
Taken from The public General Acts passed in the sixth and seventh
years of the reign of His Majesty King George the Fifth, Chapter 3k,
pp. 105-108.
NOTE ON SJRCES
The majority of the research done for this thesis took place in
the Public Record Office ani the Iniia Office Library. The Townsheixl
apers were made available to me through the courtesy of Colonel A. J.
Barker, who has donated them to the Liddell Hart Archives at King's
College. Colonel Barker states that the diary Townshenl kept throughout
his service life has been lost since his death in 1921h There is no
record of private collections for either Sir Beauchamp Duff or Sir John
Nixon, according to Chris Cook, Sources in British Political History,
vol • 2 (Lonion, 1975). The papers of all the major figures mentioned
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